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| ONR Technical Assessment Guide  Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing of Physical Protection Systems |



ONR Technical Assessment Guide (TAG)

Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing of Physical Protection Systems

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# Introduction

1. The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has established a set of Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) (Ref. [1]). This document contains Fundamental Security Principles (FSyPs) that dutyholders must demonstrate have been fully taken into account in developing their security arrangements to meet relevant legal obligations. The security regime for meeting these principles is described in security plans prepared by the dutyholders, which are approved by ONR under the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR) 2003 (Ref. [2]).
2. The term ‘security plan’ is used to cover all dutyholder submissions such as nuclear site security plans, temporary security plans and transport security statements. NISR Regulation 22 dutyholders may also use the SyAPs as the basis for Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS&IA) documentation that helps them demonstrate ongoing legal compliance for the protection of Sensitive Nuclear Information (SNI). The SyAPs are supported by a suite of guides to assist ONR inspectors in their assessment and inspection work, and in making regulatory judgements and decisions. This Technical Assessment Guidance (TAG) is such a guide.

# Purpose and Scope

1. This TAG contains guidance to advise and inform ONR inspectors in exercising their regulatory judgment during assessment activities relating to a dutyholder’s arrangements to ensure their security systems are subject to an appropriate regime of Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing (EIMT). It aims to provide general advice and guidance to ONR inspectors on how this aspect of security should be assessed. It does not set out how ONR regulates the dutyholder’s arrangements. It does not prescribe the methodologies for dutyholders to follow in demonstrating they have addressed the SyAPs. It is the dutyholder’s responsibility to determine and describe this detail and for ONR to assess whether the arrangements are adequate.

# Relationship to Relevant Legislation

1. The term ‘dutyholder’ mentioned throughout this guide refers to ‘responsible persons’ on civil nuclear licensed sites and other nuclear premises subject to security regulation, a ‘developer’ carrying out work on a nuclear construction site and ‘approved carriers’, as defined in NISR. It is also used to refer to those holding SNI.
2. NISR defines a ‘nuclear premises’ and requires ‘the responsible person’ to have an approved security plan in accordance with Regulation 4. It further requires approved carriers to have an approved Transport Security Statement in accordance with Regulation 16. Persons to whom Regulation 22 applies are required to protect SNI. ONR considers reliability, resilience and sustainability to be important components of dutyholders’ arrangements in demonstrating compliance with relevant legislation.

# Relationship to IAEA Documentation and Guidance

1. The essential elements of a national nuclear security regime are set out in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment (Ref. [3]) and the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fundamentals (Ref. [4]). Further guidance is available within IAEA Technical Guidance and Implementing Guides.
2. Fundamental Principle J of CPPNM refers to quality assurance and states that a quality assurance policy and quality assurance programmes should be established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to physical protection are satisfied. The importance of issues relating to quality assurance is also recognised in the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, specifically:

* Essential Element 12: Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime – 3.12 A nuclear security regime ensures that each competent authority and authorised person and other organisations with nuclear security responsibilities contribute to the sustainability of the regime by:
  + Developing, implementing and maintaining appropriate and effective integrated management systems including quality management systems.
  + Allocating sufficient human, financial and technical resources to carry out the organisation’s nuclear security responsibilities on an ongoing basis using a risk-informed approach.
  + Routinely conducting maintenance, training and evaluation to ensure the effectiveness of the nuclear security systems.
  + Routinely performing assurance activities to identify and address issues and factors that may affect the capacity to provide adequate nuclear security, including cyber security, at all times.

A more detailed description of quality assurance is provided in Recommendations level guidance, specifically Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 13, Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) (Ref. [5]). This document states “The quality assurance policy and programmes for physical protection should ensure that a *physical protection system* is designed, implemented, operated and maintained in a condition capable of effectively responding to the *threat assessment* or *design basis threat* and that it meets the State’s regulations, including its prescriptive and/or performance-based requirements.”

