Office for Nuclear Regulation

Withdrawal notifications for 2013

Information on advance notifications of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made to date in 2013 is shown in the table below. Data are shown in the same format as provided previously. The withdrawals involved material used as radiological shielding or small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers or for research and development.

Table: Summary of Notifications of Withdrawals from Safeguards (1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013)

Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 Reason for withdrawal
10 notifications involving plutonium (Pu), µg quantities. Ten notifications for use in analysis/analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) from organisations that provides standards/tracers and/or nuclear material for instrument calibration2. Five notifications also involved sub mg quantities of depleted, natural uranium and/or thorium2.
Three notifications involving high enriched uranium (HEU), total ~ 2g Two notifications for material contained in radiation detectors2 (from a company that manufactures radiation detectors); one notification for use in analysis/analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and in instrument calibration)2 which also involved mg quantities of depleted uranium.
19 notifications involving depleted uranium (DU), total ~ 394 kg and two notifications involving natural uranium (NU), total ~ 0.7 kg Sixteen notifications for depleted uranium as shielding containers3. Two notifications for natural uranium for use in analysis/analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and in instrument calibration)2 and three other notifications involving g quantities of depleted uranium2.


  1. Tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by ONR - Safeguards and which resulted in the eventual withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.
  2. There are no facilities outside safeguards that have material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.
  3. The advance notifications of withdrawal for depleted uranium shielded containers were for temporary withdrawals, the containers being used during the replacement of spent radioactive sources at UK defence establishments.