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| ONR Technical Assessment Guide  Training and Assuring Personnel Competence |



ONR Technical Assessment Guide (TAG)

Training and Assuring Personnel Competence

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# Introduction

1. ONR has established its Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) (refer to ref. [1] for further information) which apply to the assessment by ONR specialist inspectors of safety cases for nuclear facilities that may be operated by potential licensees, existing licensees, or other duty-holders. The principles presented in the SAPs are supported by a suite of guides to further assist ONR’s inspectors in their technical assessment work in support of making regulatory judgements and decisions.   
   This technical assessment guide (TAG) is one of these guides.

# Purpose and Scope

1. This document is principally intended to provide guidance to aid inspectors in the application of engineering principle EHF.8, which states that a systematic approach should be taken to the identification and delivery of personnel competence [1].   
   It also assists in the application of other SAPs which set out expectations of licensees’ training processes and arrangements for assuring competence.
2. The document also provides guidance to inform inspection activities carried out to judge compliance with Licence Condition (LC) 10 (training) and LC 12 (duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons).

# Relationship to Nuclear Site Licence Conditions and other Relevant Legislation

## Nuclear Site Licence Conditions

1. The Nuclear Site Licence Conditions [2] place legal requirements on the licensee to make and implement arrangements to ensure that safety is being managed adequately.
2. All licence conditions are to some extent relevant to the licensee’s arrangements for ensuring that staff are appropriately trained and that they are suitably qualified and experienced. However, the following licence conditions, and selected sub-conditions, are particularly pertinent:

### Licence Condition 10: Training

* 1. The licensee shall make and implement adequate arrangements for suitable training of all those on site who have responsibility for any operations which may affect safety.
  2. The licensee shall submit to the ONR for approval such part or parts of the aforesaid arrangements as the ONR may specify.
  3. The licensee shall ensure that once approved no alteration or amendment is made to the approved arrangements unless the ONR has approved such alteration or amendment.

### Licence Condition 12: Duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons

* 1. The licensee shall make and implement adequate arrangements to ensure that only suitably qualified and experienced persons perform any duties which may affect the safety of operations on the site, or any duties assigned by or under these conditions or any arrangements required under these conditions.
  2. The aforesaid arrangements shall also provide for the appointment, in appropriate cases, of duly authorised persons to control and supervise operations which may affect plant safety.
  3. The licensee shall submit to the ONR for approval such part or parts of the aforesaid arrangements as the ONR may specify.
  4. The licensee shall ensure that once approved no alteration or amendment is made to the approved arrangements unless the ONR has approved such alteration or amendment.
  5. The licensee shall ensure that no person continues to act as a duly authorised person if, in the opinion of the ONR, he is unfit to act in that capacity and the ONR has notified the licensee to that effect.

### Licence Condition 6: Documents, Records, Authorities and Certificates

1. The licensee shall make adequate records to demonstrate compliance with any of the conditions applied to this licence.

### Licence Condition 9: Instructions to persons on the site

1. The licensee shall ensure that every person authorised to be on the site receives adequate instructions (to the extent that is necessary having regard to the circumstances of that person being on the site) as regards the risks and hazards associated with the plant and its operation, the precautions to be observed in connection therewith and the action to be taken in the event of an accident or emergency on the site.

### Licence Condition 11: Emergency arrangements

1. Without prejudice to any other requirements of the conditions attached to this licence, the licensee shall make and implement adequate arrangements for dealing with any accident or emergency arising on the site and their effects.
2. The licensee shall ensure that such arrangements are rehearsed at such intervals and to such extent as the ONR may specify or, where ONR has not so specified, as the licensee considers necessary.
3. The licensee shall ensure that such arrangements include procedures to ensure that all persons in his employ who have duties in connection with such arrangements are properly instructed in the performance of the same, in the use of the equipment required and the precautions to be observed in connection therewith.

### Licence Condition 17: Management Systems

1. Without prejudice to any other requirements of the conditions attached to this licence, the licensee shall establish and implement management systems which give due priority to safety.

### Licence Condition 26: Control and supervision of operations

The licensee shall ensure that no operations are carried out which may affect safety except under the control and supervision of suitably qualified and experienced persons appointed for that purpose by the licensee.

## Legislative Requirements

1. Legal requirements for training are also set out elsewhere, for example the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) and the Ionising Radiation Regulations (IRRs).   
   The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations require the employer to ensure that employees and temporary workers are provided with adequate health and safety training and that they are not required to carry out work which exceeds their ability to carry out work without risk to themselves or others. The IRRs place duties on the employer to ensure that employees and others working with, or affected by, the employer’s work with ionising radiation are given appropriate training. The principal requirements are set out in Regulation 15 of the IRRs.

# Relationship to Safety Assessment Principles, WENRA Reference Levels, and IAEA Safety Standards and Guides

## Relevant SAPs

1. ONR’s expectations concerning licensee’s arrangements for training and assuring personnel competence are set out in a number of SAPs [1]. The primary reference is SAP engineering principle, EHF.8, which states:

“A systematic approach to the identification and delivery of personnel competence should be applied”.

Paragraph 457 of the SAPs expands upon this:

“The process for identifying and delivering competence should encompass the phases of job analysis; identification of competence requirements; training needs analysis; training programme design and implementation; formal assessment of competence; and training programme evaluation. The process should be applied to all whose actions could impact on safety, whether they are an employee or a contractor, including personnel who may not interact directly with plant or equipment (refer to paragraph 447). Close supervision and monitoring should be maintained until individuals are demonstrably competent to perform their tasks.”

1. EHF.8 is linked with EHF.3 which states:

“A systematic approach should be taken to identify human actions that can impact safety for all permitted operating modes and all fault and accident conditions identified in the safety case, including severe accidents.”

Paragraph 447 expands upon EHF.3 and states that:

“This principle includes identifying all the safety actions of personnel responsible for monitoring and controlling the facility and of personnel carrying out maintenance, testing and calibration activities. It also includes consideration of the impact on safety arising from engineers, analysts, managers, directors and other personnel who may not interact directly with plant or equipment.”

1. A key reference in relation to the capability of the organisation is SAP leadership and management for safety principle, MS.2, which states:

“The organisation should have the capability to secure and maintain the safety of its undertakings.”

Paragraph 65 of the SAPs expands upon this:

“Processes and systems should secure and assure maintenance of appropriate technical and behavioural competence of directors (both executive and non-executive), managers, leaders and all other staff and contractors with safety roles and responsibilities.”

1. Other SAPs and their supporting text also make reference to the need for a process to carry out training and assure that appropriate competencies are delivered and maintained. These are summarised in Appendix 1.

## IAEA Safety Standards

1. The expectations for the provision of training and competence are identified in IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) GSR Part 3 [3] under:

* Requirement 21 and Requirement 24 which places a responsibility on the licensee for the protection of it staff against occupational exposure by providing suitable and adequate human resources and appropriate training in protection and safety are provided, as well as periodic retraining as required to ensure the necessary level of competence
* Requirement 26 which states that licensees shall provide workers with adequate information, instruction and training for protection and safety. Specifically, that licensees shall:
  + provide all workers with adequate information on health risks due to their occupational exposure in normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions, adequate instruction and training and periodic retraining in protection and safety, and adequate information on the significance of their actions for protection and safety.
  + provide those workers who could be involved in or affected by the response to an emergency with appropriate information, and adequate instruction and training and periodic retraining, for protection and safety.
  + maintain records of the training provided to individual workers.

