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ONR GUIDE			
IDENTIFICATION OF LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND TRAINING NEEDS			
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1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has established a set of Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) (Reference 7). This document contains Fundamental Security Principles (FSyPs) that dutyholders must demonstrate have been fully taken into account in developing their security arrangements to meet relevant legal obligations. The security regime for meeting these principles is described in security plans prepared by the dutyholders, which are approved by ONR under the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR) 2003 (Reference 1).
- 1.2 The term 'security plan' is used to cover all dutyholder submissions such as nuclear site security plans, temporary security plans and transport security statements. NISR Regulation 22 dutyholders may also use the SyAPs as the basis for Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS&IA) documentation that helps them demonstrate ongoing legal compliance for the protection of Sensitive Nuclear Information (SNI). The SyAPs are supported by a suite of guides to assist ONR inspectors in their assessment and inspection work, and in making regulatory judgements and decisions. This Technical Assessment Guidance (TAG) is such a guide.

2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- 2.1 This TAG contains guidance to advise and inform ONR inspectors in exercising their regulatory judgment during assessment activities relating to a dutyholder's identification of learning objectives and training needs. It aims to provide general advice and guidance to ONR inspectors on how this aspect of security should be assessed. It does not set out how ONR regulates the dutyholder's arrangements. It does not prescribe the detail, targets or methodologies for dutyholders to follow in demonstrating they have addressed the SyAPs. It is the dutyholder's responsibility to determine and describe this detail and for ONR to assess whether the arrangements are adequate.

3. RELATIONSHIP TO RELEVANT LEGISLATION

- 3.1 The term 'dutyholder' mentioned throughout this guide is used to define 'responsible persons' on civil nuclear licensed sites and other nuclear premises subject to security regulation, a 'developer' carrying out work on a nuclear construction site and approved carriers, as defined in NISR. It is also used to refer to those holding SNI.
- 3.2 NISR defines a 'nuclear premises' and requires 'the responsible person' as defined to have an approved security plan in accordance with Regulation 4. It further defines approved carriers and requires them to have an approved Transport Security Statement in accordance with Regulation 16. Persons to whom Regulation 22 applies are required to protect SNI. ONR considers competence management to be an important component of a dutyholder's arrangements in demonstrating compliance with relevant legislation.

4. RELATIONSHIP TO IAEA DOCUMENTATION AND GUIDANCE

- 4.1 The essential elements of a national nuclear security regime are set out in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) (Reference 4) and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals (Reference 3). Further guidance is available within IAEA Technical Guidance and Implementing Guides.

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- 4.2 The importance of issues relating to workforce competence are also recognised in the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, specifically:
- Essential Element 12: Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime – 3.12:
 - d) Allocating sufficient human, financial and technical resources to carry out the organisation’s nuclear security responsibilities on a continuing basis using a risk informed approach; and
 - e) Routinely conducting maintenance, training, and evaluation to ensure the effectiveness of the nuclear security systems.
- 4.3 A more detailed description of the elements is provided in Recommendations level guidance, specifically Nuclear Security Series (NSS) 13, Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) (Reference 2). This publication highlights the importance of sustainability programmes to ensure that physical protection regimes are resilient and effective in the long term through adequate resourcing. With respect to competence management it advises that operators, shippers and carriers should establish sustainability programmes for their physical protection system, which should encompass human resource management and training.
- 4.4 The IAEA also publishes NSS 12 “Educational Programme in Nuclear Security” (Reference 11). It is intended for a range of people with responsibility for nuclear security including university curriculum developers, nuclear security instructors and human resource development managers. The scope of this publication is broad and covers education in all areas of nuclear security, ranging from MSc programmes for developing highly educated staff with in-depth knowledge to a programme for the development of certified nuclear security specialists.
- 4.5 This TAG is also consistent with the Systematic Approach to Training, advocated by the IAEA in in Technical Document 1254 (Reference 10) and implicit in other publications (References 8 and 9).

