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| 12 September 2025 | Redgrave Court  Merton Road  Bootle  Merseyside  L20 7HS    [Contact@onr.gov.uk](mailto:Contact@onr.gov.uk)  Unique ref: 2025/32406 |
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# Response to the Nuclear Task Force Interim Report

Dear Nuclear Taskforce

I am writing on behalf of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) to provide our response to the questions relevant to us in the Nuclear Taskforce’s interim report. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to this important review.

ONR’s response reflects our independent regulatory perspective and draws upon our statutory duties, technical expertise, and long-standing experience in regulating nuclear safety and security. Our response seeks to:

* Reiterate our commitment to facilitating the safe and timely deployment of new nuclear projects. We provide independent regulatory oversight that enables confidence in the safety, security, and resilience of nuclear operations, thereby supporting the Government’s broader ambitions for low-carbon energy and energy security.
* Emphasise the importance of independent, robust regulatory assessment. While we actively support the Government’s new nuclear programme, ONR’s statutory responsibility to provide independent assessment remains central. Our regulatory activity ensures that safety and security standards are consistently met and that risk is effectively managed, complementing Government policy without compromising safety or security standards.
* Highlight our commitment to collaboration and the promotion of constructive challenge. ONR values constructive engagement with the Taskforce, industry, and international partners, to support a regulatory environment that is enabling, aligned with international good practice, and promotes healthy challenge.

ONR remains committed to working closely with the Taskforce, and hope that our input assists in shaping its final recommendations.

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require further clarification or discussion on any aspect of our response.

Yours sincerely,

Rachel Grant

Director Strategy and Corporate Affairs

Office for Nuclear Regulation

1. What changes to regulatory guidance or processes would encourage regulators or duty holders to take a more proportionate approach?
2. In environmental regulation, how could EIA Regulations and Habitats Regulations, or their application on the nuclear estate, be amended to encourage proportionality? For example, could environmental cost during construction be compensated by longer term environmental gains once operation has begun, or by the wider environmental benefits of low carbon energy.

We support changes to the Environmental Impact Assessment for Decommissioning Regulations (EIADR) and the wider Proportionate Regulatory controls (PRC) policy that would end ONR’s regulatory responsibility after de-licensing, after which sites could be regulated by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the relevant environment agency.

We have previously provided our recommendation to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) that EIADR should no longer apply once sites are delicensed, as was the case for the full decommissioning of the Imperial College Reactor Centre in early 2024, which became the [first reactor site to be fully decommissioned in UK nuclear history](https://www.onr.org.uk/news/all-news/2024/02/onr-completes-first-ever-full-decommissioning-of-uk-reactor-site-under-modern-regulatory-controls) under modern regulatory controls, following delicensing in 2022.

We have also supported DESNZ in its initial considerations of PRC, including for EIADR to cease applying after a site is delicensed. This would remove administrative burden for both dutyholders preparing updated submissions, and a regulatory body assessing and publicly consulting on the case. We stand ready to assist government with further work in this area.

1. What measures could prevent vexatious judicial reviews from driving disproportionate approaches that increase costs and delay?

Question covered in our response to call for evidence

1. How can we create an appropriate level of tension and debate between regulators and duty holders? How could constructive challenge be incentivised without increasing delay?

We recognise that dutyholders don’t often challenge our regulatory decisions, despite there being processes in place which are published on our website. We agree that timely challenge and debate are a necessary part of a healthy regulatory system and we note the recent Nuclear Industry Association recommendation for the UK nuclear industry to collaborate to create guidance on “How to Challenge Regulatory Judgements”.

We are considering ways to enable dutyholders to feel confident that challenge is welcome and would not lead to unnecessary delay or negative outcomes.

An approach that has been used for regulators and dutyholders to break down the natural resistance to challenge, is the G6 approach we described in our response to the call for evidence.

This was first used to great effect at Sellafield to accelerate risk and hazard reduction at the site and very much focussed on behaviours of both regulators and dutyholders. The approach has been broadly captured in our guidance for ‘enabling regulation’. It has been used successfully for other projects across the sector, although there are also instances where the approach has also struggled to make progress. Nevertheless, there may be benefits in refreshing the approach, and perhaps having an industry focussed G6 approach that could address some of the cultural issues at a strategic level.

There are two specific areas where constructive challenge is currently incentivised which we think provide a valuable reference point for future improvements:

Our regulatory sandboxes have fostered a productive tension between regulators and dutyholders. By creating a safe space for discussion and challenge, they allow all parties to test assumptions and openly debate issues without a formal permissioning process. Dutyholders are encouraged to push boundaries and present novel solutions, while regulators can probe, question, and stress-test these proposals in real time.

