Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection
- November 2025
Aim of inspection
The purpose of this vendor inspection (VI) is to sample the adequacy of MIRION Technologies Limited's arrangements, established in its management system, for the supply of nuclear safety related items or services to the GB nuclear industry.
The Energy Act (2013) establishes ONR as the Enforcing Authority for section 6 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HSWA74). One of the methods ONR utilises to exercise it Enforcing Authority responsibility is to conduct inspections of companies in the GB nuclear supply chain. These inspections are known as vendor inspections (VIs), and ONR coordinates these via the annual VI programme.
Subject(s) of inspection
- Health & Safety at Work Act, Section 6 (General duties of manufacturers) - Rating: Not rated
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
ONR carried out a Vendor Inspection (VI) of Mirion Technology (Canberra) Limited (MTCL) on the 12th & 13th November 2025.
The purpose of the VI was to sample the adequacy of MTCL’s arrangements, established in its management system, for the supply of nuclear safety related items or services to the GB nuclear industry. It therefore focussed on its:
- Quality management system
- Mitigation arrangements for Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSI),
- Technical capability, capacity and culture
- Supply chain oversight and assurance
The inspection compromised discussion with staff, reviews of records including project data and a review of facility activity supporting the delivery of products.
The inspection found areas of good practice and shortfalls that MTCL will be required to address.
Conclusion
The inspection identified areas of good practice associated with controls to mitigate the risk associated with counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items. However, at the time of my intervention, and from the information I have sampled, I consider that MTCL has shortfalls with its quality management arrangements and organisational culture, associated with the toleration of degraded conditions, that if not promptly addressed represent a risk to the delivery of its products to the GB nuclear industry.
I consider the shortfalls to be against relevant good practice defined in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s General Safety Requirement, Part 2 - ‘Leadership & Management for Safety’ (GSR-2), specifically, requirement 10 ‘Management of processes and activities’ and 12 ‘Fostering a culture for safety’.
When considered in aggregation, in accordance with ONR guidance on the application of inspection ratings, an AMBER rating is appropriate for this inspection. One level three Regulatory Issue will be raised to address the shortfalls.