1. The guidance in this TAG is consistent with the systematic approach to training advocated by the IAEA in ref. [4], which is referred to in IAEA NS-G-2.8 [5].

## WENRA Safety Reference Levels

1. The guidance is consistent with WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulations’ Association) Reactor Safety Reference Levels Issue D: Training and Authorization of NPP staff (jobs with safety importance) [6], against which it has been benchmarked.

# Advice to Inspectors

1. It is essential that all personnel whose activities have the potential to impact on nuclear safety are suitably qualified and experienced (SQEP) to carry out their jobs. This includes both those who directly carry out operations and others such as directors, managers, designers, safety case authors etc. whose roles, if inadequately conceived or executed, may affect safety in less visible ways – for example, through introducing latent technical or organisational weaknesses.   
   The licensee should therefore put in place robust arrangements for identifying its competence needs and assuring these are met and maintained.   
   These arrangements are needed to comply with the requirements of LC 12.   
   The arrangements should clearly define the licensee’s interpretation of SQEP and should identify those who are required to be SQEP. Staff who discharge nuclear safety roles should be included within the licensee’s organisational baseline – refer to ref. [7].
2. LC12 further provides for the appointment of Duly Authorised Persons (DAPs). DAPs are usually identified as individuals who are in direct control or supervision of operations or activities that impact on the safety envelope of the facility.   
   Their appointments are therefore subject to additional management controls covering areas such as appointment and assessment. Roles for which DAPs must be appointed should be specified in the licensee’s LC 12 arrangements, and a register kept of such persons. However, the general principle that persons whose activities may impact upon nuclear safety should be appropriately trained, and their competence adequately assured, is similar for SQEPs and DAPs.
3. IAEA has defined competence as “the ability to put skills and knowledge into practice in order to perform a job in an effective and efficient manner to an established standard” [4]. ONR concurs with this definition, which is widely accepted within the international nuclear community. Other factors contributing to a person’s competence include the person’s prior experience, aptitudes, attitudes, behaviours, skills and qualifications. Competence can therefore broadly be equated to SQEP.
4. Training is a fundamental mechanism through which personnel acquire, and maintain, the skills and knowledge needed to perform a job to defined standards.   
   In other words, training should be instrumental in developing and sustaining competence. The licensee should have arrangements in place to define and deliver the training needed to sustain competence, and to comply with the requirements of LC 10.
5. ONR does not assess the competence of licensee staff directly, or authorise,   
   for example, reactor desk engineers, as is the case in some regulatory regimes. ONR’s approach is to seek confidence that the licensee has put in place, and is implementing, effective and proportionate arrangements for training and competence assurance for all personnel whose activities may impact upon plant safety. This should cover both licensee employees and others such as contractors whose actions could impact upon nuclear safety.

## Competency Management

1. Licensees require suitable and sufficient organisational structures, staffing, resource and competence to effectively and reliably carry out all safety significant activities for which they are licenced. This should be demonstrated by the licensee and is the principal purpose of the Nuclear Baseline (NB) [7] and the Safety Management Prospectus [8].
2. Competency management is the process by which employee competencies are identified, managed, developed and demonstrated. It aligns employees’ skills and behaviours with the licensee’s goals and should be used as a framework to recruit, develop, engage, and retain employees.
3. The training and competence assurance of personnel with safety roles should be regarded as a priority by licensees. Licensees should be able to demonstrate that the competence delivery functions are supported by commitment from senior levels in the organisation and by an appropriate management structure (SAP MS2, Para 55 [1]). ONR concurs with the requirement set out in IAEA’s SSG-72 [9] that the operating organisation should ensure that adequate resources are available to implement the safety policy. As part of this, and in addition to the provision of safe operating plant and the necessary tools and equipment, it should also include a sufficient number of competent staff (supplemented as necessary by consultants or contractors, including plant vendors).
4. The commitment to competence and training should be embodied in a policy which recognises the need to develop and maintain the competence of staff in order to achieve safety and which affirms the licensee’s commitment to resource and implement a training system to support the implementation of this policy. A strategy should be put in place to implement this policy which should recognise the need to accommodate a diverse range of staff and contractors who may have differing development requirements.
5. Whilst recognising the importance of a competent organisation, this TAG is primarily focused on personnel competence and the need to demonstrate both training and experience of personnel (both staff and contractors) by the licensee. Nevertheless, when considering team or collective competence, it is important that the licensee recognises where ‘fault lines’ may be created in the overall competence of that organisation if multiple post holders have similar competence shortfalls.
6. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. does the licensee have a training policy which sets out the company’s commitment to training?
   2. does the licensee have a management system for the training of personnel whose actions may impact upon safety?

## Organisation of the Training Function

1. Key to the delivery of competency management within a licensee is the training function/department. Significant aspects of the work discussed within this guidance will be coordinated and completed by this function. It is essential that there are sufficient numbers of staff to support the training function and that they themselves are appropriately competent.
2. The organisation of the training function may differ from licensee to licensee, and it is not the role of ONR to prescribe or define this organisation. However, within any licensee, responsibilities for training should be clearly defined and the licensee should be able to demonstrate that training is being resourced, specified, delivered, assessed, monitored and reviewed effectively. This includes ensuring that training, which is delivered by third parties, either on- or off-site, is suitably specified and delivered. There should be a clear reporting route for departments or role-holders charged with responsibility for training which ensures that training issues can be raised at Board level.
3. The training function should provide appropriate support to the line management in delivering their responsibilities in relation to competence management.   
   The immediate responsibility for ensuring that personnel are competent and medically fit to carry out tasks which impact on safety rests with their line management. This requires that line management are cognisant of the purpose and significance of training and that they appreciate the need to monitor staff performance and to ensure that these staff are subject to regular medical examination.
4. Where a training department exists as a separate on- or off-site entity, the licensee should ensure that adequate interfaces exist between training and other departments to systematically identify training needs and make personnel available for training. In addition, it is important that the training function has appropriate links to both the Human Factors and Safety Case teams to ensure safety important activities are adequately understood and supported. The training department should be actively involved in helping line management to organise the training programmes for their staff and monitoring that line management implements these programmes effectively. The training department may also take an active role in delivering certain elements of training.
5. The provision of effective training requires that personnel with a training role are themselves suitably qualified and experienced to function in these roles. It is important, therefore, that resources are made available for trainers to maintain and develop their own capability. It is essential that instructors have both technical and teaching competence. The IAEA Safety Guide: ‘Recruitment, Qualification andTraining of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants’ [5], clearly states that only qualified persons shall be entrusted with functions important to safety. This concept depends very much on the availability of competent instructors. Ref. [4] provides useful advice on this topic. Other useful references relating to instructor training include refs. [10] and [11].
6. Where training has been arranged so that it is delivered by a non-specialist   
   (for example, by an experienced person in the context of on-job training),   
   the licensee should ensure that the trainer is suitably equipped to carry out this role: this should involve training the trainer in instructional techniques and making clear the learning objectives, training methods and assessment criteria which should be used.
7. Similarly, it is important to ensure the competency of individuals who are identified as the competent person and sign off other individuals as competent for example, on DAP panels.
8. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. are responsibilities for training clearly defined, and do those responsible for discharging these responsibilities demonstrate an awareness and understanding of modern training standards?
   2. does line management recognise its responsibility for assuring the competence of personnel and appreciate the need to make personnel available for training?
   3. does the management system define the interfaces between those responsible for training and those with line management responsibility for staff whose activities may impact on safety?
   4. is the training function adequately resourced, in terms of staff numbers and capabilities?
   5. are personnel who conduct training and competence assessment suitably qualified and experienced?
   6. where training is delivered by non-specialists, are they provided with instructional skills and guidance so that they can perform their roles effectively?

