



**Magnox Ltd Oldbury Power Station Nuclear Licensed Site Operating Rules
Proposal to withdraw the ONR approval of the Operating Rules**

Project Assessment Report ONR-DFW-PAR-15-022
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Proposal to withdraw Oldbury Power Station Licence Condition 23 Office for Nuclear Regulation Approved Operating Rules

Permission Requested

Magnox Limited, the licensee, requested withdrawal by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) of the approved Operating Rules for Oldbury Power Station.

Background

Licence Condition (LC) 23 requires the licensee to produce an adequate safety case to demonstrate the safety of any operation that may affect safety and identify the conditions and limits necessary in the interests of safety. Such conditions and limits are referred to as operating rules. In common with all nuclear power stations, Magnox Ltd submitted to ONR for approval operating rules that ONR specified. From time to time as operations changed at Oldbury Magnox Ltd amended the approved operating rules with ONR's approval under LC23(5). Currently the Oldbury extant approval under LC23 covers:

- The operating rule preface,
- An operating rule on criticality involving control rod withdrawal from the reactor, removal of absorbers from the reactor core and criticality control outside the cores.
- An operating rule on fuel and reactor temperatures;
- An operating rule on the minimum safety related plant as specified in the plant operating instructions; and
- A glossary on the meaning of the maximum indicated reactor core temperature.

The operating rules relate to the safe control of nuclear fuel and are implemented through reactor plant operating instructions (RPOIs). The RPOIs were not approved by ONR or the Health and Safety Executive before ONR.

With no fuel in the reactor there are no plant schedule requirements for the reactors.

Criticality control outside the core was implemented in accordance with procedures agreed by the Nuclear Safety Committee. The Nuclear Safety Committee stated that Oldbury could not request withdrawal of the Approved Operation Rules until the nuclear licensed site was declared fuel-free. Magnox Ltd declared the site to be fuel free in a letter dated 4 March 2016, unique number OBA 51009R.

Assessment and inspection work carried out by ONR in consideration of this request

Since August 2015, I have inspected by sampling the work and records of fuel-free verification undertaken by Magnox Ltd at Oldbury. The inspections were of the new fuel route, the reactors, the route of spent fuel from the reactors to the pond, potential voids where spent fuel could be stored in the reactor building, the pond floor and the fuel skips stored in the pond.

I am satisfied that Magnox Ltd demonstrated the Oldbury Power Station is fuel-free.

Matters arising from ONR's work

There are no matters arising from my work.

Conclusions

This report presents ONR's consideration of the Magnox Ltd's request for ONR to approve the withdrawal of the Oldbury Power Station Operating Rules.

I am satisfied that Oldbury has demonstrated that it is free of fuel and therefore the Operating Rules relating to the safety of nuclear fuel no longer have any impact on safety.

Recommendations

I recommend that the Superintending Inspector:

- a. Signs this Project Assessment Report to confirm support for the ONR technical and regulatory arguments that justify issuing a Magnox Ltd Licence Instrument under Licence Condition 1(3) for the withdrawal of Approvals previously granted under Licence Condition 23(4&5) to the Magnox Ltd Oldbury Power Station.
- b. Signs this Project Assessment Report approving its release for publication, after redaction where appropriate.

I recommend that a Deputy Chief Nuclear Inspector signs the prepared Licence Instrument that will withdraw the Approvals under Licence Condition 1(3) previously granted under Licence Condition 23(4&5) at Magnox Ltd's Oldbury Power Station.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CR	Contact record
IR	Intervention record
LC	Licence Condition
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
RPOI	Referenced plant operating instructions
SMDCs	Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	PERMISSION REQUESTED	7
2	BACKGROUND	7
3	ASSESSMENT AND INSPECTION WORK CARRIED OUT BY ONR IN CONSIDERATION OF THIS REQUEST	7
4	MATTERS ARISING FROM ONR'S WORK.....	15
5	CONCLUSIONS	15
6	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	15
7	REFERENCES	16

1 PERMISSION REQUESTED

1. Magnox Ltd, the licensee, requested the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) withdraw the approval of the Oldbury Power Station Approved Operating Rules [Ref 1].