In 2023, we partnered with the Environment Agency for a groundbreaking sandboxing exercise which was applied to two potential uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the nuclear sector. We received funding from the Regulatory Innovation Office in September 2025 to [lead a further regulatory sandbox on the application of AI to support the deployment of new nuclear,](https://www.onr.org.uk/news/all-news/2023/08/end-of-project-dissemination-event-for-ai-regulatory-sandboxing-pilot) and for waste categorisation. We welcome further opportunities to work closely with industry in regulatory sandbox settings.

ONR has worked closely with DESNZ in the development of their guidance: “Ways of Working – principles to guide the application of ALARP and Best Available Techniques (BAT) in the nuclear industry”. A section of this guidance focuses on providing appropriate routes for clarification, second opinion or raising concerns if there is a lack of understanding on elements of the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)/BAT demonstration.

1. Are there examples where ‘offsetting’ harm can deliver more comprehensive and long-term benefits? For instance, in environmental regulation, what would be the impact of allowing organisations to pay for environmental conservation and enhancement efforts off-site?

Not applicable

1. Are there specific consents or regulations that could be consolidated into a single process to avoid duplication while ensuring clarity around procedural requirements? For instance, the Justification process (JOPPIR) is often cited as duplicative. What are the opportunities and challenges of streamlining this process by issuing immediate regulatory justification for classes of practice, such as (for example, Light Water Reactors)?

There are efficiencies that could be gained through reform to the application of JOPIIR and Export Control requirements.

In relation to JOPIIR, as highlighted within our response to the call for evidence, our view is that grouping technologies into classes or practices, rather than requiring each new nuclear power plant to apply as a new type or class of practice, could alleviate some of the requirements and effort required, without the need to amend existing legislation. Research could be undertaken to determine whether similar reactor technologies could be categorised into groups of justified classes or practices.

As well as undertaking this research, we would support a review of the guidance for JOPIIR. From our involvement with existing JOPIIR applications, we have seen some very lengthy and detailed submissions that have included significant design information and demonstrations of safety and environmental benefits that are scrutinised under other regulatory processes and so were not required. The purpose of JOPIIR is a high-level assessment of the holistic benefits to the country of a class or type of practice (CTP) that has never been carried out in the UK previously.

On export control requirements, a quick and practical solution to reduce duplicative administrative burden and strengthen international collaboration would be to grant us a special licence to share export-controlled information with international organisations and nuclear regulators for regulatory purposes. This would not require legislative change, only the issue of a single export licence from the UK Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU).

Currently, ONR, the DESNZ Non-Proliferation Unit, and ECJU repeatedly process licence applications for the same scope of information, but for different international recipients. Each licence is valid for only 2–5 years, requiring early renewal, which adds further unnecessary workload. A single overarching licence would eliminate these duplications and delays.

Examples of inefficiencies include: it took more than two years to obtain a licence with the US regulator (NRC), more than 12 months with the Canadian regulator, and collaboration with the French regulator regarding export-controlled technology has been paused since March – their head office address has changed thus requiring a licence amendment.

Other burdens that could be reduced include: our need for an export licence to send legally obliged nuclear safeguards information to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on behalf of the UK.

Also, in the event of an international nuclear emergency, we could not legally provide export-controlled information without the appropriate licence, creating a serious risk to timely global nuclear safety and security.

1. Are there compelling benefits to changing regulatory boundaries that would outweigh the disruption? If so, please provide evidence to support that.

No ONR response

1. What changes to NSIP guidance are needed to ensure that the regulatory process fully captures all relevant costs and benefits and balances them appropriately?

Not applicable

1. Could the National Policy Statement be adapted to enable fleet approach of approvals for identical or largely similar design scheme?

Matter of government policy

1. Does the current semi-urban population density criteria prevent otherwise suitable sites coming forward, and if so how should they be changed?

We stand ready to help government in thinking through future options for the semi-urban population density criteria (SUPD).

We are aware of suggestions to remove the SUPD and rely instead on the requirements of emergency planning regulations (The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations). This would involve an operator making a technical evaluation, the host local authority using that technical evaluation to set a detailed emergency planning zone, and then the host local authority working with national and local emergency responding agencies to develop an adequate emergency plan for that detailed emergency planning zone.

Our view is that using the National Policy Statement (NPS) criteria avoids nugatory time and cost associated with these actions at the site suitability stage. The SUPD demonstrably helps to exclude, at the outset, those sites that are most likely to be unsuitable due to the neighbouring population density. There are likely to be opportunities to work with DESNZ to refine the criteria if we the see the development (and safety justification) of advanced technologies with enhanced passive safety features, but for the moment, SUPD is an effective approach to provide early guidance.

