Office for Nuclear Regulation

Withdrawal notifications for 2014

Information on advance notifications of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made in 2014 is shown in the table below. Data are shown in the same format as provided previously. The withdrawals involved material used as radiological shielding or small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers or for research and development.

Table: Summary of notifications of withdrawals from safeguards (1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014).

Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 Reason for withdrawal
Four notifications involving plutonium (Pu), µg quantities Four notifications, which also involved mg quantities of natural uranium, for use in analysis (e.g. as samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) from organisations that provides standards/tracers and/or nuclear material for instrument calibration2
Three notifications involving high enriched uranium (HEU), total ~ 1g Three notifications for material contained in radiation detectors2 (from a company that manufactures radiation detectors)
Eleven notifications involving depleted uranium (DU), total ~ 375 kg Eleven notifications for depleted uranium as shielding containers3


  1. Tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by ONR Safeguards and which resulted in the withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.
  2. There are no facilities outside safeguards that have material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.
  3. The advance notifications of withdrawal for depleted uranium shielded containers were for temporary withdrawals, the containers being used during the replacement of spent radioactive sources at UK defence establishments.