### Use of Contractors

1. In recent years, licensees have placed increasing emphasis on the use of contractors for work that may impact upon nuclear safety, often making use of novel commercial models, such as partnerships, joint ventures, or frameworks. Regardless of the commercial model, placing work with external contractors or agency staff does not negate or mitigate the licensee’s responsibility for ensuring that all personnel whose actions have the potential to affect safety are suitably qualified and experienced. Both the contractor and the licensee are responsible for verifying the competence and qualification of contractor personnel. However, the ultimate responsibility for contractors, including ensuring the quality and safety of all work performed at the site rests with the licensee.
2. Contractor personnel need to have the necessary competence to undertake their assigned duties and be able to interact effectively with nuclear plant personnel whilst doing so. Useful guidance on assuring the competence of nuclear contractor personnel can be found in ref. [12].
3. External contractors may have been trained and assessed to different standards from those of the licensee’s directly employed workforce. The licensee should have adequate arrangements to ensure that contractors are competent to work safely and effectively, and that the standards required of the contractors are consistent with those which would be required of its employees. These should cover both technical competencies and also the other competencies and knowledge which contribute towards safe operation of the plant (for example, site induction training, communication skills, administrative arrangements and procedures, behaviours, etc.). The licensee should therefore put contractors through its own training and competence assessment programme, or otherwise satisfy itself that the contractor’s own arrangements for ensuring the technical and behavioural competence of its staff are adequate (refer to ref. [13]). The latter approach is especially appropriate where the contractor is not simply replacing the licensee’s own staff, but, instead, brings technical competencies which are out with the licensee’s own areas of capability. The licensee may therefore need to carry out audits of the contractor’s training arrangements (refer to ref. [14]).
4. NS-TAST-GD-049 - Licensee Use of Contractors and Intelligent Customer Capability [13] requires that the licensee should maintain an Intelligent Customer (IC) capability for all work carried out on its behalf by contractors that may impact upon nuclear safety. Whilst the concept of IC applies to the organisation as a whole, arrangements should be in place to identify the competencies required to fulfil IC roles and to ensure that individuals fulfilling IC roles are demonstrably competent for the roles. Whilst there is no legal requirement for formally appointing ICs, a register is a useful mechanism to demonstrate the control of IC capability.
5. In addition, NS-TAST-GD-079 – Licensee Design Authority Capability [15] sets out specific requirements regarding the competency of Responsible Designers. Responsible Designers should have a formal contractual responsibility for maintaining their specialised knowledge of design and their competence in the detailed design process. The contractual arrangements should include provision for the Design Authority and ONR (if it so wished), to assess the level of knowledge and competence via inspection.
6. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. if contractors are not subject to the licensee’s own training and assessment practices, do the licensee’s arrangements ensure that the contractor’s own arrangements for maintaining and demonstrating the competence of its staff are adequate?
   2. are periodic checks completed by the licensee to ensure that contractors are implementing their arrangements?
   3. is the licensee able to demonstrate the competence of those individuals fulfilling an Intelligent Customer role?

### Competence Management Systems

1. The purpose of a competence management system (CMS) is to control, in a logical and integrated manner, a set of activities within the organisation that will ensure competent performance in work. The CMS is usually owned by the Training Function. The CMS enables organisations to assess, verify, record and demonstrate the competence, training and qualifications of their employees.   
   The CMS comprises documented processes and a recording system (usually IT based). A technology system or software is usually used to assess, analyse, track, and manage the skills and competencies of your workforce. Without this, there is commonly too much data and too many variables to manage the information and make informed decisions in a timely manner.
2. ONR expects the licensee to have a system for the management of the competency of all personnel conducting work that may have a direct or indirect impact on safety. There are many different competency systems available, and the licensee should be able to demonstrate why the system being used is adequate and appropriate for their situation. It should be aligned to the requirements of both the current and future business needs.
3. It is particularly important that the system supports front-line supervisors in the delivery of their responsibility to ensure that workers are SQEP when completing front line work. Both gaining access to the system and retrieving key information from the system should be easy and straightforward.
4. It is recognised that there will be occasions when the licensee will make modifications to their system or upgrade their system. ONR expects that the licensee will still have the means by which to demonstrate that personnel are SQEP during such changes and up until the new or modified system has been commissioned and its effectiveness demonstrated.
5. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. is the licensee able to articulate why they have selected a particular CMS?
   2. during modifications to the system, has the licensee ensured that there is the continued ability to demonstrate that personnel are SQEP?
   3. can all personnel who need to gain access easily do so including those with front line responsibilities for checking competence?

## Systematic Approach to Training

1. A well-designed training and competence management system should adequately address the following elements:

* analysis of roles and associated competencies
* identification of learning objectives and training needs
* training programme design
* selection of appropriate training methods and media
* assessment of competence
* evaluation of training effectiveness
* organisation and support of the training function

1. The above elements are consistent with those identified in the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT), advocated by the IAEA in Technical Report [4] and implicit in other publications (for example, ref. [16]) for attaining and maintaining the qualification and competence of nuclear plant personnel. This approach has been applied extensively within the nuclear industry and experience in the use of SAT is available which provides useful insights to Inspectors and licensees, examples include ref. [17] and lessons learnt sections for each part of the ADDIE (Analysis Design Development Implementation Evaluation) process in ref. [18].
2. ONR expects that each stage of the SAT process be applied in a proportionate and targeted manner. This assessment guide presents a summary of the reasons why each element is an important component of a licensee's training arrangements and sets out the principal factors which should be considered by the ONR Inspector.
3. The emphasis that the Inspector gives to assessing different elements of a licensee’s training and competence arrangements will depend upon the case being assessed. For example, where the tasks involved in carrying out a role are already well-defined, it may not be necessary to scrutinise closely the processes used to analyse the role and define competence and training needs. Conversely, where new activities are being developed, closer examination of the approach which the licensee takes to analysing these factors may be appropriate. As an overriding principle, the Inspector should consider the safety significance of the activities which the licensee carries out, allied with the complexity and novelty of the activities, and adopt a proportionate and targeted approach to applying the guidance in this document (refer to Section 5.5.4 – Safety Case).

