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Torness - Inspection ID: 53791

Executive summary

Date(s) of inspection

  • July 2025

Aim of inspection

This is a System Based Inspection (SBI) of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd.’s (EDF-NGL’s) Torness power station fuel route system, with a focus on fuel assemblies and plug unit maintenance, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Operating Facilities Division (OFD) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The aim of the SBI is to establish whether the Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs) associated with fuel route system activities at Torness power station are able to adequately fulfil their safety functional requirements, in line with claims made within the safety case.

Subject(s) of inspection

  • LC10 - Training - Rating: GREEN
  • LC23 - Operating rules - Rating: GREEN
  • LC24 - Operating instructions - Rating: GREEN
  • LC27 - Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits - Rating: GREEN
  • LC28 - Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing - Rating: GREEN
  • LC34 - Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste - Rating: GREEN
  • Overall Inspection Rating - Rating: GREEN

Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made

The key findings of the systems based inspection (SBI) on the structures, systems and components (SSCs) for EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd.’s (EDF-NGLs) Torness power station fuel route system, with a focus on fuel assemblies and plug unit maintenance, are:

LC 10 - Training: I examined how operators and engineers were demonstrated to be suitably qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP), and adequately trained, to undertake fuel route examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIMT) activities and considered that the associated arrangements were being adequately implemented. I sampled the training records of a refuelling engineer, fuel route operating technician and non-destructive testing (NDT) operator who had roles important to the operation and maintenance of fuel route system SSCs and found that the training arrangements were being adhered to.

LC 23 - Operating Rules: I sampled several fuel route system operating rules (Tech Specs), associated commentaries, and discussed their application with operators and engineers. As a result, I considered the operating rules were implemented in accordance with the arrangements and that records showed compliance with the limits and conditions from the safety case and were straightforward to follow.

LC 24 - Operating Instructions: I examined the main station operating instruction (SOIs) and quality plans (QPs) associated with new fuel build in the fuel route system and discussed their application with operators and engineers. As a result, I judged that the arrangements for operating instructions were being adequately implemented. They were logical and clear for operators and maintainers of the SSCs to follow to ensure compliance with the limits and conditions set out in the operating rules.

LC 27 – Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits (SMDCs)I reviewed several engineering, operating, and maintenance documents, undertook a plant walkdown and spoke to system engineers and operators. I judged that the fuel route system SSCs were properly connected and in working order.

LC 28 – Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIMT): I sampled several fuel route system SSCs plant item maintenance instructions (PIMIs) and the associated work order cards (WOCs) and check sheets. I judged that the associated tasks had been adequately defined and that the records indicated that they have been carried out as specified. I judged that the fuel route system SSCs were being adequately examined, inspected, maintained, and tested.

LC 34 – Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste: I sampled the implementation of the arrangements for the fuel route system to ensure that the SSCs would identify leaking radioactive materials, liquids, sludges or gases and that the containment provided by the SSCs is adequate. I considered that these arrangements have been appropriately defined and were understood by the relevant SQEP staff. I judged that the sampled evidence indicates that the safety functions of the fuel route system SSCs meet the safety case requirements in regard to leakage and escape.

Conclusion

From the evidence sampled during the SBI against LCs 10, 23, 24, 27, 28 and 34 I judged that the fuel assemblies structures, systems and components are able to fulfil their safety duties (safety functional requirements) in line with the safety case. I therefore judged the ONR inspection rating for this inspection to be GREEN (No formal action).

There were no intervention findings that could significantly undermine nuclear safety at TOR and, at present, I consider that no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the interventions currently planned at TOR, which will continue as planned.

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