Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection
- April 2026
Aim of inspection
There have been a number of near misses and incidents where suitable and sufficient risk assessments have not been carried out for the tasks across the EDF Energy NGL Fleet including Heysham 1. It has also been identified that in some instances the setting to work process has failed to identify outstanding risks. This risk assessment and setting to work themed inspection at Heysham 1 was performed to allow ONR to sample activities taking place at the time of the inspection and assess whether the processes EDF Energy NGL have in place are being appropriately implemented at station.
Subject(s) of inspection
- Health & Safety at Work Act - Rating: Not rated
- Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations - Rating: Amber
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
This inspection targeted EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) work processes for assessing industrial safety risks during the planning of tasks. The inspection was held over two days on site. The scope consisted of observing a task carried out by the stations DART (Diagnosis and Rectification Team), and a task carried out by the maintenance team and office based discussions with personnel who have carried out the role of work specifier and APSA (Authorised Person Safety Assessment)
The work tasks that were sampled were identified as having a potential electrical safety risk. As such, during the station walk down, electrical work equipment was sampled, specifically electrical testing equipment. During this walkdown a non-standard electrical cable was identified, although not in use at the time of the inspection and was removed from use by agreement.
In carrying out task observations the inspection team were able to observe individuals being set to work, individuals carrying our pre-job briefs and also sample the use of the ‘Take 5’ point of work risk assessment process. The inspection identified that in some cases site health and safety hazards had not been appropriately identified during the planning of the work tasks.
Conclusion
Of the areas sampled, ONR identified gaps within the risk assessment processes that mean tasks can be carried out without a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risk posed by the work to be undertaken. The risk assessment process is owned by EDF fleetwide industrial safety branch. Industrial safety branch have been reviewing their risk assessment process. A level 3 regulatory issue (RI-13082) has been raised to track their progress with implementing their improvements and to identify how outstanding gaps can be closed. This has been accepted by EDF.
It was also identified that there are gaps within station's process for identifying safety defects. The industrial safety team are not privy to all work requests and as such it is possible, and was indeed sampled at station, that safety defects are not identified. A regulatory issue (RI-13081) has been raised to ensure that station have implemented a process to close this risk gap.
A shortfall was identified in relation to the work specification process and how risks are assessed in that it is reliant on work specifiers to identify all potential health and safety hazards. The sample of the motor cover cowling identified that the work specification team, who were trained in line to EDF’s corporate standards were unable to identify a hazard that constituted a breach of the provision and use of work equipment regulations (PUWER). Station are subsequently taking action to involve their industrial safety engineers within the work request process. However, ONR are to look more widely at the work specification process. This will involve sampling it at other stations to identify if this is a common gap and targeting any associated action towards the central fleet industrial safety branch.
Based on the sample taken gaps were identified in that risks were not suitably and sufficiently assessed. There was universal agreement that the overarching process for risk assessments and the overarching process for work specifiers and the requirements for that role were owned by EDF fleetwide industrial safety branch and they will be responsible for filling the gaps.
This inspection was rated as AMBER (Seek Improvement).