### Analysis of Roles and Associated Competencies

1. In order to develop a suitable and effective training programme, it is necessary first to identify the roles that must be performed. ONR expects the licensee to show how it has identified all roles that have the potential to impact on nuclear safety.   
   This includes roles discharged by staff who do not have immediate hands-on contact with the facility, such as those who work in plant design and analysis and outage planning and should cover those working in corporate offices as well as on-site. It should also include managerial roles and should extend up to and including the Board.
2. The licensee should have in place a process for ensuring that safety roles performed by staff whom it does not employ directly - such as contractors and agency staff – have been suitably identified and that these are subject to the licensee’s arrangements. The tasks associated with each role then need to be determined so that competence and training needs can be established.
3. Identifying the components of a role, and the competencies needed to carry them out, may involve the use of job or task analysis. Where it exists, this should build on and extend any existing task analysis that has been developed in support of human factors integration (HFI) (refer to ref. [19]). A range of task analysis techniques are available to the licensee, and the choice of technique should depend on the nature of the activity and the information which the licensee's analyst is seeking to extract. Useful guidance on the selection and use of task analysis techniques is provided in ref. [20]. It is important to recognise that many jobs include a combination of simple, complex, and critical tasks and that a combination of task analysis techniques may be required. Some techniques are oriented towards describing the cognitive demands made by the task, whereas others are better at describing procedural steps or interactions between people. Ref. [18] identifies that when analysing complex tasks and higher order cognitive competencies, the use of Job Task Analysis (JTA) alone can be insufficient and a combination of Cognitive Task Analysis and JTA would be appropriate.
4. The analysis should draw upon sources such as the plant safety case, procedures, staffing levels, statements of personnel responsibilities, the licensee’s nuclear policy, regulatory requirements and operational experience feedback. For new facilities, where sources such as operational experience feedback are not available, the analysis may need to place more emphasis on expert judgement, simulation and desk-top exercises. Job and task analysis can be a resource-intensive activity, and it may not be necessary for detailed analysis to be performed for every role.   
   It may also be possible to define ‘families’ in which several related roles are grouped together so that generic competence needs are identified.
5. For each role and associated task, the competencies needed to carry out the work should be determined. The set of competencies should include both technical elements and others which may be less tangible, but which are no less important, such as decision making, challenge, management and leadership, communication and behavioural skills, etc. The competence requirements for all nuclear safety roles are expected to include an awareness of the importance of sustaining and contributing to a strong safety culture and the importance of attitudes and behaviours in relation to this. All staff should understand why nuclear safety matters and their roles and responsibilities for working in such a way that safety is the overriding priority. The stated levels of competence needed to discharge each of these related roles (or ‘families’ of roles) then vary according to the nature of the work – for example, more qualifications and experience may be required for roles which include authority to make significant nuclear safety decisions. This approach can help the licensee to manage its staff competence and personal development needs and support succession planning.
6. When considering the range of competencies that are needed to fulfil a designated role, the licensee should consider the full range of operating modes and all fault and accident conditions identified in the safety case, including severe accidents.
7. The ONR Inspector should confirm that the licensee has a structured process in place to identify the tasks which are to be performed for each role, and the competencies needed to perform the associated tasks. The output of this process should contribute towards the specification of a role profile. An individual post may include a number of roles, and these should be set out in the job description.   
   Where this is the case, consideration should also be given to the integration of these roles within a ‘post’ to ensure they are compatible and do not either overload individuals or create conflicts in relation to their requirements. The job description and role profile should explicitly include, or reference, the competencies needed to carry out the associated activities.
8. In addition to consideration of individual roles and tasks, the analysis should include consideration of the way in which these come together and how, team and organisational performance can impact upon safety. This should input to and be reflected in the process for identification of required competencies.
9. When considering the range of competencies that are needed to fulfil a designated role, the licensee should consider circumstances where an individual may be called upon to deputise for another person – for example, at times of sickness or holiday. Although the deputy may not possess the full range of competencies required to carry out the work on a long-term basis, the licensee should identify the principal safety-related activities and ensure that the Deputy is, and remains, competent to carry out these activities.
10. Inspectors may consider the following:
    1. has a suitable analysis been carried out to identify those roles that may impact on safety, including corporate as well as plant functions?
    2. is the analysis sufficiently detailed to provide confidence that all safety-related roles and responsibilities have been identified?
    3. does the analysis include consideration of the full range of operating modes and all fault and accident conditions identified in the safety case, including severe accidents?
    4. is the analysis current - i.e., has it been maintained to take account of plant, equipment, procedural or organisational changes?
    5. have the competencies required to carry out the tasks or activities associated with each role in an efficient and effective manner to the designated standards been formally identified?
    6. has the identified set of skills, knowledge and competencies been used to inform the selection criteria for specific roles and posts?
    7. do the identified competencies include managerial, leadership and behavioural as well as technical factors?
    8. has consideration been given to the competencies required to support team and organisational performance as well as individual roles?

### Identification of Learning Objectives and Training Needs

1. The analyses of roles, tasks and competencies logically give rise to the generation of a set of learning objectives. These objectives should inform the development of a set of training needs, and should be used to derive the criteria, or standards, against which the trainee is assessed during and/or after training.
2. Although licensees may choose to put their staff through training programmes which cover all the learning objectives identified in this way, this may not be essential. Each person will bring certain skills and experience to their job and a review of these, and application of appropriate selection techniques, may obviate the need for training to be provided in every facet of the job. It is reasonable for the licensee to consider the competencies which a person already has, to carry out a gap analysis and then to target its training effort on those areas where the person is not demonstrably competent. Nonetheless, in circumstances where training is waived, the licensee should demonstrate that the waiver is warranted – for example, by ensuring that the person is assessed against the learning objectives and shown to be competent, or that his/her level of performance during previous assessments corresponds to the standards set out for the role in question (refer to ‘Assessment of Competence’ later in this section).
3. Although it is important that the licensee’s approach to staff selection is rigorous and effective (refer to IAEA guidance in ref. [5]), ONR places emphasis on the adequacy of the licensee’s training arrangements and, in particular, the measures used to determine, monitor and sustain competence. Regardless of the previous experience and qualifications of the candidate, the licensee should ensure that the competencies needed of each role and post-holder have been identified systematically, and that training is provided for all those areas in which the person is not able to demonstrate an adequate level of competence. As noted above, these should include both technical competencies and other areas such as decision making, management and leadership, communications, behavioural, attitudinal, etc.
4. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. has the output of the task analysis been distilled into an outline set of training needs?
   2. does the set of training needs take account of the qualifications, skills and experience of the employee?
   3. have the standards which should be achieved in order for a person to be considered competent been defined?
   4. is the need for refresher training in defined elements of competence acknowledged and formalised?