5. RELATIONSHIP TO NATIONAL POLICY DOCUMENTS

- 5.1 The SyAPs provide ONR inspectors with a framework for making consistent regulatory judgements on the effectiveness of a dutyholder’s security arrangements. This TAG provides guidance to ONR inspectors when assessing a dutyholder’s submission demonstrating they have effective processes in place to achieve SyDP 3.2 – Identification of Learning Objectives and Training Needs, in support of FSyP 3 – Competence Management. The TAG is consistent with other TAGs and associated guidance and policy documentation.
- 5.2 The HMG Security Policy Framework (SPF) (Reference 5) describes the Cabinet Secretary’s expectations of how HMG organisations and third parties handling HMG information and other assets will apply protective security to ensure HMG can function effectively, efficiently and securely. The security outcomes and requirements detailed in the SPF have been incorporated within the SyAPs. This ensures that dutyholders are presented with a coherent set of expectations for the protection of nuclear premises, SNI and the employment of appropriate personnel security controls both on and off nuclear premises.

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- 5.3 The Classification Policy (Reference 6) indicates those categories of SNI, which require protection and the level of security classification to be applied.

6. ADVICE TO INSPECTORS

- 6.1 It is essential that personnel whose activities have the potential to impact on nuclear security are Suitably Qualified and Experienced (SQEP) to carry out their jobs. This includes those who directly carry out security operations and others such as directors, managers, designers, security plan authors (etc) whose roles, if inadequately conceived or executed, may affect security in less visible ways, for example, through introducing latent technical or organisational vulnerabilities. Dutyholders should, therefore, put in place robust arrangements for identifying its functional competence needs and ensuring these are met and maintained. Functional competencies describe the knowledge and skills required of a specific job or task. The arrangements should clearly define the dutyholder's interpretation of SQEP, and should identify those who need to be SQEP. Staff who discharge nuclear security roles should be included within the dutyholder's organisational baseline in accordance with NS-TAST-GD-065 (Reference 12) and TAG 1.2.
- 6.2 By focusing on functional competencies, the dutyholder can define a baseline from which to conduct a learning needs analysis and put in place plans to develop staff competency through a variety of learning methods. A learning need is the gap between current level of knowledge and performance in a particular competency area, and the desired level to meet the organisational objectives. The learning needs analysis may be an iterative process which should link the learning and development planning to the overall goals of the organisation.
- 6.3 Training is a fundamental mechanism through which personnel acquire, and maintain, the skills and knowledge needed to perform a job to defined standards. In other words, training should be instrumental in developing and sustaining competence. IAEA has defined competence as "the ability to put skills and knowledge into practice in order to perform a job in an effective and efficient manner to an established standard" (Reference 9). ONR concurs with this definition, which is widely accepted within the international nuclear community. Other factors contributing to a person's competence include the person's prior experience, aptitude, attitude, behaviours, skills and qualifications. Competence can, therefore, broadly be equated to SQEP. Dutyholders should have arrangements in place to define and deliver the training needed to sustain competence, and these arrangements should be clearly detailed in their security plan. The IAEA advocates the use of the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) which identifies the training need, assists course design, planning the appropriate resources, delivery of the material (implementing) which results in an evaluation of the output and whether it meets the training need. This process is summarised in Appendix 1.
- 6.4 Security Delivery Principle 3.2 recommends that the results from the analysis of roles, tasks and competencies are used to generate learning objectives, which will inform the development of a set of training needs. It also recommends that training programme design and methodology are appropriately selected following the Systematic Approach to Training advocated by the IAEA. The development of competent staff can be achieved through a variety of methods and not solely by a training course. Alternative learning methods include mentoring, on-line courses, on the job training, practical

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simulator exercises or external academic courses leading to recognised security qualifications (e.g. SIA licencing or MSc in Security Management).

6.5 ONR does not assess the competence of dutyholder staff (e.g. security guards or control room operators) directly or authorise them. Rather ONR's seeks confidence that dutyholders have put in place, and are implementing, effective and proportionate arrangements for training and competence assurance for all personnel whose activities may impact upon security. This should cover both dutyholder employees and the contracted element of the workforce, whose actions could impact upon nuclear security. A well-designed training and competence management system should adequately address the following elements:

- Analysis of roles and their associated competencies
- Identification of learning objectives and training needs
- Training programme design
- Selection of appropriate training staff, methods and media
- Assessment of competence (gap analysis)
- Evaluation of training effectiveness
- Organisation and support of the training function
- Knowledge management and capture
- A process to measure, assess and improve training

6.6 This guidance should be applied in a proportionate and targeted manner at each stage. This assessment guide focuses on the analysis of roles and associated competencies, presenting a summary of the reasons why it is an important component of a dutyholder's training arrangements, and sets out the principal factors which should be considered by the ONR inspector.

