Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
February 2026
Aim of inspection
The aim of this compliance inspection was to assess the adequacy of the dutyholders arrangements with respect to control of ignition sources associated with EC&I equipment where hazardous areas have been identified by the DSEAR risk assessments, or the control of major hazards (COMAH) risk assessments, or where fire / explosion hazards could impact upon nuclear safety.
Two inspections will be carried out:
- (this inspection) - An inspection of the corporate EDF arrangements for managing ignition risks including corporate governance carried out at EDF Gloucester Business Park Offices
- (future inspection) - A inspection of the implementation of the corporate arrangements at a power station. The selection of station sample will be based upon the first inspection outcomes and other regulatory intelligence.
Subject(s) of inspection
- COMAH - Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015 - Rating: GREEN
- Health & Safety at Work Act - Rating: GREEN
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
I undertook an inspection to assess compliance of the dutyholders corporate arrangements with respect to control of electrical, control and instrumentation (EC&I) ignition risks associated with potentially explosive atmospheres. The key findings are:
Corporate requirements to complete DSEAR risk assessments were in place to identify where EC&I ignition prevention controls would be necessary to control explosive atmosphere risks and to allow their selection. There were some ongoing improvements to align the findings of these risk assessments with other risk assessments.
Relevant roles and responsibilities were defined and personnel appointed to the roles. Competence requirements were defined so that they could be managed by wider site arrangements. There were some ongoing improvements to better align the roles and competence requirements to the responsibilities.
Corporate requirements were in place to select and design EC&I equipment within the potentially explosive atmospheres to appropriate standards. There were some ongoing improvements to increase the level of guidance provided to stations on how to comply with the standards. There were minor shortfalls found in the assessment of the adequacy of legacy equipment, which will be followed up by a regulatory issue.
Corporate requirements were in place for examination, inspection, maintenance and test (EIMT) of EC&I equipment within the potentially explosive atmospheres to appropriate standards. There were some ongoing improvements to increase the level of guidance provided to stations on how to comply with the standards. There were minor shortfalls found with the EIMT strategy, which will be followed up by a regulatory issue.
Conclusion
From the evidence sampled during this inspection, I judge that EDF had corporate arrangements in place to require identification DSEAR hazardous areas that were adequate to allow selection of EC&I ignition prevention controls. I also judge EDF had corporate arrangements in place to require selection, design and examination, inspection, maintenance and test of this EC&I equipment to appropriate standards.
I found minor shortfalls in the management system procedures that EDF already had plans in place to improve and provided regulatory advice on these findings.
I found minor shortfalls associated with arrangements to assess the adequacy of legacy EC&I equipment, and with respect to defining a risk-based EIMT strategy that took into account the specific ignition prevention requirements, wider risks, previous EIMT findings or wider operational experience for all equipment. I will follow up these minor shortfalls with a level 4 regulatory issue.
Based upon the evidence sampled, I judge that a GREEN rating (no formal action) is appropriate for the inspection.