### Training Programme Design

1. A training programme should be designed to help develop and maintain the competence of all personnel with safety responsibilities. The starting point for the training programme should be the competence requirements and learning objectives of the role-holder. The training programme should specify how those objectives are to be achieved. The programme therefore needs to take account of all the elements of training considered in this document.
2. In this sense, the training programme can be viewed as gathering the different elements into a focused and coordinated schedule to support the development of competence for a given role. It should include detailed plans setting out the learning objectives and written procedures on how to conduct each training session.   
   As above there may be a need to address team working, command and control, as well as individual task performance (for example, for control room staff or for those with emergency response roles). It should be recognised that there is a need to inculcate a positive safety culture in all staff, and training programmes should seek to build in and promote an awareness of safety culture and its attributes.
3. Design of the training programme should give consideration to the most effective means of meeting competence requirements and should consider whether the use of training is appropriate and the role that it plays. This will have overlap with other aspects such as task and equipment design and the development of documentation such as procedures and instructions.
4. Where task analysis is used to inform competence requirements and learning objectives, the same task analysis should be used elsewhere in the design process including the development of procedures and instructions (refer to ref. [21]).   
   This helps to provide a clear demonstration that tasks are controlled either through training or appropriate use of procedures.
5. **Initial training** programmes should cover all the training needed to enable personnel to work in specified roles and posts. This should include basic induction training which applies to all workers, and which covers items such as facility hazards and risks and their control measures, working practices, actions in event of emergencies etc; and job-specific training. In addition to the outputs of the role and task analysis, the plant safety case should be used to identify activities which warrant particular attention during training. For example, tasks upon which significant safety claims are made should be highlighted in training (refer to Section 5.5.4 – Safety Case) and should be extensively trained to ensure their reliable performance. Tasks which are complex, or which are performed infrequently, and hence subject to irregular practice, may also need to be drawn out and given special attention. In the case of infrequent tasks consideration should be given to the timing of training and delivery of this on a ‘just in time’ basis.
6. It is important that all personnel, from the Board down, receive training which supports the safety culture of the organisation, by inculcating the right safety attitudes and informing personnel about the behaviours and management arrangements which help to ensure both personal and plant safety. The need for training to reinforce an appropriate safety culture, as well as enabling the acquisition of technical competence, was recognised by ACSNI (refs. [16] and [22]), and is acknowledged by the IAEA [5]. Such training should encompass lessons learned from case histories of major accidents and events world-wide, and the underlying organisational and cultural factors. Contractors should be included in such training.
7. **Continuing training** must also be programmed to help maintain competence, especially for tasks associated with roles which are safety-significant and those which are complex or infrequently performed (for example, by those deputising for others). Different groups may have differing continuing training needs. For example, operations staff should have the opportunity to rehearse knowledge of the safety case and operating rules, and to engage in team training. Maintenance personnel may require training in the use of equipment needed during infrequently performed activities and in the relevance of their work to the safety case. Supervisors and managers should receive training in management of safety, leadership, communication, and other supervisory skills. Training should be used to update personnel on operational experience feedback and the implications of modifications to plant, operating regime and instructions as well as personal development needs. The periodicity of training required for some activities, such as fork-lift truck driving and firefighting, is set out in nationally defined standards. Work to reinforce a positive safety culture should be a consistent feature of continuing training.
8. Training of staff involved in dealing with emergencies and beyond design basis conditions is an important aspect of continuing training (LC 11, SAP AM1, para 643 [1]). Training should address a comprehensive range of scenarios, both to support the development of personnel competence and to improve the facility’s emergency preparedness and response arrangements. This should include consideration of the full range of competencies and include considerations of aspects such as leadership, interpersonal communications, stress resilience and decision making.
9. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. has the licensee established an initial training programme for all personnel whose activities at work might impact upon safety, including the Board, managers, contractors as well as other staff?
   2. does the initial training programme include induction training to ensure a basic understanding of the employee's responsibilities, safe working practices, generic safety-related matters and safety management systems?
   3. does the training programme demonstrate how the role-specific training needs are to be met?
   4. does the training programme reference task analyses, operating experience and the plant safety case including the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), to identify activities which are safety-significant, complex or infrequent and which warrant particular attention during training?
   5. does the training programme recognise the need to address leadership, managerial, behavioural, communication and safety culture issues as well as individual competence?
   6. has the licensee established a continuing training programme for all personnel whose activities at work might impact upon safety?
   7. does the continuing training programme take account of the demands of each role: for example, the safety significance of different tasks; the need to refresh infrequently practised skills or inform changes to plant, equipment or instructions; the need to meet nationally defined standards?
   8. does the continuing training programme clearly define and justify the training periodicities for different activities?
   9. does the training programme identify when training is to be delivered, and how it should be delivered, assessed and evaluated?
   10. is training consistent with, and does it continually seek to reinforce, a positive safety culture?

### Selection of Appropriate Training Methods and Media

1. The training media and methods which are used to develop the competencies required in different roles should be both effective and practicable. This demands that careful attention is given to the choice of training media and to the way in which those training media are then used (i.e., the training method). The licensee should therefore be able to show that it has considered and identified the most appropriate media and methods for use in training different tasks.
2. A range of different training media are available, including the following principal examples:

* **Classroom teaching** may be most suitable for introductory material and where detailed information of a theoretical or conceptual nature needs to be learned. This medium also allows tasks to be talked- or walked-through in a seminar or workshop-style approach. However, classroom teaching allows the trainee limited opportunity to gain hands-on experience in performing a practical task, or to put conceptual learning into practice.
* **On-job training** is an essential part of most training programmes and provides a realistic environment for the trainee. However, it can be difficult to ensure systematic and controlled training on the job because the learning environment may be less easily controlled. In addition, concerns about the potential impact of trainee error on safety-significant tasks limit the suitability of this approach for some activities. The licensee should be able to demonstrate that on-job training is properly specified, provided by people suitably prepared to carry out that function, and that adequate control and supervision (LC 26) is in place.

On-job training can sometimes involve the use of Briefings (as distinct from setting to work briefs, or tool box talks which are described below). Briefings may be used to provide an update to a group of individuals in relation to a topic which they are already familiar with. Briefings work best when presented by a competent individual, are structured around a briefing pack, are presented to a small group of individuals, involve active participation by attendees and include a set of questions to assess competence. Care should be used in the use of briefings however, as they do not provide as strong a mechanism as other media to either develop or assure competence and therefore careful thought should be given to the selection and use of this media. Briefings are most appropriate where they are used to refresh existing knowledge and skills acquired through other media.

* **Simulators** allow the rehearsal of practical skills under controlled conditions. Full-scope, high fidelity control room simulators are essential for nuclear power reactors and for other nuclear installations are regarded as a highly desirable, though expensive, requirement to train control room operators to deal with fault and emergency conditions as well as planned plant manoeuvres - the Sizewell ‘B’ simulator was required by the Layfield Public Inquiry [24] to be available for training one year before reactor start-up. WENRA states that control room operators should spend at least five days on the simulator per year [6]. Part-task training can be used to focus training on specific elements of the operators' tasks, and part-task simulators, employing varying degrees of physical fidelity, can be used to train either practical or conceptual skills.

Simulators and replica equipment may be used to train groups of staff other than control room operators; mock-ups of plant items, for example, are a valuable aid to maintenance staff and others who need to learn about the way in which these items work, and to prepare them out with a potentially hostile environment. This can also help in dose minimisation. Low fidelity task simulation (for example, table-top exercises) may also be used. Useful advice on the use of simulators can be found at ref. [25].

* **Open learning techniques**, in which training is provided through structured self-teaching packages, are increasing in popularity as technology developments continue, owing to their flexibility and cost-effectiveness.   
  These techniques may employ advanced technology such as computer-based packages and interactive video as well as more conventional methods.   
  Care must be taken to ensure that open learning is fit for purpose, and that it is not used at the expense of other forms of training without justification and demonstrable benefits.
* **Toolbox talks**, which may not be formally structured in the same way as other training approaches, can play an important role in training. These will typically involve discussions, often led by a manager or Team Leader, on factors affecting the way in which jobs are carried out – for example, adherence to procedures, safety culture, communications etc.