# Relationship to National Policy Documents

1. The SyAPs provide ONR inspectors with a framework for making consistent regulatory judgements on the effectiveness of a dutyholder’s security arrangements. This TAG provides guidance to ONR inspectors when assessing a dutyholder’s submission demonstrating they have effective processes in place to achieve Security Delivery Principle (SyDP) 5.2 – Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing (EIMT), in support of Fundamental Security Principle (FSyP) 5 – Reliability, Resilience and Sustainability. The TAG is consistent with other TAGs and associated guidance and policy documentation.
2. Government Functional Standard 007: Security (GovS 007) (Ref. [6]) describes the Cabinet Secretary’s expectations of how HMG organisations and third parties handling HMG information and other assets will apply protective security to ensure HMG can function effectively, efficiently and securely. The security outcomes and requirements detailed in GovS 007 have been incorporated within the SyAPs. This ensures that dutyholders are presented with a coherent set of expectations for the protection of nuclear premises, SNI and the employment of appropriate personnel security controls both on and off nuclear premises.
3. The Classification Policy for the Civil Nuclear Industry (Ref. [7]) indicates those categories of SNI, which require protection and the level of security classification to be applied.

# Advice to Inspectors

1. Physical Protection Systems (PPS) should be designed on the basis that the supporting security equipment infrastructure will achieve the standards of reliability claimed in the security plan, thus ensuring risks are appropriately managed and controlled. The reliability of a protection system will only be assured through the site’s full lifecycle by a process of EIMT, which may include the refurbishment or replacement of Security Structures, Systems and Components (SySSCs). This process is based upon a sound understanding of the PPS, the identification of SySSCs together with the categorisation and classification of individual components, knowledge and understanding of the security equipment's characteristics as it ages and the implementation of an appropriate EIMT programme.
2. EIMT activities should be proportionate to the potential consequences of the relevant malicious acts (as detailed in the Design Basis Threat (DBT) document (Ref. [8]) directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities, or other acts which may have an adverse impact on nuclear security. The guidance set out in this TAG should be applied taking account of the graded approach, as described in the SyAPs.

**Regulatory Expectation**

1. The regulatory expectation placed upon the dutyholder is that the security plan identifies the nature and intervals of EIMT for critical elements of the security system and provides appropriate justification for any long-term performance claims without EIMT. EIMT activities should take account of any reliability claims in the security plan and be appropriate for the life cycle and/or PPS outcome required of the site.

There should be traceability of EIMT requirements from the security plans through the plant maintenance schedule to maintenance Instructions.

**Table 1: FSYP 5 - Reliability, Resilience and Sustainability**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| FSYP 5 - Reliability, Resilience and Sustainability | Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing | SyDP 5.2 |
| Security structures, systems and components should receive regular and systematic Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing (EIMT). | | |

# Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing Through Facility Life

1. The provisions of EIMT are relevant to the whole lifecycle of a nuclear facility and the associated SySSC. The nature and balance of these provisions, and hence the associated regulatory expectations, change during the various stages of the lifecycle.

# Design and Security Plan Development

1. Dutyholders should confirm that the security plan identifies the nature and periodicity of the proposed EIMT and provides a justification for any claims associated with any part of the PPS without an EIMT programme. Whenever the latter is claimed, the inspector should confirm the adequacy of the additional design measures incorporated to justify the absence of EIMT, or the arguments and evidence cited in support of such a claim.
2. A key element of the arrangements should be consistency at all stages from the identification of SySSCs in the security plan through to the plant maintenance schedule, or equivalent, and the maintenance instructions (which may be termed job plans). This consistency should include the ability to readily identify the categorisation and classification for a SySSC from anywhere within the chain of documents, e.g. through the use of clear SySSC cross-references between documents.
3. Inspectors should note dutyholders may produce a plant maintenance schedule that includes other plant. In such instances, the inspector should determine whether anything that may affect nuclear security is clearly identified. A systematic approach to identifying SySSCs through their categorisation and classification for inclusion in the Schedule should be adopted.

# Manufacture and Works Tests (Factory Acceptance Tests)

1. Relevant works tests should be formally documented and captured in the dutyholder’s operational documentation (for example, quality plans) as the baseline for ongoing demonstration that the design intent of any SySSC is achieved.