6.7 The emphasis that the inspector gives to assessing different elements of a dutyholder's training and competence arrangements will depend upon the case being assessed. For example, where the tasks involved in carrying out a role are already well-defined, it may not be necessary to scrutinise the processes used to analyse the role and define competence and training needs. Conversely, where new activities are being developed, closer examination of the approach which the dutyholder takes to analysing these factors may be appropriate. As an overriding principle, the inspector should consider the security significance (as effected by aspects including security function category or the categorisation for theft or sabotage) of the activities concerned and adopt a proportionate and targeted approach to applying the guidance in this document.

Regulatory Expectation

6.8 The regulatory expectation placed upon the dutyholder is that they will ensure that the security plan identifies how they adopt a systematic approach to training that incorporates identification of learning objectives and training needs as part of an ongoing commitment that personnel whose activities have the potential to impact on nuclear security are SQEP to carry out their jobs.

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FSyP 3 - Competence Management	Identification of Learning Objectives and Training Needs	SyDP 3.2
An analysis of roles, tasks and competencies should be used to generate learning objectives, which inform the development of a set of training needs and are used to derive the criteria, or standards, against which the trainee is assessed during and/or after training.		

7. IDENTIFICATION OF LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND TRAINING NEEDS

- 7.1 The analysis of roles, tasks and competencies generate a set of learning objectives. These objectives should inform the development of a set of training needs, and should be used to derive the criteria, or standards, against which the trainee is assessed during and/or after training.
- 7.2 Although dutyholders may choose to put their staff through training programmes which cover all the learning objectives identified in this way, this may not be essential. Each person will bring certain skills and experience to their job and a review of these, and application of appropriate selection techniques, may obviate the need for training to be provided for every facet of a job. Thus it is reasonable for the dutyholder to consider the competencies which a person already has when conducting a gap analysis and target its training effort on those areas where the person is not demonstrably competent. Nonetheless, in circumstances where training is waived, the dutyholder should demonstrate that the waiver is warranted – for example, by ensuring that the person is assessed against the learning objectives and shown to be competent, or that their level of performance during previous assessments corresponds to the standards set out for the role in question (see “Measurement of Competence” TAG 3.3).
- 7.3 Although it is important that the dutyholder’s approach to staff selection is rigorous and effective (see the IAEA guidance in (Reference 9), ONR places emphasis on the adequacy of the dutyholder’s training arrangements and, in particular, the measures used to determine, monitor and sustain competence. Regardless of the previous experience and qualifications of the candidate, the dutyholder should ensure that the competencies needed of each role and post-holder have been identified systematically, and that training is provided for all those areas in which the person is not able to demonstrate an adequate level of competence. As noted above, these should include both technical competencies and other areas such as decision making, management and leadership, communications, behavioural, attitudinal etc.

Inspectors should consider:

- Has the output of the task analysis been distilled into an outline set of training needs?
- Does the set of training needs take account of the qualifications, skills and experience of the employee?
- Have the standards which should be achieved in order for a person to be considered competent been defined?

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- Is the need for refresher training in defined elements of competence acknowledged and formalised?

8. TRAINING PROGRAMME DESIGN

- 8.1 A training programme should be designed by a SQEP individual to help develop and maintain the competence of all personnel with security responsibilities. The starting point for the training programme should be the competence requirements and learning objectives of the role-holder and their competence gaps as identified through a gap analysis. The training programme should specify how those objectives are to be achieved. The programme, therefore, needs to take account of all the elements of training considered in this document. In this sense, the training programme can be viewed as gathering the different elements into a focused and coordinated schedule to support the development of competence for a given role. As referenced above there may be a need to address team working and command and control, as well as individual task performance (e.g., for security control room staff or for those with security event response roles). It should be recognised that there is a need to inculcate a positive security culture in all staff, and training programmes should seek to build in and promote an awareness of security culture and its attributes.
- 8.2 Design of the training programme should give consideration to the most effective means of meeting competence requirements, which means of training is appropriate, and the role that it plays. This will have overlap with other aspects such as task and equipment design and the development of supporting documentation such as procedures and instructions. Where task analysis is used to inform competence requirements and learning objectives, the same task analysis should be used elsewhere in the design process including the development of procedures and instructions. Doing so helps provide assurance that tasks are controlled either through training or the appropriate use of procedures.
- 8.3 **Initial training** programmes should cover all the training needed to enable personnel to work in specified roles and posts. This should include basic induction training which applies to all personnel and covers items such as security hazards and risks and their control measures, secure working practices, actions to take in response to security events etc, as well as job-specific training. In addition to the outputs of the role and task analysis, security plans should be used to identify activities which warrant particular attention during training. For example, tasks upon which significant security claims are made should be highlighted in training and should be extensively exercised to ensure they are properly and consistently done. Tasks which are complex or which are performed infrequently, and hence irregularly practiced, may need identifying and warrant special attention. In the case of infrequent tasks consideration should be given to the timing of training and its delivery so it is provided in good time but not so far in advance of when it is needed that it is forgotten.
- 8.4 It is important that all personnel, from the Board down, receive training which supports the security culture of the organisation, through inculcating the right attitude to security by informing personnel about the behaviours, expectations and management arrangements that help ensure an effective approach to nuclear security. Such security attitudinal training aimed at a wide audience may be achieved by a variety of means such as by making use of the dutyholder's established communication channels/methods for imparting key messages. The need for training to reinforce an appropriate security culture, as well as enabling the acquisition of technical

