Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection
- May 2026
Aim of inspection
The aim of this unannounced inspection was to observe staff using the Small Article Monitors (SAMs) prior to exiting the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). The inspection also provided an opportunity to gather behavioural and cultural intelligence of station staff. There are basic requirements that all individuals leaving the RCA are expected to undertake. Given that the station has been engaging significantly with its staff in areas of improving nuclear professionalism, improving behaviours and expectations, this inspection was an opportunity to observe workforce behaviours. This inspection falls under Regulation 9 of the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) that requires employers to restrict, as far as is reasonably practicable, the extent to which employees and other persons are exposed to ionising radiation. This requires the use of engineering controls, safety features, and systems of work to minimise the potential for contaminated items leaving the RCA.
Subject(s) of inspection
- IRR17 - Rating: Not rated
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
ONR undertook an unannounced reactive inspection to examine compliance with arrangements for monitoring personal items on exit from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). The inspection identified shortfalls in the consistent application of these arrangements. Although individuals observed were using the monitoring equipment provided, standards were not being applied with sufficient rigour in many cases. The dutyholder took immediate action to address the issue, including reinforcing expectations, increasing supervisory oversight and implementing corrective actions. In view of the prompt response taken, ONR has not raised a regulatory issue at this stage but will continue to monitor performance to determine whether improvement is sustained.
In addition to the above, the nominated site inspector undertook a structured programme of engagements and observations across Hartlepool Power Station covering several areas during their station visit. These were productive in intelligence gathering and in providing key interactions with key members of the senior leadership team, group heads and supervisors.
Conclusion
My observations indicated that behavioural and cultural factors had contributed to an erosion of station standards and expectations required by individuals leaving the Radiologically Controlled Area. Given that the station acted promptly to address the issue, and that the matter forms part of the station's Performance Improvement Plan Proficiency & Operations work, I have elected not to raise a regulatory issue at this stage. I will however continue to monitor this during my routine station visits to determine if there are notable improvements in behaviours. I have not rated this inspection given that the station is already in significantly enhanced attention and consider that at this present moment in time, any ratings will only distract the station from its performance improvement activities.
From my routine station engagements I noted improvements in behaviours at the senior leadership level with holding people to account, predominantly in my opinion, driven by the appointment of the new Plant Manager and the new Technical & Safety Support Manager who is continuing to develop in their role. I will continue my structured programme of engagement and observation across Hartlepool Power Station and monitor it's delivery of its Performance Improvement Plan.