Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
- December 2025
Aim of inspection
The aim of this intervention was to provide evidence to support regulatory confidence in the dutyholder’s ability to detect the entrainment of Seal Ring Groove Wall (SRGW) related graphite debris before the Anti Gapping Unit (AGU) brush enters the Layer 11 restriction by examining the arrangements in place to review the fuel grab load trace and subsequent decision making.
Intervention Objectives:
- To provide regulatory confidence in the implementation of the Layer 10 hoist stop arrangements at Torness (by observing fuel movement activities if possible).
- To provide confidence in the process of reviewing the fuel grab load trace (FGLT) to provide snag forewarning during refuelling.
- To provide confidence in the arrangements for seeking specialist advice in the event an anomaly within the FGLT is detected, including following up on the outcome of advice provided following the inspection of “Implementation of risk reduction measures and potential recovery options for fuel snags due to SRGW debris” (IR-53400) – EDF reference number AR 01400017 - Action:
- to review the training needs for the FHAP; and
- to consider clarifying the FHAP guidance TSP/PLANT/067 by defining the formal decision making process needed for "Overload limit 3” (ultimate pull)
- To provide confidence in EDF’s ability to determine the location of debris entrainment in the event of a snag.
- To provide confidence that EDF are learning from operational experience generated during previous refueling campaigns across HYB/TOR power stations.
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC28 - Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing - Rating: Green
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
The purpose of this inspection was to seek evidence to support regulatory confidence in the dutyholder’s ability to detect the entrainment of Seal Ring Groove Wall (SRGW) related graphite debris by examining the implementation of the arrangements in place to review the fuel grab load trace and subsequent decision making, specifically in relation to LC28 (EIMT).
During the inspection we sampled completed procedures and fuel grab load traces for recent fuel handling activities, training materials and records and maintenance records.
This inspection highlighted no significant issues relating to the implementation of the Layer 10 hoist stop. One observation was made during the inspection relating to human factors assessment and this will be followed up by a human factors specialist. Overall, on the basis of the inspection and evidence sampled, I judge that the inspection rating against LC28 is GREEN.
Conclusion
From the evidence sampled during this inspection, I am satisfied that the Layer 10 hoist stop and subsequent review of the FGLT has been appropriately implemented at Torness and that the relevant arrangements, including relevant training for the operators, are in place.
There was one observation during the inspection, relating to the assessment of human factors. However, in my judgement, this finding was not significant enough to undermine the implementation of the Layer 10 hoist stop and fuel grab load trace review and will be followed up via normal business by a human factors specialist.
Based on my sample, I judge that the ONR inspection rating for this LC28 inspection is GREEN.