Information on advance notifications of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made in 2019 are shown in the table below. The withdrawals involved material used as radiological shielding or small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers or for research and development.
Summary of notifications of withdrawals from safeguards (1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019)
| Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 | Reason for withdrawal |
|---|---|
| One notification involving plutonium (Pu) only and three other notifications involving plutonium and natural uranium total mg quantities | This material was withdrawn for use in analysis (e.g. as samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration)2 |
| There were no withdrawals of high enriched uranium (HEU) Not applicable | There were no withdrawals of high enriched uranium (HEU) Not applicable |
| Twenty eight notifications involving depleted uranium (DU), total 470kg and two notification involving natural uranium, total 193.6g | The withdrawals of depleted uranium were materials incorporated in shielding containers3. The g quantities of natural uranium were withdrawn for use in analysis (e.g. as samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration)2 |
Notes
- the tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by ONR Safeguards and which resulted in the withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.
- there are no facilities outside safeguards that have material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.
- the advance notifications of withdrawal for depleted uranium shielded containers were for temporary withdrawals, the containers being used during the replacement of spent radioactive sources at UK defence establishments.