Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
March 2024
Aim of inspection
To assess:
- The effectiveness of AWE’s strategy for the management of maintenance of safety significant Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) in response to the reduced capacity and capability of SQEP maintenance resource, and
- The implementation of that strategy across the key operational areas across both sites to demonstrate compliance against the requirements of LC28 and the regulatory expectations defined within ONR’s NS-INSP-GD-028 (Version 8.1).
We will also take the opportunity to look at the AWE response to Common Challenge 1 from the CNI themed inspection on Ageing Management.
This will be within site infrastructure.
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC28 - Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing - Rating: Green
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
This inspection at Atomic Weapon's Establishment (AWE) Infrastructure was undertaken as part of a programme of planned inspections across a number of AWE facilities for 2023/24. The scope of the intervention was aligned to the ONR/ AWE Strategy and was to judge the adequacy of AWE’s implementation of its arrangements made under Licence Condition (LC) 28 with a focus on the management of maintenance backlogs.
I, a Mechanical Engineering Specialist Inspector for the ONR Weapon's programme, undertook a Licence Condition 28 (Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing (EIMT)) inspection at Infrastructure on the AWE Aldermaston site, I was supported by the ONR Infrastructure portfolio Inspector; and an ONR Electrical Engineering Specialist Inspector. The inspection focussed on seeking assurance that AWE is:
- managing any maintenance backlog;
- assigning adequate SQEP resource to EIMT activities;
- able to justify the deferral of any maintenance;
- managing stores effectively and ensuring that SSC labelling is fit for purpose;
- managing ageing assets; and
- uundertaking appropriate risk assessments for non-nuclear activities.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
I reviewed the management arrangements for LC28 and was able to establish the “golden thread” in the management system for this Licence Condition.
I sampled the evidence for maintenance backlogs; staff capacity and capability for undertaking EIMT; the deferral process for not undertaking maintenance; and SSC labelling. It is my opinion that the procedures and controls evidenced by AWE demonstrated that Relevant Good Practice had been observed and that whilst there were minor shortfalls in EIMT capacity and capability,
AWE was following its own procedures and that the requirements of LC28 had been satisfied. AWE presented a clear auditable trail for all of the areas sampled and demonstrated good control of documents, records and certifications. In addition to LC28 items, the opportunity was taken to review progress against the CNI findings on Ageing management as well as the learning from a recent INF1 regarding non-nuclear risk assessments. I judged that both these areas demonstrated adequate progress.
Conclusion
The inspection sought to sample certain areas associated with LC28. These were: EIMT backlog; staff capacity and capability; the process of deferring EIMT; storage facilities and SSC labelling. In addition, the opportunity was taken to check progress against the CNI findings on Ageing management as well as a review of a recent INF1 (3531) with a focus on non-nuclear risk assessment learning. These will be considered individually based on the evidence presented:
EIMT backlog. Evidence was presented that showed up-to-date backlog information. Whilst there was a backlog, which comprised mostly of breakdowns, it was not a significant percentage of the total AWE backlog. Neither was it a significant percentage of the assets requiring EIMT within the facility. AWE was able to show that the backlog was well understood and being managed appropriately. I was satisfied that the EIMT backlog within Infrastructure was not a concern.
Staff capacity and capability. I noted that potential improvements in EIMT capability (as a result of 'Project Glasgow'), specifically, the introduction of a Principal Maintenance & Reliability Engineer had not yet been fully realised as the role had only just been filled. IR-52730 had identified that EIMT capacity was a known corporate issue and Regulatory Issue 11175 exists to cover wider 'capacity and capability' across the whole site. Noting the low EIMT backlog and mature strategy to embed the M&RE role, on balance, I was satisfied with Infrastructure EIMT capacity and capability.
EIMT deferral. Infrastructure followed corporate arrangements to defer maintenance by use of the ACR process.The process was sampled for 1 item and found to be adequate. I also sampled the management loading of ACRs and was content that managers were not over-loaded. I was therefore satisfied that the EIMT deferral process was adequate within Infrastructure.
Storage facilities. There were no stores to inspect. Utilities relied on equipment redundancy and readily available COTS equipment, although this policy was under review. I was therefore satisfied with the stores/spares situation at Utilities.
SSC labelling. Labelling under the use of the AMS was checked during the walkdown and, with minor exceptions, was found to be adequate. I was therefore satisfied with Infrastructure labelling.
Ageing Mgt. Infrastructure presented metrics on how it is addressing the CNI challenge to Ageing management. I was satisfied that Infrastructure was making adequate progress.
Non-Nuclear Risk Assessments. I was satisfied that appropriate learning had been noted from INF1 3531 regarding non-nuclear risk assessments.
I judge that overall there were no significant concerns with EIMT backlog; the use of the EIMT deferral process; and the labelling of SSCs. I also judge that whilst there was a minor shortfall in EIMT capacity and capability, this was not currently causing significant delays in EIMT. I therefore rate this inspection as Green.