Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
May 2026
Aim of inspection
The aim of this inspection is to conduct a readiness review in support of the permissioning of the constrained activity for the introduction of the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to the HR2 building as outlined in PR-02329.
Subject(s) of inspection
- CDM 15 (Client / PD / PC duties) - Rating: Green
- LC19 - Construction or installation of new plant - Rating: Green
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
This was a planned permissioning inspection delivering intervention H26-20, Hinkley Point C (HPC) introduction of the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to the HR2 building. The Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) in a nuclear power plant serves as the primary, high-strength steel container holding the reactor core, nuclear fuel and coolant. It maintains structural integrity to house nuclear fission reactions under high pressure and temperature, while acting as a vital safety barrier against radioactive material release.
The RPV is identified by NNB GenCo (HPC) Ltd (NNB) as a high integrity component (HIC) of the primary circuit, whose failure is not addressed within the design basis and for which the consequences of failure cannot be shown to be tolerable. For these components, the structural integrity safety case relies on a multi-legged approach, with a number of beyond design code requirements on materials and manufacturing, inspection and analysis.
The RPV was designed and manufactured by Framatome in France and transported to a Framatome controlled storage facility at HPC. Framatome are the contractor controlling the RPV lift into the HR2 building and are support by Sarens (Bylor) and Mammoet.
The aim of this inspection was to conduct a readiness review in support of the permissioning of the constrained activity for the introduction of the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to the HR2 building as outlined in PR-02329.
Overall, the evidence sampled provided confidence that adequate arrangements and controls are in place. I provided advice for consideration by NNB relating to the implementation of four sensitive tasks within the lift plan, this advice was acted on and improvements were implemented during the inspection.
Conclusion
ONR has now gathered sufficient information from inspection IR-52654 to enable the permissioning of the constrained activity for the introduction of the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to the HR2 building as outlined in PR-02329.
This inspection has been rated Green. Permissioning is not subject to the completion of NNB GenCo’s planned preparation works as there is sufficient confidence in the dutyholder’s HGold Point governance process that will include representation from the internal regulator.