2 BACKGROUND

2. Licence Condition (LC) 23 requires the licensee to produce an adequate safety case to demonstrate the safety of any operation that may affect safety and identify the conditions and limits necessary in the interests of safety. Such conditions and limits are referred to as operating rules. In common with all nuclear power stations, Magnox Ltd submitted to ONR for approval operating rules that ONR specified under LC23(4). From time to time as operations changed at Oldbury Magnox Ltd amended the approved operating rules with ONR's approval under LC23(5). Currently the Oldbury extant approval under LC23 covers:

- The operating rule preface,
- An operating rule on criticality involving control rod withdrawal from the reactor, removal of absorbers from the reactor core and criticality control outside the cores.
- An operating rule on fuel and reactor temperatures;
- An operating rule on the minimum safety related plant as specified in the plant operating instructions; and
- A glossary on the meaning of the maximum indicated reactor core temperature.

3. The operating rules relate to the safe control of nuclear fuel and are implemented through reactor plant operating instructions (RPOIs). The RPOIs were not approved by ONR or the Health and Safety Executive before ONR.
4. With no fuel in the reactor there are no plant schedule requirements for the reactors.
5. Criticality control outside the core was implemented in accordance with procedures agreed by the Nuclear Safety Committee. The Nuclear Safety Committee stated that Oldbury could not request withdrawal of the Approved Operation Rules until the nuclear licensed site was declared fuel-free [Ref. 2]. Magnox Ltd declared the site to be fuel free in a letter dated 4 March 2016, unique number OBA 51009R [Ref. 3].

3 ASSESSMENT AND INSPECTION WORK CARRIED OUT BY ONR IN CONSIDERATION OF THIS REQUEST

6. I have undertaken the following assessments and inspections in the following areas to satisfy myself that Oldbury has implemented its arrangements adequately and demonstrated that the site is free of fuel:

3.1.1 SYSTEM INSPECTION OF OLDBURY FUEL-FREE VERIFICATION

ONR-DFW-IR-15-078, TRIM 2015/316833, dated 18-20 August 2015

3.1.1.1 BACKGROUND

7. The Oldbury safety case for demonstrating that there was no fuel on the site involved a number of activities. I found that these activities were addressed by the site's post operational safety case. In two instances the safety case was modified to meet the needs of fuel free verification. These were:
 - Modification to the pond skip crane to facilitate inspection of the pond floor

- The pond floor was an area where fuel pieces were found at other Magnox sites during draining. It is easier to retrieve these pieces and deal with them while the pond equipment is all in place.
 - To discharge, dip and reload the edge channels containing on-lattice absorber elements to confirm there were no fuel elements in any of these channels
 - For operational reasons 36 channels in Reactor 1 and 19 channels in Reactor 2 were loaded with on-lattice absorber. Oldbury undertook to check that no fuel elements were mixed in with the absorber. It is my understanding that other locations containing absorber were of too small a diameter to allow fuel elements to be placed in them.
8. LC10 required Magnox Ltd to make and implement adequate arrangements for suitable training for Oldbury site staff that have a responsibility for any operations which may affect safety.
9. The method of removing the absorber from the on-lattice locations was similar to the method used for removing fuel elements from the reactor. The difference was that once the absorber channels in question were emptied the absorber was transferred back into the on-lattice location from which it came. It will be stored there until the site is cleared.
10. I am satisfied that the decommissioning proposal approval form provided sufficient information to conclude that the check on the absorber for fuel did not require additional training provided experienced defuelling staff undertake the work.
11. Similarly, the camera inspection equipment was used by suitably qualified and experienced persons with 'many years of experience of remote camera operation'. The adequacy of this statement was demonstrated to me. This showed that it was possible to take meaningful pictures of objects on the pond floor and assess the depth of sludge present.

