Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
January 2026
Aim of inspection
Targeted Supply Chain/Vendor Inspection of Severfield Nuclear Infrastructure (SNI) manufacturing facilities.
Subject(s) of inspection
- Health & Safety at Work Act, Section 6 (General duties of manufacturers) - Rating: Green
- LC6 - Documents, records, authorities and certificates - Rating: Green
- LC17 - Management systems - Rating: Green
- LC19 - Construction or installation of new plant - Rating: Green
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
The purpose of this inspection was to seek assurance that Sellafield Ltd. has implemented adequate supply chain and quality management arrangements for the supply of Programme and Project Partners (PPP) steelwork products to inform a regulatory judgement regarding the licensee’s compliance with relevant statutory provisions and good practice.
This targeted inspection was to gain confidence that the Sellafield Ltd. identified improvements are effective and have been sustained in response to identified quality related shortfalls at Severfield Nuclear and Infrastructure (SN&I) UK manufacturing facilities, follow up on related findings from the ONR Quality and Supply Chain themed inspection in November 2024 (IR-53445), and consider the implications of recent weld quality shortfalls in items provided by Severfield to other UK critical infrastructure. This included sampling the arrangements and supporting evidence to support improvement action closure.
The inspection was undertaken on 28 January 2026 at the SN&I manufacturing facilities based in Lostock, by a team comprising of ONR Retrievals East River and Sellafield Site Ion Exchange Effluent Plant (SIXEP)/SIXEP Continuity Plant (SCP) Site Inspector, Structural Integrity Inspector, and Quality and Supply Chain Inspector.
Based on the discussions held and evidence sampled during the inspection, examples of good practice were identified which included a collaborative approach to address the required improvements, provision of lifetime records, segregated workshop for Nuclear related products, component traceability, production control arrangements, and communication of expectations in relation to Nuclear Safety and Counterfeit Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSI) risk mitigation.
ONR Structural Integrity also gained confidence in the adequacy of the response and Root cause analysis presented by SN&I following the HS2 bridges weld defect issues.
Regulatory advice was provided relating to identified areas for improvement, and ONR raised a number of observations for Sellafield Ltd. consideration which will be followed up via routine engagements where appropriate.
During the inspection ONR used the following guidance and Relevant Good Practice including (but not limited to):
- NS-INSP-GD-006 – LC6 – Documents, Records, Authorities and Certificates
- NS-INSP-GD-017 – LC17 – Management Systems
- NS-INSP-GD-019 – LC19 – Construction or Installation of New Plant
- NS-TAST-GD-033 - Duty Holder Management of Records
- NS-TAST-GD-077 - Supply chain management arrangements for the procurement of nuclear safety related items or services
- Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities’, Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-3.1
- The Management System for Nuclear Installations’, Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-3.5
Conclusion
Overall, based on the areas sampled, I have concluded that an inspection rating of Green, no formal action, is appropriate. I considered that relevant good practice was generally met with minor shortfalls identified, when compared to appropriate benchmarks. I am satisfied that Sellafield Ltd. has implemented adequate improvements in response to previously identified shortfalls.
I outlined ONR's intent to provide regulatory advice to capture the identified shortfalls
Sellafield Ltd. concurred with my findings and the overall RAG rating of this inspection, and considered the feedback provided was balanced.