- Site: Hartlepool
- IR number: 21-092
- Date: October 2021
- LC numbers: 30
Executive summary
Purpose of Intervention
This was a planned inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s (NGL) Hartlepool power station, undertaken as part of the intervention strategy for the Operating Facilities Division (OFD) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
The intervention was conducted in support of ONR’s decision to give Consent to restart Hartlepool Reactor 1 following its 2021 periodic shutdown.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
The inspection was conducted by the ONR outage project inspector for the Hartlepool Reactor 1 periodic shutdown. The inspection consisted of a planned on-site inspection against:
- License condition (LC) 30 – periodic shutdown
The purpose of LC 30 is to ensure that for the purpose of enabling any examination, inspection, maintenance or testing of any plant or process to take place, that any such plant or process is shut down in accordance with the requirements of its plant maintenance schedule referred to in LC 28.
During the engagement the outage project inspector also participated in the early outage safety review (EOSR) and met with the pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel (PCPV) Appointed Examiner (APEX).
The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Not applicable (this was not a system-based inspection).
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
I sampled evidence demonstrating compliance with the stations LC30 arrangements for outage management and the mitigation of operational risk.
I considered the overall management of the outage through the Outage Control Centre (OCC) to be effective and found the OCC to be running efficiently and dealing effectively with the emergent outage issues.
I sampled the routine daily outage meetings and observed open discussions on the various outage activities and suitable challenge raised where required. There was evidence of appropriate focus on emergent safety challenges and contingency planning.
I observed the delivery of effective pre-job briefs and a range of outage related tasks being performed. There was evidence of effective control and supervision of both NGL staff and contract personnel undertaking invasive plant activites.
I judged that NGL adequately demonstrated compliance with the requirements of LC 30 and therefore rated this inspection as Green, no formal regulatory action.
Conclusion of Intervention
There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above the planned interventions at Hartlepool Power Station as set out in the Integrated Intervention Strategy, which will continue as planned for the reactor 1 periodic shutdown.