1. Choosing an appropriate training medium does not of itself guarantee that training will be satisfactory. The way in which the training medium is used is of utmost importance. For example, the control room simulator can be used to practise responding to faults as well as undertaking key operations such as reactor start-up or shutdown; training can be given to shift teams or to individuals; classroom instruction can be based around a lecture-style approach or a workshop approach which encourages trainee participation; on-job training is better carried out under the direction of a SQEP individual, working to a set of defined training objectives which may be supported by detailed work instructions, as opposed to a less structured approach of merely watching the activity being performed; feedback on trainee performance can be provided concurrently or via a debrief, and so on.
2. Where there are significant changes to the method or media by which training is provided, this should be subject to robust risk assessment. For example, a change of presentational format or move from the original mode of training such remote rather than plant based.
3. When the training method has been determined, attention should be given to the **materials** needed to apply the training method and to planning its implementation. The design and use of items such as training manuals, lesson plans, simulator exercise scenarios, data recording sheets and other supporting equipment need careful consideration in order to ensure a structured and effective use of the training method.
4. The Inspector should ensure that the licensee has considered the choice of training methods, and the way in which these methods are used, as well as the training media. The licensee should be able to demonstrate that the selected training methods and media promote effective development of the learning objectives and competencies which have previously been specified.
5. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. is the licensee’s choice of training media and training method based upon a consideration of how best to achieve the learning objectives?
   2. are the training methods developed, planned and applied by personnel who are familiar with current practice regarding training/instructional techniques?
   3. is training delivered by personnel who have acquired relevant training qualifications or equivalent experience?
   4. are the training methods subject to periodic review to ensure that they are appropriate, and reflect best current practice?
   5. are simulators and other training media kept up to date such that they reflect changes to actual plant and equipment?
   6. are the methods for on-job training appropriate?
   7. does the training method take account of the supporting material which is needed - for example, lesson plans, simulator scenarios, etc?

### Assessment of Competence

1. LC 12 requires that each person who carries out activities which may affect the safety of operations on a nuclear site must be suitably qualified and experienced (SQEP).
2. A key component of the assurance process is the assessment of whether personnel have achieved the standards needed for satisfactory job performance. Through theSAT analysis and design phases, these standards will have been identified and included as training objectives. Such standards include not only those related to nuclear safety, but also the behavioural skills needed for satisfactory job performance. Useful guidance on the assessment of behavioural competencies is provided in ref. [26].
3. For some posts it may also be necessary to designate persons who control and supervise operations which may affect safety as Duly Authorised Persons (DAPs). Although training plays an important role in developing the necessary competencies to become a SQEP or DAP, it does not itself guarantee competence: if training is poorly specified or targeted, or the trainee is not suited to the job, then a person may fail to achieve an acceptable level of performance.
4. For these reasons, ONR regards the assessment of trainee competence and, subsequently, the periodic re-assessment of personnel, as a key element in the process of developing and maintaining the competencies needed to function as a SQEP or a DAP. Assessment serves the following important functions:
   1. properly defined and carried out, it provides a means of demonstrating that learning objectives have been achieved and a level of competence attained
   2. it can point to a need for refresher or additional training through identifying shortfalls in performance
   3. it can indicate whether training has been effective in developing the required competencies. In particular, assessment can point to deficiencies in the identification of training needs, the choice of training methods or the training programme.
5. The licensee should therefore satisfy itself that all staff and contractors whose actions have the potential to impact upon nuclear safety meet its competence expectations.
6. When an individual is first appointed to a role, he/she may not be fully competent to carry out all the duties of that role. The competence assessment process should therefore be used to inform a management decision to restrict the individual’s range of tasks to those for which they are competent (for example, a C&I engineer may be competent to work on most instrumentation but may not be confirmed as SQEP to work on guard lines and is therefore restricted from doing so). Licensee management should also encourage staff and contractors to raise any concerns about their own competence or readiness to carry out a task and to seek further training or advice as necessary.

### Assessment Methods

1. Licensees may use a range of different assessment methods. Their suitability will depend upon the training method and the nature of the competency which is being assessed. The classical view of assessment as a paper-based question and answer session may be appropriate for some activities but will be quite inappropriate for many others. For example, it might be a sound means of assessing a trainee's understanding of principles concerning the transfer of heat across different mediums but would not necessarily give an accurate indication of a trainee's practical competence in operating a master-slave manipulator arm. Assessment may take the form of a specific, defined activity or as a continual assessment in the context of training or actual job performance. It may take place on-the-job, or in a controlled training/assessment environment such as a control room simulator, a workshop or a classroom. Recent research has been completed in Stockholm in relation to different approaches to the assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators (refer to ref. [27]). The work compares a competency-based approach to the more traditional event-based approach to assessment. For the event-based approach, an exercise is designed and assessed around specific events, for example, can the operators manage the event “Reduced pump capacity 414 P108”. For a competency-based approach, the design and assessment of the exercise is based on whether the operators can demonstrate the underlying competencies to allow them to manage the different events and there were perceived benefits to this approach.
2. An overview of issues relating to competence assessment is provided in ‘Competency Assessments for Nuclear Industry Personnel’ [28] .
3. In some circumstances, the licensee may wish formally to waive some parts of training. Such waivers should be kept to a minimum, but where training is waived, the licensee should ensure that the affected person is assessed to the same, or an equivalent, standard. This provides a basis for demonstrating that the person is competent, despite not receiving the waived part of training. Where credit is claimed for prior training and competence of contractors, the licensee should be able to show how it has satisfied itself that the contractor’s training and competence assurance arrangements are adequate and that they meet the licensee’s expectations (refer to ref. [14]).
4. Assessment may involve carrying out real or simulated tasks or surrogates which have been shown, or are judged by the licensee, to be representative of the real job demands. As such, assessment methods can include written, oral or practical demonstrations of learning or competence. It is preferable that assessment is carried out by persons independent of the training itself. Some of the merits and disadvantages of different approaches to assessment are discussed in ref. [29].
5. Nonetheless, for any assessment method, the licensee should be able to demonstrate that the assessment process is:
   1. **valid**; i.e., it provides a reasonable indication of a person's likely performance on the real job. The criteria used to judge performance should therefore remain under review by the licensee
   2. **objective**, so far as is possible, i.e., the less judgmental the assessment method, and the criteria used to judge performance, the less uncertainty there will be about the validity of the assessment. This is of particular relevance to on-job assessment
   3. **reliable**; i.e., if repeated, the assessment would be likely to produce the same results again.

