Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection
- July 2026
Aim of inspection
The purpose of this inspection was to obtain evidence that fire-related structures, systems and components that may affect nuclear safety are subject to adequate examination, inspection, maintenance and testing arrangements, and that these arrangements are being effectively implemented on site.
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC28 - Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing - Rating: Amber
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
During the inspection we sampled defect and maintenance records of fire-related systems claimed for nuclear safety, combustible laydown management arrangements, training materials and records and undertook a site walkdown. The inspection identified shortfalls against LC28, related to the absence of competence arrangements for personnel undertaking Technical Specification related fire patrols.
ONR also noted that the management of sampled defect in the fire barrier did not have a clear recorded rationale for categorisation and timeliness of rectification.
Conclusion
From the evidence sampled during this inspection, I found positive evidence that scheduled maintenance for the sampled nuclear fire safety systems had generally been completed within the required periodicity. I also found evidence that sampled contractor competence records for fire door maintenance were current, and that fire breaches, fire risk assessments and combustible laydown are subject to defined arrangements. However, I identified shortfalls in the implementation and traceability of arrangements supporting the continued integrity of fire protection barriers that may affect nuclear safety. These included:
- Inadequate defined and recorded competence arrangements for personnel undertaking Tech Spec fire patrol duties.
- Unresolved potential penetration in a claimed one-hour fire barrier, without clear recording of the rationale for categorising defects affecting fire barriers.
ONR judge that the shortfall associated with the defect does not immediately undermine nuclear safety, based on the evidence sampled. However, it undermined the implementation of LC28 because they affect the dutyholder’s ability to demonstrate that fire protection features remain capable of fulfilling their safety case functions, that defects are appropriately categorised and monitored.
ONR judged that the shortfall associated with surveillance activities not undertaken by suitably trained personnel represent a significant shortfall in the implementation of LC 28 (6).
In accordance with GD64, ONR judged an Amber rating to be appropriate because the inspection identified weaknesses in the delivery and implementation of arrangements supporting safety case requirements. I have raised a regulatory issue to track resolution.