3.1.1.2 OPERATING RULES, LICENCE CONDITION 23 – IIS RATING – 3, ADEQUATE

12. Magnox Ltd must ensure that operations are at all times controlled and carried out in compliance with the operating rules as required by LC23. The ONR approved Oldbury operating rules were not relevant to the inspection undertaken provided the plant concerned was free from fuel.
13. The decommissioning proposal approval form for modification of the cooling pond skip crane to facilitate fuel-free verification addressed a number of operating rules. They stated that modification to the skip crane interlocks were not to take place until after the final scheduled fuel flask was dispatched from site and the inspection function was only be utilised with a fuel-free validation inspector present (who controlled the inspection function key). Given the level of risk present, I am satisfied that this approach was adequate.

3.1.1.3 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, LICENCE CONDITION 24 – IIS RATING – 3, ADEQUATE

14. Magnox Ltd ensured that all operations which may affect safety at Oldbury were carried out in accordance with written instructions, known as Operating Instructions. Magnox Ltd ensured that Oldbury's Operating Instructions included any instructions necessary to ensure that any operating rules were implemented.

15. I am satisfied that Magnox Ltd had adequate arrangements for preparing, reviewing and amending operating instructions relevant to fuel-free verification as this was part of the decommissioning proposal form demonstration.
16. I was shown plant operating instructions for defuelling channel reference B2 at standpipe Q83 on reactor 2 and witnessed the channel being defuelled. To demonstrate the functionality of the instrumentation the operation was adjusted so that it left a fuel element in the channel which was then removed by the operator. All of this was witnessed by an appropriate person and the initial location checks agreed by an approved suitably qualified and experienced person.
17. The instructions described how tasks were to be carried out and contained prerequisite activities, checks, precautions, and actions to be taken in the interests of safety. The instructions were reviewed, amended and implemented by persons that were suitable qualified and experienced for that purpose as part of setting to work and decommissioning processes. I was able to confirm that the author, approver and authoriser were clearly specified.
18. Each instruction identified the plant conditions required, identified the special requirements needed before work was carried out, the documentation requirements, staffing needs, risk assessment information, special instructions, special hazards and special tools or equipment if needed.
19. I was satisfied that the instructions met the needs of the safety case adequately.

3.1.1.4 SAFETY MECHANISMS, DEVICES AND CIRCUITS (SMDCS), LC27 – IIS RATING – 3, ADEQUATE

20. Magnox Ltd ensured there were SMDCs for the safe operating envelop developed in the safety case during operation, inspection, maintenance and testing. Oldbury ensured that all required SMDCs were properly connected and in good working order.
21. Reactor defuelling included mechanical and electrical safety mechanisms that need to be in service during defuelling operations and fuel-free verification process. During the channel defuelling, the operator and system engineer were able to demonstrate that the safety mechanisms were operating as required.
22. Magnox Ltd confirmed that if the minimum level of SMDCs was not available, the plant would be taken out of service until there was a minimum level of SMDCs restored.
23. I was satisfied that the arrangements met ONR guidance requirements and were fit for defuelling and fuel-free verification purposes and rated them as adequate.

3.1.1.5 EXAMINATION, INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE AND TESTING, LC28 – IIS RATING – N/A

24. Under LC28, Magnox Ltd ensured that Oldbury had adequate arrangements for the regular and systematic examination, inspection, maintenance and testing of all plant which may affect safety which were implemented in line with the requirements of the safety case.
25. I discussed with Oldbury how examination, inspection, maintenance and testing were to be used to ensure the fuel-free verification worked as described by the safety case. I noted that maintenance was continuing on equipment in line with the required periodicity. An example sampled was the planned outage of the flask crane for its maintenance which was demonstrated to be in line with the requirements.

