Information on advance notifications of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made in 2025 are shown in the table below. The withdrawals involved material used as radiological shielding, or small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers, or for research and development.
| Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 | Reason for withdrawal |
|---|---|
| One notification involving uranium (U), total 5g | This material was withdrawn for use in analysis (e.g. as samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration)2 |
| Two notification involving plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U), total <1mg including one involving thorium (Th) of <1mg | This material was withdrawn for use in analysis (e.g. as samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration)2 |
| No withdrawals of enriched uranium. | No withdrawals of enriched uranium. |
| Twenty Six notifications involving depleted uranium (DU), total 408kg including one notification involving thorium (Th), total <1mg | The withdrawals of depleted uranium were materials incorporated in shielding containers3 |
Notes
- The tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by ONR Safeguards and which resulted in the withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.
- There are no facilities outside safeguards that have material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.
- The advance notifications of withdrawal for depleted uranium shielded containers were for temporary withdrawals, the containers being used during the replacement of spent radioactive sources at UK defence establishments.