Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
February 2026
Aim of inspection
The aim of this inspection was to determine whether suitable arrangements are in place to carry out Control and Instrumentation (C&I) related statutory outage activities that are necessary to support nuclear safety, and demonstrate that the C&I equipment and systems are fit to return to service and operate for the specified period. The inspection involved a review of a sample of Torness (TOR) Reactor 2 (R2) 2026 statutory outage (S13R2) activities carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety and considered compliance of the associated arrangements in relation to Licence Condition (LC) 28 – examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIMT) and Licence Condition (LC) 22 - modification or experiment on existing plant.
The findings of this inspection contribute to ONR’s regulatory decision to grant Consent to the return of R2 to normal operating service in accordance with LC 30 – periodic shutdown.
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC22 - Modification or experiment on existing plant - Rating: Green
- LC28 - Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing - Rating: Green
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
During the inspection we sampled statutory outage control and instrumentation (C&I) related examination, inspection, maintenance, and testing (EIMT) activities important to nuclear safety, based on the schedule of activities contained within the Torness (TOR) maintenance schedule, known at Torness as the maintenance, inspection and testing schedule (MITS).
We found the EIMT activities sampled had either been satisfactorily completed or were on schedule to be completed. It should be noted that in relation to the latter we were confident, based on the information provided, that the outstanding EIMT activities would be completed satisfactorily.
We also sampled some engineering changes (EC) that were being implemented during the statutory outage and had no concerns that their implementation would be a risk to the safe return to service of reactor 2 (R2)
We held discussions with several system group heads (GHs) and system engineers (SEs) and found that they had a good understanding of the systems and equipment for which they were responsible and appreciated the importance to nuclear safety of the statutory outage EIMT work being undertaken.
We also found that, in general, appropriate focus had been given to ageing and obsolescence equipment management to ensure that the equipment reliability could be sustained for the next period.
We did identify a small number of maintenance documentation and record keeping shortfalls, and raised them with the relevant SEs, who agreed to address them. However, we considered them to be minor in nature and that they did not pose an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety. It should be noted that none of these issues would preclude R2 returning to service.
We conducted a plant walkdown during the inspection and found the operating conditions and lighting levels afforded a good working environment for maintainers. We did not identify any significant signs of age-related degradation with respect to the items of C&I equipment we examined. We also found the general standard of housekeeping to be adequate.
Conclusion
Based on our sampled inspection of the C&I aspects of the TOR R2 2026 statutory outage, we have assigned an intervention rating of Green to LC 28 ‘Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing’ and LC 22 ‘Modification or experiment on existing plant’.
We did not identify any significant issues in relation to the C&I equipment during this inspection that could prevent ONR from issuing a consent to allow TOR R2 to return to service.
Therefore, we recommend that support be given for a consent to allow R2 to return to normal operating service.