3.1.1.6 LEAKAGE AND ESCAPE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE, LC34 – IIS RATING – 2, GOOD STANDARD

26. Under LC34 Magnox Ltd ensured that at Oldbury, so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP), radioactive material and radioactive waste on the site was at all times adequately controlled or contained so that it could not leak or otherwise escape from such control or containment.
27. The removal and replacement of the absorber into and out of the fuelling machine has the potential to result in the release of radioactive graphite dust from the containment. Because of this, the safety case allowed a negative pressure to be drawn on the reactors to prevent a release outside of the containment. In addition the health physics staff suggested that a skirt be fitted to close the gap at the bottom of the defuelling machine. I see this as a good example of the staff demonstrating they are actively seeking to reduce risks SFAIRP. I therefore gave the inspection a rating that shows good standards are implemented.

3.1.2 REACTORS 1 AND 2 NEW FUEL ROUTE – INTERVENTION RECORD

ONR-DFW-IR-15-095 TRIM 2015/414256, dated 26 to 28 October 2015

28. Oldbury provided me with updates on their work to satisfy themselves that disused parts of the fuel route did not contain fuel fragments. This included providing me with copies of:
 - Oldbury Quality Plan OLD/QP/860 defuelling reactor one
 - Oldbury Quality Plan OLD/QP/1079 confirmation of absorber loading in fuel channels in reactor one
 - Oldbury Report OLD-EPREP-1270 Issue 1 verification of reactor 1 as fuel free
29. Oldbury showed me how the documentation confirmed in more than one way that fuel had been removed from its location in the reactor and successfully transferred to the pond prior to being transported off-site. The system was effective in recording fuel inventory as it left the reactor and entered the pond (double entry book keeping). This proved effective in identifying one or two anomalies during the defuelling process. A review of the fuel history confirmed the reason for the anomaly and that the fuel had been removed successfully. I was therefore satisfied with the licensee's arrangements and their implementation.
30. I was also shown a number of fuel channel records that showed the movements of fuel in and out of the channels since the reactors was first loaded and the fuel reference number up to the verification that the channel was fuel free.
31. Oldbury undertook commissioning trials of the camera system to be used to inspect the bottom of the pond and the inside of the pond skips for misplaced fuel. I viewed some of the videos recorded during the trial. The videos showed that, although there were some graphite particles on the bottom, the depth of debris was not sufficient in the areas inspected to hide significant fuel fragments. I saw that the video resolution was sufficient to identify items that had been dropped into the pond, including bolts, cable ties and pens.
32. I saw the video evidence of the inspection of storage holes between the reactor 1 and reactor 2 pile caps. Again the video was clear in showing no fuel being present of any significant size. I witnessed two of these inspections being undertaken.

3.1.3 INTERVENTION RECORD ONR-DFW-IR-15-125 TRIM 2016/16912, dated 6-7 January 2016

33. Oldbury nuclear licensed site previously defuelled its two reactors. I watched the last shipment of spent fuel stored in the pond leave the site for Sellafield on 7 January 2016. Fuel-free status for the site will be attained when inspections show there is no significant quantities of nuclear fuel remaining on the site. The phrase “no significant quantities” was adopted as some fragments of fuel may be mixed in with the radioactive waste stored on the site. The locations where this can occur are known to the site and include particular voids located in the reactor building used to store activated components taken out of the reactors with the spent fuel and the Active Waste Vaults (AWV) used to store desplitting debris.
34. There were also voids that store high dose-rate radioactive items for extended time periods in between the two reactors. Given the high dose-rate items stored in the voids, these were not designed for access by personnel. The Magnox Ltd strategy was to leave retrieval of high dose-rate items from the voids until final site clearance. If there were fuel fragments mixed in with the radioactive waste in the voids they will be dealt with when the voids are emptied in the future. Magnox Ltd had no evidence that fuel fragments had been stored in the voids. I was satisfied that because of the radioactive waste stored in the voids, Magnox Ltd would remove the waste and any fuel fragments in the waste in an appropriate, safe way when the time comes to empty the voids. Experience at other Magnox sites demonstrated that any fuel fragments present will be detected by the assay work undertaken before the waste is processed into a form that is passively safe for long-term storage and disposal.
35. Magnox Ltd made the same argument for any fuel fragments in with the fuel element debris in the AWVs. The fuel fragments will be assayed for significance and potential segregation when the AWVs are emptied for long-term passive safe storage in self-shielding boxes. Again I was satisfied that if any fuel fragments were present in the waste it would be detected by the assay work undertaken before the waste is processed into a form that is passively safe for long-term storage and disposal.