# Onsite Plant Installation, Facility Acceptance Tests and Commissioning (Site Acceptance Tests)

1. Plant changes during installation and testing should be adequately assessed in terms of identifying resultant effects on the proposed EIMT arrangements. Such changes may result in the need to modify the Maintenance Schedules and Maintenance Instructions.
2. For key SySSCs (and where it is not possible for tests to confirm the ability to operate under the most onerous design conditions), the inspector should seek justification of the components’ performance and reliability from additional analysis utilising data from commissioning or rig-testing. Reference data should be taken from type-testing to establish a baseline for comparison against in-service performance.
3. As a project proceeds, dutyholders should document changes to the maintenance schedule and maintenance instructions along with records of the consideration and agreement by all relevant project, security and operations disciplines.
4. Dutyholders should consider the extent to which the commissioning will demonstrate the proposed in-service test regime for each part of a SySSC, as well as the whole system itself.
5. Where an EIMT activity to satisfy a security requirement is shown on the appropriate maintenance schedule or equivalent, cross references to its security role definition within the security plan, unique numbers for the test documents, maintenance instruction number and commissioning documents, should be provided as appropriate.

# Operations

1. EIMT for the various SySSCs should be specified, standards selected, and the work undertaken to a level of quality commensurate with their security Classification.
2. Attention should be paid to the following security plan concerns:

* Confirmation that any security plan requirements for staggered testing are translated into the maintenance schedule.
* Confirmation that, in constructing the maintenance schedule, the dutyholder has considered and demonstrated that the minimum configurations of operational SySSCs justified in the security plan will be maintained.
* Where a SySSC is taken out of service for EIMT, temporary security plans should be in place to provide commensurate levels of protection or provide adequate mitigation where this is not possible. Furthermore, the potential for the EIMT to initiate a fault or generate vulnerability should be analysed and the associated risks appropriately assessed and managed.

# Inspection Based Maintenance

1. Dutyholders should establish that the programme of work provides the necessary EIMT for the PPS (within an overall long-term plan) and includes additional work following, or arising, from the identification of any specific security concerns during operation of a facility or SySSC. The EIMT programme should be assessed by Suitably Qualified and Experienced Persons (SQEP) from the dutyholder’s operational and design authority organisations.
2. All EIMT activities should be carried out using written procedures. Appropriate arrangements should be in place for the independent checking (by sampling) of EIMT activity to confirm it is conducted to the specified standard.
3. Dutyholders’ arrangements for the reporting and reviewing of results, the prioritisation and sentencing of defects, (including independent assessment where appropriate), should be assessed to confirm overall acceptability.
4. Where there is a regulatory or procedural control over a SySSC’s return to service, be it as an individual system or part of a plant restart, all findings pertinent to the security justification for the restart should be provided in good time for consideration and if necessary, assessment by inspectors.
5. Procedures should be sampled to confirm they contain clear and adequate instructions, guidance on reporting criteria, provide adequate means of identifying and recording items inspected and any features or defects observed.
6. SQEP staff should review the final outage inspection reports, or any equivalent reports, and advise whether any of the matters reported raise new concerns which should at least be considered before equipment is brought back into service.

# Verification of EIMT

1. The dutyholder should have a process for confirming maintenance has taken place and records any repairs or modifications. It should be protectively marked to reflect the importance of that equipment to nuclear security and associated EIMT. This should specifically include an appropriate level of physical verification of EIMT on the facility.

# Periodic Security Reviews

1. Periodic reviews of security by both the dutyholder’s plant and security directorate(s)/department(s) as part of the overarching internal assurance programme, should demonstrate the ongoing adequacy of EIMT regimes by describing plant failures, anomalies and the means of rectification. Confirmation should be provided that cumulative data from EIMT continues to support the reliability claims made within security plans.

# End of Routine Operations and Decommissioning

1. Dutyholders may be able to justify reductions in EIMT for the various phases of facility decommissioning where site categorisation for theft and sabotage decreases and a less onerous outcome may, therefore, be required of the PPS. However, any such reduction should be supported by amended security plans that demonstrate the revised arrangements are adequate. Such plans will require approval and possibly assessment by ONR before they can be implemented.

