Executive summary
Date(s) of inspection:
March 2025
Aim of inspection
The aim of the Hartlepool (HRA) Reactor Post Trip Logic System (RPTLS) based inspection (SBI) is to seek assurance that the:
- RPTLS is able to meet the nuclear safety functional requirements defined in the station’s safety case.
- Implementation of RPTLS arrangements in relation to the following Licence Conditions (LCs), are being correctly implemented:
- LC10: Training.
- LC23: Operating Rules.
- LC24: Operating Instructions.
- LC27: Safety Mechanisms, Devices and Circuits (SMDCs).
- LC28: Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing (EIMT).
The RPTLS does not contain radioactive material and therefore LC34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste) was not considered as part of this inspection.
This will be achieved through a sample based inspection of associated arrangements, a plant walkdown, and discussions with various stakeholders, (e.g. operators, maintainers, engineers, and training administrators).
This inspection will be performed in line with Office for Nuclear Regulation’s (ONR’s) guidance requirements, which are described in our technical inspection guides (TIGs).
Subject(s) of inspection
- LC10 - Training - Rating: GREEN
- LC23 - Operating rules - Rating: GREEN
- LC24 - Operating instructions - Rating: GREEN
- LC27 - Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits - Rating: GREEN
- LC28 - Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing - Rating: GREEN
- LC34 - Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste - Rating: Not rated
- Overall Inspection Rating - Rating: GREEN
Key findings, inspector's opinions and reasons for judgement made
The key findings of SBI of the Hartlepool RPTLS SBI are:
LC10 Training – We examined how the personnel responsible for the oversight, operation and maintenance of the RPTLS were deemed SQEP and found the arrangements to be adequate. We also sampled training records of the personnel recently involved with the RPTLS and found that they had been adequately completed. The sampled evidence indicated that there were adequate arrangements in place for training associated with the RPTLS.
LC23 Operating Rules – We talked through the application of a sample of the Tech Specs and associated commentaries and arrangements for the RPTLS with operations personnel and found that these identified the RPTLS operating rules from the safety case to enable operational compliance. We also sampled the surveillance requirements for the RPTLS and associated actions to ensure compliance and found evidence that the surveillance requirements were being followed. The sampled evidence indicated that the Tech Spec arrangements were adequate to ensure compliance with the RPTLS operating rules.
LC24 Operating Instructions – We talked through the application of a sample of the operating instructions for the RPTLS with operations personnel and judged that they were adequate for RPTLS operations. The sampled evidence indicated that there were adequate operating instructions for the RPTLS in place and that these were managed appropriately.
LC27 SMDCs – We sampled the arrangements in place for ensuring that the RPTLS was in place and correctly configured, operated and maintained (including management of obsolescence) to perform its safety function and found them to be adequate. We also walked down a sample of the RPTLS and found the systems connected and in good working order.
LC28 EIMT – We sampled several work order cards, work instructions and EIMT records for the RPTLS. The sampled evidence indicated that there were adequate arrangements in place to schedule, carry out and record the RPTLS EIMT, and manage any arising defects. The sampled evidence also indicated that there were adequate processes in place to review the overall RPTLS condition and EIMT performance. However, we noted that HRA were not in compliance with their plant walkdown arrangements. We did not find any evidence that this shortfall has resulted in significant threat to the RPTLS reliability or safety but have raised a regulatory issue to address the plant walkdown shortfall.
Conclusion
From the evidence sampled during this inspection against LC 10, 23, 24, 27 and 28, we judged that the RPTLS was able to fulfil its safety duties (safety functional requirements) in line with the safety case.
No issues were identified with the RPTLS itself, but there were some minor deficiencies with only limited material impact identified with the management system procedures that could be easily rectified by EDF and regulatory advice was provided on these findings.
However, a shortfall was identified with respect to EDF not being in compliance with their arrangements with respect to plant walkdown which will be followed up with a level 4 regulatory issue.
However, this finding did not significantly undermine nuclear safety at this time, and therefore we judge an overall GREEN rating (no formal action) appropriate for the inspection.