### Frequency of Assessment

1. Assessment should not be regarded as a one-off activity which takes place after initial training, and which "qualifies" a person for the period that they subsequently remains in post. A person's competence may change over time as a result of influences such as the frequency with which a task is performed, the varying circumstances under which the task may be performed, or changes to plant or equipment. Loss of memory for the task and the procedures or arrangements which affect the way it is performed may also be compounded by factors such as the development of bad habits, short-cuts etc. Changes to plant operational parameters or procedures may also take place when a person is away for an extended period. All these factors support the case for periodic re-assessment to ensure that personnel are informed about relevant changes, and that they are competent to carry out their jobs.
2. The frequency of re-assessment should be influenced by consideration of the following issues:
   1. the safety significance of the roles and associated tasks which the person performs, as identified through the job and task analysis and formalised in the safety case
   2. the (in)frequency with which the tasks are performed
   3. the nature of the task (including whether it changes) and the inherent likelihood of loss of competence over time
   4. operational experience feedback originating both within the licensee and from other organisations
   5. compliance with standards defined nationally or by other accredited or authoritative bodies.
3. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. does the licensee have formally defined provisions for assessing the competencies of all personnel whose activities impact upon safety?
   2. has the licensee put in place robust processes for satisfying itself as to the competencies of its contractors where they are not subject to the licensee’s competence assessments?
   3. is assessment carried out during and/or after training?
   4. where possible, is the assessment carried out by a person who is independent of the training which the trainee has received?
   5. does the choice of assessment method reflect the nature of the competencies which are being assessed, and the training methods and media which are available?
   6. can the licensee demonstrate that the assessment methods provide a valid, objective and reliable basis for determining competence?
   7. does the licensee act, in a timely manner, upon deficiencies in performance identified through the assessment or during training?
   8. has the licensee defined the periodicity of re-assessment which is appropriate for each job or task?
   9. does the frequency of re-assessment take into account factors such as the safety significance of the task, the nature of the task and the frequency with which it is performed, plant/procedural changes and operational experience?
   10. does the licensee have a defined strategy for addressing failures to meet the required standards following training?

### Evaluation of Training Effectiveness

1. Training is effective only in as much as the learning acquired through training transfers into the real situation. For example, training on a simulator is of limited benefit if it provides trainees with the skills needed to operate the simulator but not the real plant; and classroom training which equips students with the capability to understand thermal hydraulics is unlikely, in itself, to be sufficient to develop control room operational competence. Licensees should therefore have a well-defined system for monitoring the effectiveness of training, and for identifying areas where training may need to be augmented or revised (a requirement identified in IAEA GSR Part 2 [30]).
2. Evaluation of training effectiveness involves an intelligence gathering exercise, the purpose of which is to provide confidence that training has been specified properly, and that it is comprehensive, effective and up to date. As such, it should draw on a range of sources such as:
   1. operational experience feedback from the workplace and from other plants
   2. performance measures from the site
   3. safety reviews and inspections
   4. plant operating procedures and administrative arrangements
   5. revised information on training needs
   6. summaries of assessments of trainees, including trainee feedback
   7. changes in regulatory aspects, plant or procedures
   8. independent reviews, such as those by peers under the auspices of organisations such as WANO or IAEA.
3. Evaluation of training effectiveness should include review of both individual elements of training as well as the scope of overarching training programmes.
4. The Inspector should be satisfied that the licensee is ‘closing the loop’ by monitoring the systems which have been put in place to evaluate the effectiveness of each element of training identified in this TAG. Where shortfalls in training are identified (for example via event investigations), consideration should be given to which system elements have contributed to the shortfall, and how the system or process itself can be strengthened.
5. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. does the licensee have in place a formal process to evaluate the effectiveness of training?
   2. does the evaluation process take account of information gained through factors such as operational experience feedback, trainees, instructors, plant procedures, safety reviews and inspections, other plants etc?
   3. is the way in which training is specified, delivered and assessed monitored regularly?
   4. does the evaluation aim to gain information on the effectiveness of all the elements of training, as identified in this TAG?
   5. do the findings of the evaluation process demonstrably influence the specification or implementation of the training arrangements?

## Training Records

1. Licence Condition 6 requires the licensee to make adequate records to demonstrate compliance with any of the conditions attached to the site licence (refer to ref. [31]). ONR regards the design, control and maintenance of accurate training and competence records as an essential requirement in support of LCs 10 and 12. Such records enable training to be scheduled and delivered against a controlled statement of training needs. They are a vital input to the planning process for training and provide a traceable means for both licensee and ONR to ensure that training has been given, and competence assessed, for all personnel with safety roles. This is also relevant to mock-ups and trials when they are identified as part of the training and competence assurance for personnel.
2. The value of training records is related to the quality of information which is entered into them, and the use that is made of this information. The licensee should ensure that this information, and the design of the record system, enable training to be planned, scheduled, delivered and monitored effectively. Some licensees are moving towards the development and implementation of integrated human resources/competence management systems. Such systems are to be welcomed. Properly specified, they can offer considerable benefits by providing a comprehensive and consistent framework for managing a licensee’s resource/competence needs and availabilities. They may be used to identify vulnerabilities and assist in activities such as succession planning and can help the licensee to maintain a current organisational Baseline (refer to ref. [7]). Ideally, the record system should be able to provide advance warning of the need for repeat/refresher training to ensure that staff competencies remain “in-date”.
3. The licensee should also ensure that the training records are subject to proper quality management, as stated in SAP MS1, Paras 50-51 [1], Licence Conditions 6 and 17, and ref. [31].
4. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. are training records available, and are they controlled in a manner consistent with LC 6 and the expectations of NS-TAST-GD-033 [30]?
   2. are the training records reviewed periodically so as to identify training or competence shortfalls or omissions?

## Managing Change

### Application of SAT at the Different Stages of the Lifecycle

1. During the transition between the different stages of the lifecycle of a nuclear facility, there is a need to re-visit consideration of competence and application of SAT. During these different stages of the lifecycle, the nature of the work carried out on the facility changes and this can have important impacts for the skills mix and competencies required of staff. For example, during construction, when there isn’t an operations team in place, SAT will be focused on the Design Authority (DA) [15]. However, this will change with the transition to commissioning and operations. At the End of Generation when the focus shifts to decommissioning the risk to the public is lowered, the worker role will change and there is potentially a change in the required competencies and an increased risk to workers. It is therefore important that SAT is re-visited and applied in a proportionate way at each stage of the lifecycle giving cognisance to the risk and changing nature of activities being undertaken.

### Application of SAT as part of Organisational Change (LC 36)

1. The impact of organisational change on training can also be significant.   
   Changes which materially affect individuals’ roles – for example, where they move to different jobs or where they take on additional roles – may require different competencies. Licensees’ arrangements under LC 36 should explicitly consider the competencies required during and following an organisational change and should demonstrate that staff affected by the change are SQEP for any changed roles (refer to ref. [23]). The management of change arrangements should include reference to training and assessment programmes as part of this demonstration. Licensee Directors and Managers, who are charged with determining the need for, and agreeing, organisational changes, should be trained to understand and manage the organisational change process. They should also be made aware of the need to control ‘organisational drift’ arising from successive changes.
2. In reviewing any proposed organisational changes, consideration should be given to operator claims and assumptions within the safety case to ensure that the safety case is not undermined. Mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the safety case is not undermined by the proposed organisation changes and that any changes to the safety case arising from the organisational change flows into revised training.
3. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. does the licensee acknowledge the need to review competence requirements during and following periods of organisational change (and as part of its succession planning arrangements) and put in place training programmes to deliver and sustain appropriate competencies?
   2. has the licensee put in mechanisms to ensure that the safety case and associated training is not undermined by proposed organisational change?
   3. has the licensee ensured that changes to the safety case arising from the organisational changes are appropriately reflected in revised training?
   4. has any training that will be made obsolete by the organisational change been identified and removed where appropriate?