**Inspectors should consider:**

* Does the dutyholder have adequate arrangements for maintaining any installed SySSC prior to it being put into operational service?
* Is the EIMT programme adequate to maintain the current (and/or future) PPS posture, outcome and the associated nuclear security functions identified in security plans?
* Do dutyholders have a process for capturing project assumptions related to EIMT generated by the on-going design and security analyses, along with an auditable record of where these assumptions are recorded in operational documents?
* Whether it is appropriate for the EIMT programme for SySSC to be aligned with any other EIMT programme on site?
* Does the EIMT strategy ensure that adequate compensatory measures have been identified and implemented to allow SySSC to be released for EIMT?
* Does the proposed EIMT strategy support security plan reliability claims?
* Is adequate development work undertaken on novel systems or components between concept design and manufacturing? Such work may have significant impact on the EIMT tasks defined within the evolving maintenance schedules.
* Are all relevant stakeholders involved in developing an appropriate EIMT programme for SySSC?
* Has the dutyholder adequately incorporated human factors assessments of EIMT tasks during testing and commissioning? Looking in particular, for error traps, and common cause failure mechanisms created by the procedures or by operators’ actions.
* Whether the security classification is appropriate for the EIMT specified, and standards selected, for the various SySSCs it covers?
* Are the dutyholder’s arrangements for developing a catalogue of all facility EIMT adequate and are relevant SySSC placed on the plant maintenance schedule?
* Where in-situ testing is not possible, are alternative arrangements made by the dutyholder adequate? Such alternative arrangements may be necessary for issues such as the removal and offline testing of a device.
* Are security plan assumptions regarding component reliability, which can influence “mean time between failures” and therefore tests and performance, along with unavailability for EIMT, adequately reflected in implementation documentation such as Maintenance Schedules and Instructions?
* Do EIMT instructions provide for full and accurate reporting? This should include the recording and reporting of any defects and of any properties or parameters which may need to be monitored to confirm continuing effective operation. Clear criteria for successful completion of the work should be stated and the procedures should provide for the reporting and rectification of non-conformances.
* Are arrangements in place to identify trends in failures or gradual degradation of SySSC over time?
* Are both security plan and plant changes adequately assessed by appropriate SQEP staff to identify commensurate effects on the existing EIMT arrangements and the need for any additional or revised EIMT? Such changes may result in the need to modify the maintenance schedules and maintenance instructions.
* Does the dutyholder have adequate EIMT arrangements for equipment provided to support the site’s and facility’s security response?
* Are the EIMT arrangements for SySSCs fully integrated into the sites wider operational maintenance and ageing management and obsolescence arrangements?
* Are there adequate provisions for the secure, quarantined storage of overhauled security equipment prior to it being re-installed on the facility?
* Are dutyholders adopting the latest relevant good practices for EIMT?
* Do dutyholders have a formal process for EIMT staff to identify shortfalls, inconsistencies or discrepancies in EIMT procedures, along with evidence that staff are encouraged to use the process and that the process provides a mechanism for dealing with the observations raised and learning from experience?
* Are the dutyholder’s maintenance arrangements based on generic approaches? Such approaches could include: reliability-centered maintenance, condition monitoring, planned maintenance, preventative maintenance, risk-based maintenance and run-to-failure (corrective) maintenance.

# References

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| [8] | HMG, “Design Basis Threat”. |

*Note: ONR staff should access the above internal ONR references via the How2 Business Management System.*

# Glossary and Abbreviations

CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

DBT Design Basis Threat

EIMT Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing

FSyP Fundamental Security Principle

GovS 007 Government Functional Standard GovS 007: Security

HMG His Majesty’s Government

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

NISR Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003

NSS Nuclear Security Series

ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation

PPS Physical Protection System

SNI Sensitive Nuclear Information

SQEP Suitably Qualified and Experienced Persons

SySSC Security Structure, System and Component

SyAP Security Assessment Principle

SyDP Security Delivery Principle

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