Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
August 2025
Aim of inspection
We conducted preliminary enquiries with Direct Rail Services Limited (DRS) on 28 January 2025 (see IR-53765) following notification to ONR from DRS that EnerMech Limited were not compliant with IRR17 (see INF-4597). We identified that EnerMech Limited were a subcontractor to DRS for the loading/unloading of Class 7 dangerous goods at DRS railheads. We concluded that from contract award in 2021 to November 2024, EnerMech Limited operated in contravention of a number of regulations of IRR17 and the requirements of ADR/RID, i.e. in contravention of CDG09 Regulation 5.
We also identified that DRS:
- had been aware of their sub-contractors non-compliances since at least October 2024 but did not notify ONR until November 2024;
- did not take conservative action when these non-compliances were identified;
- did not notify ONR of the full extent of their sub-contractor's non-compliance with IRR17 and ADR/RID;
- procured nuclear services without engaging appropriate subject matter experts and ensuring the full legal compliance of their subcontractor; and
- did not identify their subcontractor's non-compliances by audit/surveillance and supply chain management.
We concluded that the DRS management system was not adequate to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of ADR/RID relating to the carriage of Class 7 dangerous goods, as required by ADR/RID 1.7.3.
Following our enquiries, I:
- served, in accordance with the Enforcement Management Model and Enforcement Policy Statement, an improvement notice (ONR-IN-24-13) to Direct Rail Services Limited; and
- raised a Level 2 regulatory issue (RI-12430) to track and monitor the dutyholder's progress towards compliance.
This inspection aims to ensure that the dutyholder has undertaken the necessary actions to ensure compliance with the relevant legislation by 31 August 2025, as stipulated in the improvement notice and the accompanying letter (ONR-TD-TRA-24-072). This will allow the improvement notice and the regulatory issue to be formally closed.
Subject(s) of inspection
- Transport - Carrier Duties - Rating: GREEN
- Transport - Incidents, Events and Reporting processes - Rating: GREEN
- Transport - Management Systems - Rating: GREEN
- Transport - Training and Competence - Rating: GREEN
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
Direct Rail Services Limited (DRS) - trading as Nuclear Transport Solutions (NTS) - undertake rail carriage and / or provide transport solutions to various nuclear sector dutyholders including EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (EDF), Nuclear Waste Services, Nuclear Restoration Services, Sellafield Limited and the Ministry of Defence.
On 15/11/2024, DRS reported an incident (INF-4597) to ONR that EnerMech Limited (a subcontracted loader/unloader at DRS railheads) did not have an appointed radiation protection adviser (RPA) and radiation risk assessment (RRA) as required by IRR17.
During preliminary enquiries in January 2025 (IR-53765), we found that DRS did not have an adequate management system to ensure that, when using the services of another organisation, transport activities are undertaken in accordance with all legal requirements for Class 7 dangerous goods. Consequently, Direct Rail Services Limited permitted Class 7 dangerous goods to be transported non-compliant with applicable requirements of ADR and RID. Several other legal non-compliances with CDG09, ADR, RID and IRR17 were identified during the enquiries and are recorded in IR-53765.
An improvement notice (ONR-IN-24-13) was served on DRS that required remedy of the contraventions by 31 August 2025. A Level 2 regulatory issue (RI-12430) was raised to monitor progress against the DRS improvement plan.
This inspection was undertaken to ascertain whether DRS had made improvements to their management system in accordance with the improvement notice and their improvement plan. We inspected several documents that had been revised or created since the incident. We found that DRS have made significant improvements to their written arrangements relating to the improvement notice (specifically: procuring nuclear services and subcontract management; incident notification; and, training) and judged that the improvement notice can be closed. We identified opportunities for improvements to some of their written arrangements that have been captured in a Level 4 regulatory issue (RI-12727) to monitor future DRS improvements.
Conclusion
DRS have made significant improvements to their management system in accordance with our improvement notice and regulatory issue RI-12430. Safety and dangerous goods policy documents have been created. A transport manual exists and identifies safety critical roles (although the manual is dedicated to ensuring compliance with GERT8000-TW4). A legal register identifying the key regulatory requirements has been developed and integrated into the management system. Procurement documentation has been revised to reflect good practice and implements a gated process with SME input. Management of change documentation has been revised with governance at the NTS director level. At an operational level, DRS provided examples of relevant good practice and how they achieve compliance with four areas of the regulations that we sampled to test the management system. DRS have undertaken a compliance gap analysis – this identifies the relevant regulatory requirements of CDG09, ADR, RID, IRR17 and to some extent, demonstrates how DRS discharge duties through their management system. It has recognised gaps and influenced change to internal documents such as P 0400 DRS TW4. This document could form the basis of a transport compliance matrix, alongside the new legal register.
The improvements made provide confidence that, when using the services of another organisation, transport activities are undertaken in accordance with all legal requirements for Class 7 dangerous goods. My judgment is that the improvement notice (ONR-IN-24-13) and associated Level 2 regulatory issue (RI-12430) should be closed.