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competence, is acknowledged by IAEA. Such training should encompass lessons learned from case histories of security events (e.g. Y12), and the underlying organisational and cultural factors that impacted on them. Contractors should be included in such training.

- 8.5 **Continuation training** should also be programmed to help maintain competence, especially for tasks associated with roles which are security-significant and those which are complex or infrequently performed (e.g. by those deputising for others). Different groups may have differing continuing training needs. For example, security operations staff should have the opportunity to rehearse knowledge of the security plan (including security contingency arrangements) and operating rules, and to engage in team training. Maintenance personnel, and those supervising or approving maintenance activity, may require training in the use of equipment needed during infrequently performed activities and in the relevance of their work to the security plan. Supervisors and managers should receive training in security management, leadership, communication, and other supervisory skills. Training should be used to update personnel on operational experience feedback and the implications of modifications to plant, operating regime and instructions as well as personal development needs. Work to reinforce a positive security culture should be a consistent feature of continuing training.
- 8.6 Training of staff involved in dealing with security events is an important aspect of continuing training. Training should address a comprehensive range of scenarios, both to support the development of personnel competence, and to improve the site and/or facility's emergency preparedness and response arrangements. This should include consideration of a full range of competencies such as leadership, interpersonal communications, stress resilience and decision making.
- 8.7 The impact of organisational change on training should not be underestimated. Changes which materially affect an individual's roles, for example, where they move to different jobs or where they take on additional roles, may require different competencies. Instances where the nature of the work carried out on the facility changes, for example, from construction to commissioning, from commissioning to operations or from operations to decommissioning, or where changes in security outcome and posture may need to be accommodated, may necessitate changes in staff competencies. Dutyholder's arrangements should explicitly consider the competencies required during and following an organisational change and demonstrate that staff affected by the change are SQEP for their new or changed roles. The management of change arrangements should include reference to training and assessment programmes in support of this. Dutyholder directors and managers, who are charged with determining the need for, and agreeing, organisational changes, should be trained to help them understand and effectively manage the organisational change process. They should be made aware of the need to control "organisational drift" arising from successive changes.

Inspectors should consider:

- Has the dutyholder established an initial training programme for all personnel whose duties might impact upon security, including the Board, managers and contractors, as well as other staff?

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- Does the initial training programme include induction training to ensure a basic understanding of the employee's responsibilities, secure working practices, generic security-related matters and the threat?
- Does the training programme demonstrate how role-specific training needs are to be met?
- Does the training programme reference task analysis, operating experience, the security plan and any facility security operating procedures, to identify activities which are security-significant, complex or infrequent and which warrant particular attention during training?
- Does the training programme recognise the need to address leadership, managerial, behavioural, communication and security culture issues as well as individual competence?
- Has the dutyholder established an ongoing training programme for all personnel whose activities at work might impact upon security?
- Does the ongoing training programme take account of the demands of each role: e.g. the security significance of different tasks, the need to refresh infrequently practised skills or take account of changes to plant, equipment or instructions, and the need to meet nationally defined standards?
- Does the ongoing training programme clearly define and justify the training schedule(s) for different activities?
- Does the dutyholder acknowledge the need to implement training when new systems, processes and plant are developed or to update personnel on operational experience feedback?
- Does the dutyholder acknowledge the need to review competence requirements during and following periods of organisational change (including as part of its succession planning arrangements) and put in place training programmes to deliver and sustain appropriate competencies?
- Does the training programme identify when training is needed, and how it should be delivered, assessed and evaluated;
- Is training consistent with, and does it continually seek to reinforce, a positive security culture?

9. SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE TRAINING METHODS AND MEDIA

- 9.1 The training media and methods which are used to develop the competencies required in different roles should be both effective and practicable. This demands that careful attention is given to the choice of training media and to the way in which those training media are then used (i.e. the training method). The dutyholder should, therefore, be able to show that it has considered and identified appropriate media and methods to support the training for different tasks.

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9.2 A range of different training media are available, including the following principal examples:

- **Classroom teaching** may be most suitable for introductory material and where detailed information of a theoretical or conceptual nature needs to be learnt. This medium also allows tasks to be talked or walked-through using a seminar or workshop-style approach. However, classroom teaching allows the trainee limited opportunity to gain hands-on experience in performing a practical task, or to put conceptual learning into practice.
- **On-job training** is an essential part of most training programmes and provides a realistic environment for the trainee. However, it can be difficult to ensure systematic and controlled on-job training because the learning environment may be less easily controlled. In addition, concerns about the potential impact of trainee error on security-significant tasks may limit the suitability of this approach for some activities. The dutyholder should be able to demonstrate that on-job training is properly specified, provided by people suitably SQEP (i.e. competent) to carry out that function, and that adequate control and supervision is in place.
- **Simulators** allow the rehearsal of practical skills under controlled conditions. Simulators and replica equipment may be used to train groups of staff other than security operators; mock-ups of plant items, for example, are a valuable aid to maintenance staff and others who need to learn about how this equipment works, and to prepare them for working on it in a safe and secure environment. This can also help in dose minimisation. Whilst it is unlikely that dutyholders will have security control room simulators, there may be secondary security control rooms that could be utilised for training specific actions such as response to security events and alarms. Low fidelity task simulation (e.g. table-top exercises) may also be used.
- **Open learning techniques**, in which training is provided through structured self-teaching packages, are increasingly popular owing to their flexibility and cost-effectiveness. These techniques may employ advanced technology such as computer or tablet based packages and interactive video as well as more conventional methods. Care should be taken to ensure that open learning is fit for purpose, and that it is not used at the expense of other forms of training without justification and demonstrable benefits.
- **Tool-box talks**, which may not be formally structured in the same way as other training approaches, can play an important role in training. These will typically involve discussions, often led by a manager or team leader, on factors affecting the way in which jobs are carried out; for example, adherence to procedures, security culture, communications etc.
- **Others**, such as meetings, briefings, Operational Experience (OPEX) displays, etc, can also be used to support the more formal and established methods.

9.3 Choosing an appropriate training medium does not of itself guarantee that training will be satisfactory. The way in which the training medium is used is of utmost

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importance. For example, training can be given to shift teams or to individuals, and classroom instruction can be based around lectures or a workshop approach which encourages trainee participation. On-job training carried out under the direction of a SQEP individual, working to a set of defined training objectives which may be supported by detailed work instructions, is better than simply watching an activity being performed, and feedback on trainee performance can be provided concurrently or via a debrief.

- 9.4 Delivery of training requires instructors who have the appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes for their area(s) of responsibility. They should thoroughly understand all aspects of the security training syllabus they are responsible for delivering, and the relationship between the course content and security operations. Additionally the instructors should be familiar with the basics of adult learning and a systematic approach to training, and should have adequate instructional and assessment skills.
- 9.5 When the training method has been determined, attention should be given to the materials needed that will best support it and to planning its implementation. The design and use of items such as training manuals, lessons plans, simulator exercise scenarios, data recording sheets and other supporting equipment need careful consideration in order to ensure structured and effective training.
- 9.6 The inspector should ensure the dutyholder has considered the choice of training methods, and the way in which these are used, as well as the training media that support them. The dutyholder should be able to demonstrate that the selected training methods and media promote effective development of the learning objectives and competencies which have previously been specified.
- 9.7 Where training has to be revalidated it is important this is done in sufficient time to enable personnel to maintain their competence. The dutyholder should keep an accurate record of all security training undertaken by their staff or contractors to enable it to demonstrate that personnel are competent. Reminders should be sent out in good time ahead of an individual's competence lapsing where refresher training is needed to maintain currency.

