Hartlepool - Inspection ID: 54036

Licence Condition 28 (LC28) requires the licensee to make and implement adequate arrangements for the regular and systematic examination, inspection, maintenance and testing of all plant which may affect safety. For any plant or process that is shut down for the purpose of enabling these activities, LC30 requires ONR to provide consent before said plant or process is started up again.

The aims of this inspection are:

1. To provide regulatory confidence in the implementation of the Hartlepool Reactor 1 Outage Intentions Document in relation to structural integrity.

2. To provide evidence to inform the ONR decision relating to the issue of a Licence Instrument for a Consent for return to service of Unit 1 at Hartlepool Power Station.

The inspection was planned to be carried on out the 3-5 June, however due to an unplanned trip of Reactor 2 on the 3^rd June, the inspection was postponed. The inspection was rescheduled for the 24-25th June, a total of 2.5 days were spent at Hartlepool power station.

During the inspection, I sampled the licensee’s arrangements to meet LC 28 expectations from a structural integrity perspective. From my sample, I judge that the station was compliant with their LC 28 arrangements. EDF observed a pipe clash of the MSR pipeline during the station hot hanger survey, an investigation of the consequences of this clash is currently ongoing and requires resolution prior to return to service, the response and associated justification will be considered as part of the structural integrity assessment report.

I noted some areas for improvement which I have explained to the Licensee, and I will assess any follow up actions in the structural integrity assessment report (AR-01716).

During the inspection I noted shortfalls in conventional health and safety arrangements which were corrected immediately, I have informed the site inspector of these observations.

On the whole from my sample of structural integrity activities I judged the site demonstrated compliance with structural integrity LC28 expectations. However, I identified a shortfall related to the observation of a pipe clash between the MSR and Decay Heat lines. I had not received enough evidence during my inspection on the proposed resolution strategy or sufficient confidence that the risks were being reduced ALARP. Due to consequences of failure of the MSR line I have therefore rated the inspection AMBER.