Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
February 2026
Aim of inspection
This is a planned & announced Licence Condition Compliance Inspection on 24th and 25th February 2026. This inspection aims to target Corporate LC10 & LC12 compliance with an emphasis on new to nuclear Duly Authorised Persons (DAPs). This focus has been chosen due to Sellafield's recent (in past 2 years) recruitment of DAPs from outside the nuclear industry.
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC10 - Training - Rating: Green
- LC12 - Duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons - Rating: Green
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
This was a planned and announced Licence Condition Compliance Inspection on 24th and 25th February 2026, targeting Corporate LC10 & LC12 compliance. During routine engagements with the Corporate Training Function throughout 2024 and 2025, Sellafield described the external recruitment of Duly Authorised Persons (DAPs) from outside the nuclear industry, referred to as new to nuclear DAPs. Given this is a deviation from the traditional route of recruiting Team Leaders (including DAPs) from existing experienced operators, this intervention considered whether the arrangements are suitable and sufficient for ensuring competence of new to nuclear DAPs.
In particular, whether the arrangements adequately account for a potential lack of nuclear (and Sellafield) experience in new to nuclear recruits. During these routine engagements, ONR sought confidence that consideration had been given to the potentially different training and competence requirements of DAPs employed through this route; unfortunately sufficient evidence was not provided. Although this was a corporate inspection, the opportunity was taken to sample DAPs and Appointed Suitably Qualified and Experienced Persons (ASQEPs) within First Generation Magnox Storage Pond (FGMSP) given I was informed that this was a facility that had several external recruits.
Unfortunately Sellafield Corporate did not present a clear comprehensive view of the topics requested and had little evidence ready to present. Both the lack of key personnel and poor preparation increased ONR regulatory effort throughout the inspection and resulted in gaps being identified that then later emerged as not being gaps as the inspection progressed. This was included in inspection feedback and additionally fed back by senior leaders within ONR during higher level engagement with Sellafield.
No evidence of analysis underpinning DAP training could be provided by Sellafield. Whilst I think it unlikely that there was no analysis performed in the past, this does present a gap in the evidenced ‘analysis’ part of ADDIE and demonstrates that no review of the adequacy of the analysis was performed when they introduced an additional route of recruitment to DAP. Whilst this was a significant potential gap, Sellafield described work underway to produce analysis of training needs for DAPs. I note that whilst this work may close the gap for analysis of training needs for DAPs, I have raised a Level 4 Regulatory Issue to track progress and review the suitability of this analysis and any further actions Sellafield takes as a result of the analysis.
Sellafield considers the DAP panel as being the key to ensuring all individuals appointed to DAP roles are competent. From consideration of the DAP panel forms, I found the DAP panel to cover all of the expected areas providing a good breadth of skills and knowledge needed to be a DAP. Whilst I am content that the panel is robust, this does not account for any of the required training inputs and training/competence needed to get to the point of panel assessment. I have therefore found a gap in the analysis of training needs for externally recruited DAPs. However, from the individuals spoken to during the inspection, I have no concerns over their competence or appointment and do not believe there is a potential safety implications from this gap.
Sellafield has confirmed no current or future plans to recruit further DAPs with non-nuclear backgrounds. I have therefore provided regulatory advice and guidance in the form of a letter to Sellafield, advising that should their decision not to recruit further DAPs be reversed, there are gaps in the arrangements that should be addressed.
I have assigned an inspection rating of Green for both LC10 and LC12. However, this is predominantly due to significant efforts on the part of the facility in training and mentoring trainees rather than through a systematic approach by the Corporate Training or Ops Profession functions.
I note that Sellafield has already identified the need for, and started, training needs analysis for DAP competence. I intend to raise a Level 4 Regulatory Issue (#13028) to track this Training Needs Analysis (TNA) and any associated actions through to completion.
Conclusion
My inspection of LC10 and LC12 identified shortfalls in the arrangements for assuring the competence for DAPs recruited from external non-nuclear sources. However, I found no evidence of shortfalls in the SQEPness of the specific ASQEPs and DAPs sampled at FGMSP and am content that the facility had provided adequate support and training to those individuals. I also found a gap in the arrangements for reviewing the analysis underpinning the DAP training, however I note that Sellafield has already identified this gap and work to undertake analysis is already underway.
Crucially, Sellafield has confirmed that there are no current or future plans to recruit further DAPs with non-nuclear backgrounds. Therefore I have assigned an inspection rating of Green for both LC10 and LC12. However, it should be noted that this is predominantly due to significant work by the facility in training and mentoring trainees rather than due to a systematic approach by the Corporate Training or Ops Profession functions.