Inspectors should consider:

- Are the dutyholder's chosen training media and training methods based upon a consideration of how best to achieve the learning objectives?
- Are the training methods developed, planned and applied by SQEP personnel who are familiar with current practice regarding training/instructional techniques?
- Is training delivered by personnel who have acquired relevant training qualifications or equivalent experience with evidence of their suitability as trainers?
- Are the training methods subject to periodic review to ensure that they are appropriate, and reflect current good practice?
- Are simulators and other training media kept up-to-date such that they reflect changes to the site and its security equipment and arrangements?

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- Are the methods for on-job training appropriate?
- Does the training method take account of the supporting material which is needed - e.g. lesson plans, simulator scenarios, etc.?
- Are training records kept and up to date, and reminders issued to help maintain workforce competence
- Does the dutyholder take account of 360° feedback, evaluation and learning from prior training programmes?

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1. **Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003.** Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 403
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11. **IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 12.** Educational Programme in Nuclear Security. March 2010. 7
12. **ONR Document NS-TAST-GD-065.** Function and Content of a Nuclear Baseline

Note: ONR staff should access the above internal ONR references via the How2 Business Management System.

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CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CS&IA	Cyber Security and Information Assurance
FSyP	Fundamental Security Principle
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
NISR	Nuclear Industries Security Regulations
NSS	Nuclear Security Series
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
SAT	Systematic Approach to Training
SNI	Sensitive Nuclear Information
SPF	Security Policy Framework
SQEP	Suitably Qualified and Experienced
SyAP	Security Assessment Principle
SyDP	Security Delivery Principle
TAG	Technical Assessment Guide

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APPENDIX 1: SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO TRAINING

A1.1. The systematic approach to training (SAT) is recognised as a model for assisting in identifying the training needs and for designing, planning, implementing and evaluating training programmes. It has been used in the last 20 years by several regulatory and governmental agencies, as well as many dutyholder organisations.

A1.2. The dutyholder's management needs to assign the responsibilities for applying SAT. In some organisations, a person (or the leader of the team) is named the training coordinator (TC). Typical roles and responsibilities of the TC include:

- Planning the competence gap analysis
- Briefing the management and staff on the conduct of the competence gap analysis
- Organising and supervising the implementation of each step of the competence gap analysis
- Considering how to fill the gaps by recruitment, training and outsourcing;
- Reporting the results of the analysis and recommending means to fill the gaps to the dutyholders' management
- For those gaps to be filled by training, developing a programme to provide the training needed, in consultation with other staff and management
- Supervising the implementation of the training programme
- Evaluating the training results
- Suggesting future training actions or alternative measures to ensure regulatory competence in the short, medium and long term

A1.3. SAT consists of five interrelated phases as follows:

A1.3.1 ANALYSIS

In this phase, the training needs are identified to cover those competence gaps that are to be remedied by training as determined by the gap analysis.

A1.3.2 DESIGN

Training needs and learning points related to specific competences are converted to learning objectives, including evaluation strategies, which are then organised into training plans, taking into account the available options and methods for training. An annual training programme for the dutyholder can be developed by the management with the assistance of the TC, based on the organisational strategies and the individual needs.

A1.3.3 DEVELOPMENT

In this phase, training materials and evaluation tools are prepared in accordance with the training plan produced in the design phase, so that the achievement of training

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objectives can be confirmed. The work performed in this phase, as well as in the design phase, ensures that the intended training is both appropriate and adequate. This work includes, among other things, the production and modification of:

- Training plans
- Training materials (learner text, presentations and hand-outs)
- Instructor manuals
- Evaluation tools

A1.3.4 IMPLEMENTATION

In this phase, training is conducted in a specific training environment, using the training materials that were created in the development phase. Specific delivery methods and tools are used to ensure that training is delivered in an effective and efficient manner. Typical activities in this phase are:

- Deliver training through the training programme
- Use internal or external training facilities
- Contract and secure qualified trainers (e.g. lecturers, mentors and experts)
- Use appropriate and adequate equipment
- Conduct training in accordance with the lesson plans
- Use evaluation tools developed

A1.3.5 EVALUATION

The training and development programme needs to be continually evaluated on the basis of data collected during each preceding phase. The evaluation provides feedback that can facilitate training and development programme improvements. There are several sources of feedback:

- Course evaluation by trainees
- Self-evaluation of performance improvement by trainees;
- Course evaluation by trainers
- Feedback from line managers on how the training and development affected employee performance
- Feedback from interested parties, such as contractors and non-security staff, on dutyholder security staff performance

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