Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
January 2026
Aim of inspection
System based inspections (SBIs) are an essential element of ONR’s overall intervention on a nuclear site, and consist of a series of inspections which are intended to establish that the basic elements of a site/facility safety case (as implemented in Safety Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs)) are fit for purpose, and that they will fulfil their safety functional requirements.
The aim of this SBI was to determine whether the SSCs associated with Auxiliary Cooling & Sea-water systems adequately fulfil their safety duties (safety functional requirements), in line with claims made within the safety case; and to consider the adequacy of implementation of the licensee’s arrangements.
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC10 - Training - Rating: Not Rated
- LC23 - Operating rules - Rating: Not Rated
- LC24 - Operating instructions - Rating: Not Rated
- LC27 - Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits - Rating: Not Rated
- LC28 - Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing - Rating: Not Rated
- LC34 - Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste - Rating: Not Rated
- Overall Inspection Rating - Rating: Not Rated
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
This inspection on Hartlepool was carried out by ONR Mechanical, Civil, and, Control & Instrumentation Specialist inspectors and Nominated Site Inspector to consider the adequacy of implementation and compliance with the licencee's arrangements for the delivery of safety functional requirements of the Sea Water System (Main Cooling Water system) and Auxiliary cooling System (Emergency Cooling Water System).
During the system based inspection, ONR specialist inspectors sampled the following to inform their judgement:
- Discussions with system owners, system engineers and representatives of the training team, a sample of training records and role profiles for Licence Condition 10;
- Enactment of the Main Cooling Water and Emergency Cooling Water system operating rules and instructions through a sample of technical specifications, surveillance requirements and station operating instructions for Licence Conditions 23 and 24
- management and testing of safety devices and mechanisms, such as the Turbine Hall Flood Prevention System level alarms for Licence Condition 27;
- A plant walkdown, in conjunction with a sample of completed examination, maintenance, inspection and test records, work order cards and work instructions for compliance with Licence Condition 28.
Conclusion
Overall, from the sampled evidence, I did not identify any major shortfalls against the sampled licence conditions that would have an adverse impact on nuclear safety. I consider Hartlepool to have been open and honest in their discussions and provided regulatory advice for minor risk gaps and raised a Level 4 regulatory issue to address a minor shortfall in the arrangements for oversight or ownership of system boundaries and interfaces.
Since this inspection concluded, Hartlepool Power Station has been placed under Significantly Enhanced Regulatory Attention. Therefore, as I have not identified any major shortfalls in nuclear safety, I consider it proportional to not rate this inspection to enable Hartlepool to prioritise work needed to return to normal regulatory attention levels. The regulatory intelligence obtained during this inspection will be input into future regulatory interactions.