### Application of SAT as part of the Plant Modification Process (LC 22)

1. Changes to plant under LC 20 and LC 22 [32] arrangements should involve a proportionate application of SAT. LC 20 and LC 22 identifies that modifications or experiments may require personnel to undergo elements of additional training in accordance with LC 10 before the commencement of commissioning and operations, and to demonstrate that staff satisfy the requirement to be SQEP and/or DAP where this is appropriate (LCs 12 and 26).
2. Consideration should be given to the extent of the changes (including the Safety Case (refer to Section 5.5.4)), and there should be a clear articulation of the delta to the existing competences. In addition, the mechanism by which this delta will be addressed should be identified, for example through ‘formal’ training, briefings, directed reading, etc and clarity on how competence (and understanding of new information and knowledge) will be assessed should be confirmed.
3. In reviewing any proposed changes to plant, consideration should be given to operator claims and assumptions within the safety case to ensure that the safety case is not undermined. Mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the safety case is not undermined by subsequent changes to training and any changes to the safety case flow into revised training
4. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. does the licensee acknowledge the need to implement training when new systems, processes and plant are developed or to update personnel on operational experience feedback?
   2. does the licensee have appropriate guidance in place to support proportionate consideration of competence assurance as part of its LC 22 arrangements?
   3. where modifications or experiments are proposed, is there a clear articulation of the delta to the existing competences, clarity with regard to the mechanisms by which this delta will be closed and details of how competence will be confirmed?
   4. has the licensee put in mechanisms to ensure that the safety case and associated training is not undermined by proposed plant changes?
   5. has the licensee ensured that changes to the safety case arising from the plant changes are appropriately reflected in revised training?
   6. has any training that will be made obsolete by the plant changes been identified and removed where appropriate?

### The Importance of the Role of the Safety Case

1. It is essential that there is a strong link between the competence assurance/SAT process and the facility safety case, with consideration given to the implications of the safety case through all stages of the SAT process. This link is a key requirement as it underpins the management of safety and, in particular, the delivery of safety important tasks and administrative controls. It is important that consideration is given to any claims made on human performance and the associated requirements in terms of staff knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours. It should be clear how any claims on human performance are translated into a clear articulation of the competence requirements and how they are assessed and confirmed in practice.
2. The plant safety case should be used to identify activities which warrant particular attention during training. For example, tasks upon which significant safety claims are made should be highlighted in training and should be extensively trained to ensure their reliable performance. Tasks which are complex, or which are performed infrequently, and hence subject to irregular practice, may also need to be drawn out and given special attention. In the case of infrequent tasks consideration should be given to the timing of training and delivery of this on a ‘just in time’ basis.
3. Inspectors may consider the following:
   1. what are the claims being made on human performance?
   2. what does the safety case expect, and how are those claims translated into competence requirements?
   3. does the licensee have a clear understanding of the necessary knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours for each competency?
4. The impact of any changes to the safety case should be carefully considered with regard to the requirement to modify or update training. In particular changes to the safety significant activities should be scrutinised to ensure that any changes to the associated human actions and administrative controls are fully understood. It is important that representatives from the Training Function are involved, and that the Safety Case Team appropriately communicate the changes so that the impact on training and competence can be assessed. The proportionate and targeted approach described in this guidance should be followed.

# Appendix 1: SAPs relevant to training and competence

**SAP EHF.8: A systematic approach to the identification and delivery of personnel competence should be applied**

Para 457 to SAP EHF8: The process for identifying and delivering competence should encompass the phases of: job analysis; identification of competence requirements; training needs analysis; training programme design and implementation; formal assessment of competence; and training programme evaluation. The process should be applied to all whose actions could impact on safety, whether they are an employee or a contractor, including personnel who may not interact directly with plant or equipment (refer to paragraph 447). Close supervision and monitoring should be maintained until individuals are demonstrably competent to perform their tasks.

**SAP EHF.3: Identification of actions impacting safety**

Para 447 to SAP EHF.3 states: This principle includes identifying all the safety actions of personnel responsible for monitoring and controlling the facility and of personnel carrying out maintenance, testing and calibration activities. It also includes consideration of the impact on safety arising from engineers, analysts, managers, directors and other personnel who may not interact directly with plant or equipment.

**SAP EHF.5: Analysis should be carried out of tasks important to safety to determine demands on personnel in terms of perception, decision making and action.**

Para 451 to SAP EHF5:

“The analysis should be sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for developing user interfaces, procedures and job aids, as well as helping define operator roles and responsibilities, staffing levels, personnel competence and training needs, communication networks and workspace design…”

**SAP MS.2: The organisation should have the capability to secure and maintain the safety of its undertakings.**

Para 65 to SAP MS.2:

Processes and systems should secure and assure maintenance of appropriate technical and behavioural competence of directors (both executive and non-executive), managers, leaders and all other staff and contractors with safety roles and responsibilities.

**SAP SC.1: The process for producing safety cases should be designed and operated commensurate with the hazard, using concepts applied to high reliability engineered systems.**

Para 82(e) to SAP SC1:

(Application of this principle should result in) …definition of the training and qualifications needed for the formal roles within the process (to ensure that those who undertake the roles are suitably qualified and experienced).

**SAP SC.4: A safety case should be accurate, objective and demonstrably complete for its intended purpose.**

Para 9101(h) to SAP SC4:

(To achieve these, a safety case should) …provide the basis for the safe management of people, plant and processes. (For example, the safety case should address management and staffing levels, training requirements, maintenance requirements, operating and maintenance instructions, and contingency and emergency instructions).

**SAP FA.14: PSA should be used to inform the design process and help ensure the safe operation of the site and its facilities.**

Para 661(i) to SAP FA.14:

” Appropriate use of PSA should be made in activities such as… developing and changing operating procedures and associated training programmes for managing faults and accidents (including severe accidents) …”

**SAP AM.1: Strategies and plans should be in place to prepare for and manage accidents at the facility and/or site.**

Para 786 to SAP AM.1:

“Provision should be made for training personnel (including from the local emergency services) in the accident management procedures and implementing the accident management strategies.…”

**SAP DC.7: Organisational arrangements should be established and maintained to ensure safe and effective decommissioning of facilities.**

Para 729 to SAP DC7:

The competence needs for personnel responsible for undertaking decommissioning activities, including contractors, should be identified. Personnel should receive suitable training and be suitably qualified and experienced to carry out their duties (refer to Principle EHF.8).

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# Glossary and Abbreviations

ADDIE Analysis Design Development Implementation Evaluation

CMS Competency Management System

DA Design Authority

DAP Duly Authorised Person

HFI Human Factors Integration

HMI Human Machine Interface

HSWA Health and Safety at Work Act

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IC Intelligent Customer

IRRs Ionising Radiation Regulations

IT Information Technology

JTA Job Task Analysis

LC Licence Condition

NB Nuclear Baseline

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation

PSA Probabilistic Safety Analysis

SAP Safety Assessment Principle(s)

SAT Systematic Approach to Training

SQEP Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person

SRL Safety Reference Level

TAG Technical Assessment Guide(s)

TIG Technical Inspection Guide(s)

WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association