3.1.3.1 FUEL-FREE VERIFICATION – 8TH FLOOR STORAGE LOCATIONS - IIS RATING 2

36. A Decommissioning Proposal Approval Form (DPAF) number 11767 was prepared for the 8th floor centre block fuel free verification inspections that required inspection of locations using non-routine access methods. This demonstrated how Oldbury would confirm specified areas of the pile cap centre block, discharge and maintenance facilities were fuel-free. It provided method statements to be used to carry out the verification work at specific locations including pressure test facilities, redundant equipment storage tubes and disposal holes.
37. Oldbury made available to me quality plans as follows:
- OLD-QP-969 to confirm that all unused and unirradiated fuel had been accounted for and removed from the site (I inspected this aspect during a previous site inspection).
 - OLD-QP-1083 and 1084 to confirm the reactor 1 and reactor 2 bottling machines and fuel unloading tubes were fuel-free
 - OLD-QP-1087 and 1088 to confirm the reactor 1 and reactor 2 upper maintenance rooms and lower maintenance cells were fuel-free
 - OLD-QP-1089 and 1090 to confirm the reactor 1 and reactor 2 North, Centre and South Track storage and disposal holes (including absorber disposal tubes) were fuel free

- OLD-QP-1092 fuel free verification of the test well.
38. Oldbury confirmed to me that all these quality plans had been undertaken and no fuel had been found. The inspections of tube, holes and the well were videoed. I witnessed some of this work. Once the inspection was completed the tube, hole or well cover was welded shut. Oldbury was in the process of cataloguing this information to simplify verification activities in the future. The information will also be stored in a retrievable form in at least two different ways.
39. I rated the work on fuel-free verification as of a good standard because Oldbury was actively learning from and improving on the verification work undertaken at other Magnox sites, demonstrating a proactive and positive approach to the verification activities.

3.1.3.2 FUEL-FREE VERIFICATION – POND – IIS RATING 2

- Movement of fuel into skips and then out of the pond in flasks
40. Oldbury explained to me how they confirmed that all the fuel removed from the pond had been shipped to Sellafield. This verification could be traced back to 1973 when EURATOM audit records were generated each month and found to be correct. In addition, I was shown how fuel was recorded leaving the reactors and entering the pond. Once in the pond its movement into the flasks was recorded in more than one way to ensure accurate accounting. This included a system using the weight of the fuel as it was placed in a skip. The system that did not produce records unless the weight measured indicated that it was a fuel rod that had been transferred into the skip.
- Verification that no fuel remained in the pond
41. Oldbury was preparing to examine the pond floor and the remaining furniture in the pond to demonstrate no significant pieces of fuel remained. Work was underway around the desplitter machines, which by their operation had occasionally broken fuel and could hide fragments around their structures. During this work, some components of the fuel element had been found, but no fuel fragments. Examples were 'spiders' and top-end fittings that had detached from the fuel as it entered the pond occasionally until modifications were made to the end of the entry tube approximately 10 years ago. At that time the desplitter machines' stands had been modified by boxing in to prevent debris from accumulating under the machines' locations. To confirm this Magnox Ltd moved the desplitter machines' stands and inspected the area where the stands has been.
- Conclusion
42. Oldbury noted where fuel had been found in other Magnox sites and was actively ensuring their inspections would address these areas adequately. As a result some unexpected small pieces of fuel rod assembly had been located (but no fuel fragments). This willingness to learn and use experience to improve inspections lead me to rate this inspection as showing a good standard.

3.1.4 ONR-DFW-IR-15-141, TRIM 2016/75057 - system inspection of the fuel-free verification of the Oldbury pond dated 9 to 12 February 2016

43. The safety case for the fuel-free verification used the case that had been used with the spent fuel and skips. As the spent fuel had been transported off-site, the nuclear safety hazard had been much reduced. However, the use of the inspection mast had its own safety needs and these had been incorporated into the inspection procedures (for example the process of moving around skips with IONSIVs).
44. As part of the inspection, I witnessed inspection by Magnox Ltd of part of the pond floor. The team undertaking this were able to explain to me the process and how they would review items found during their scans. During the scan I saw some items which needed to be moved to confirm no fuel fragments were hidden under them. Also the debris in the corner was higher than on the floor and could have hidden objects within it. Two cylindrical objects were located that will be investigated further (see paragraph 53).
45. I was shown how the steel plates on the floor of the pond were known to be about 70mm by 6.6mm and used as a useful reference point for the size of items found. I was told that work was undertaken to remove any uncertainties. I witnessed an example of such activity during the inspection on 15 March 2016 (TRIM 2016/123408).

3.1.4.1 TRAINING, LC 10, IIS RATING: 2, GOOD STANDARD

46. LC 10 requires Oldbury to make and implement adequate arrangements for suitable training for all those on the site with responsibility for any operations which may affect nuclear safety. For the fuel-free verification work, the inspection techniques were not new and some staff were already suitably qualified and experienced to undertake the inspections. In order to enable shift working to complete the inspections as soon as possible, some additional workers were trained in the operations required. The Head of Defuelling Systems monitored the effectiveness of the training and signed off the training when completed. He also satisfied himself the workers had demonstrated they were capable of undertaking the inspections to the task sheet requirements. I noted that the task sheets specifically stated who was to do what and that others in the vicinity should not distract them from their tasks. The records I saw demonstrated the training was specified properly, comprehensive, effective and up-to-date.
47. Oldbury stuck to tried and tested methods of training of operators, using where possible people who had undertaken the tasks previously and used their understanding and skill in the training of the additional staff needed to cover shift working. I therefore rated training aspects of the fuel-free verification activities in the pond as being of a good standard.

3.1.4.2 OPERATING RULES, LC 23, IIS RATING: 2, GOOD STANDARD

48. Oldbury must, in respect of any operation that may affect nuclear safety, produce an adequate safety case to demonstrate the safety of that operation and to identify the conditions and limits necessary in the interests of nuclear safety. The fuel-free verification safety case was the same as the one used for operations in the pond when it contained fuel. I went through parts of the case and noted that the most hazardous operations were no longer an issue as they related to movements with or near fuel. The remaining hazardous operations did not seem to give rise to significant nuclear safety issues.
49. Oldbury used the existing operating rules arising from the pond safety case and thereby had minimised changes to inspection work that had been demonstrated as appropriate over a number of years. In doing so I believe the staff demonstrated

sound judgement and so I rated the operating rules aspect of the fuel-free verification activities in the pond as being of a good standard.

3.1.4.3 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, LC 24, IIS RATING 2, A GOOD STANDARD

50. Oldbury must ensure that all operations which may affect nuclear safety are carried out in accordance with written operating instructions. I was shown the operating instructions for fuel-free verification work in the pond. They were the same ones as were used for movements when there was fuel in the pond, but with modifications related to inspection movements over skips that were stacked.
51. As the safety case for undertaking the pond inspections had been based on previous inspection activities in the pond, the systematic review of the existing instructions was limited to those related to interactions with fuel. All the other instructions were unchanged and therefore familiar to the operators. With the absence of significant amounts of fuel the safety functions and actions supporting safety functions were easily met as they were designed for far more hazardous situations. The low level of hazard negated the need for any additional redundant and diverse provisions, back-up or stand-by arrangements, including availability of consumable items and supporting supplies. If equipment and consumables break or run out there wasn't a consequential safety concern.
52. I reviewed the work instructions for some of the inspection tasks. They described how tasks were carried out and which tasks had to be acknowledged as being complete. I noted the sheets had been completed and signed as required for some of the floor and pond equipment inspections. The instructions contain all prerequisites, checks, precautions, and actions to be taken if an item was found, including when to inform the management. An example of this was when a cylindrical bar was found. It was subsequently inspected by a health physicist and judged not to be fuel.
53. The operating instructions included information on who was responsible for ensuring that operations were carried out. The outcome of the inspections was recorded on the task sheets, which included adverse conditions (for example, objects found) revealed by the work.
54. Oldbury used the existing operating instructions and thereby had minimised changes to inspection work that had been demonstrated as appropriate previously. I noted the actions taken when the inspections located objects in the pond that were not part of the pond furniture or other items known to be stored in the pond. This indicated to me the staff demonstrated sound judgement and so I rated the operating instructions aspect of the fuel-free verification activities in the pond as being of a good standard.

3.1.4.4 SAFETY MECHANISMS, DEVICES AND CIRCUITS (SMDCS) LC 27, ISS RATING: NOT APPLICABLE.

55. No new SMDCs were required for the fuel-free verification processes. No SMDCs were on the LC 28 Plant Maintenance Schedule. I concluded that LC 27 was not significant for this work.

3.1.4.5 EXAMINATION, INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE AND TESTING ARRANGEMENTS: LC28, ISS RATING: NOT APPLICABLE.

56. The duration of the fuel-free verification processes in the pond mean that maintenance should not be required. Items that break will be repaired or treated as consumables so LC28 will not need to be addressed formally.

3.1.4.6 LEAKAGE AND ESCAPE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE: LC34, ISS RATING: NOT APPLICABLE

57. I inspected and reported on previously the systems in place to record leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste from the pond.

3.1.4.7 CONCLUSION

58. From my inspection of the documentation, discussion with the managers and seeing the inspections being undertaken I am confident that the system of inspecting the pond and its furniture will be able to locate fuel fragments to the desired standard.

3.2 LEGAL ASPECTS

59. I have drafted Licence Instrument (LI) in response to Magnox Ltd's request for the Withdrawal of Approvals previously granted under Licence Conditions 23(4) and 23(5). The LI is not of the standard format licence instruments given within ONR procedures and as such required review by Government Legal Department.

4 MATTERS ARISING FROM ONR'S WORK

60. There are no matters arising from my work.

5 CONCLUSIONS

61. This report presents ONR's consideration of Magnox Ltd's request to withdraw its Operating Rules made under LC23(4) and LC23(5) at Oldbury.
62. I am satisfied that Oldbury has demonstrated that it is free of fuel and therefore the Approved Operating Rules relating to the safety of nuclear fuel are no longer required and have any impact on safety.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

63. I recommend that the Superintending Inspector:
- a. Signs this Project Assessment Report to confirm support for the ONR technical and regulatory arguments that justify issuing Magnox Limited a Licence Instrument under Licence Condition 1(3)(a) for the withdrawal of Approval previously granted under Licence Conditions 23(4) and 23(5) to the Magnox Oldbury Power Station.
 - b. Signs this Project Assessment Report approving its release for publication, after redaction where appropriate.
64. I recommend that a Deputy Chief Nuclear Inspector signs the Licence Instrument 552 under Licence Condition 1(3)(a) that will withdraw the Approvals previously granted under Licence Conditions 23(4) and 23(5).

7 REFERENCES

1. TRIM 2016/22356 letter from Magnox Ltd dated 13 January 2016 requesting the withdrawal of Oldbury Power Station Operating Rules
2. TRIM 2015/392805 Magnox Nuclear Safety Committee meeting minutes dated 30 September 2015 agreeing to the removal of the Operating Rules once the site was declared fuel-free.
3. TRIM 2016/100742 letter from Magnox Ltd dated 4 March 2016 declaring Oldbury Power Station to be fuel free.