1. What measures would create more effective collaboration and common resourcing between regulators?

As highlighted in our response to the call for evidence, we believe improved coordination and collaboration across domestic regulators would lead to efficiencies. The creation of a multi-agency framework, clearly setting out new build regulatory processes for new entrants, could bring significant benefit.

We are aware of the recommendation in the Corry review that a lead regulator is appointed for all major projects in which multiple regulators have an interest. We are committed to exploring the feasibility of this with the Environment Agency, other regulators and government in due course.

The MoU between ONR and the Environment Agency [onr-ea-mou-november-2024-25-update.docx](https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.onr.org.uk%2Fmedia%2F5g5kwsjk%2Fonr-ea-mou-november-2024-25-update.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK), has an established set of high-level principles to manage working arrangements in key areas where there are joint regulatory activities. In addition, at the operational level we have joint guidance [onr-insp-gd-061-guidance-to-support-the-joint-regulatory-mou-between-onr-and-ea-on-matters-of-mutual-interest-in-england.docx](https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.onr.org.uk%2Fmedia%2Fptfh1woh%2Fonr-insp-gd-061-guidance-to-support-the-joint-regulatory-mou-between-onr-and-ea-on-matters-of-mutual-interest-in-england.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK) which covers regulation of nuclear safety, safeguards, security, transport, and environmental protection on nuclear licensed sites, and other sites where both ONR and the Environment Agency have respective regulatory functions.

Part of this guidance identifies primary and secondary regulatory responsibility and working arrangements. The guidance has recently been reviewed and establishes a framework for more effective co-ordination and collaboration. In the short term, there is an opportunity to improve implementation within both organisations to deliver the intent of these arrangements and provide benefit to dutyholders.

1. Are Strategic Workforce Plans sufficiently mature across all organisations to ensure that SQEP skills can be delivered in sufficient numbers and within the correct timescales?

The Nuclear Skills Task force brought together industry, government and training bodies to develop a strategic plan to retain, attract and develop the skilled workforce required to deliver ambitious plans for new civil and defence nuclear. The resulting Nuclear Skills Plan has made a good start, successfully delivering results (for example DestinationNuclear.com, and driving collaboration).

Ongoing involvement and attention from government, industry and regulators are necessary to maintain progress, monitor long-term demand, and address any fluctuations in demand.

We understand the need for a flexible organisation that can adapt to future demands and to ensure we have greater agility in how we utilise and develop our current people.

However, it is challenging to quantify the demand for Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person or Personnel skills in the longer term across the range of our activities due to the unpredictability of future deployment needs. A strategic steer from government would mean we could take a risk-based view in terms of investing in the skills sets required to recruit now or internally develop to build capability and capacity for the future.

1. What incentives and approaches might address the cultural issues identified to drive a reduction in complexity and bureaucracy?

Externally, we have been very active in influencing sustained improvements in safety and security culture in the UK nuclear industry through a “twin track” approach of targeted interventions and enabling activities. An example of targeted interventions is our sector-wide thematic intervention on cyber security leadership, governance and culture, to ensure that comprehensive arrangements are in place to prevent a cyber-attack.

For enabling activities, we have worked with the University of Manchester and the UK nuclear industry to develop a model and measure of safety culture, which has been validated specifically for our industry. Known as the Nuclear Industry Safety Culture Inventory (NISCI), this tool reduces barriers to interorganisational learning and introduces efficiency into the safety culture assessment process.

In 2023, we commissioned an independent review of our culture by the Alliance Manchester Business School (AMBS). The purpose of the review was to:

* + determine the extent to which our culture supports achievement of our mission - to protect society by securing safe nuclear operations;
  + to provide recommendations which will allow us to learn lessons to further strengthen our culture.

We are one of few regulators internationally to have commissioned such an assessment and its was identified as a good performance in the IAEA International Regulatory Review Service mission to the UK in 2024. We have published AMBS’ report in full in line with our transparency policy. We are committed to carrying out periodic re-assessments of our culture, to monitor progress and drive continual improvement.

The final independent report found that we are a supportive organisation and that our enabling approach to regulation is praised by external stakeholders. It confirmed the positive features expected of a regulator including our professionalism, technical expertise and independence. The report also identified potential areas for improvement, for example our tendency towards perfectionism and risk aversion.

Since the publication of AMBS’s report, we have acted to further strengthen our culture, for example by instigating a series of ‘Leading ONR’ events to provide our leaders with the tools to embed our organisational values of Supportive, Open-minded, Fair and Accountable more strongly. We have also made culture a strategic theme of our Corporate Plan for the past three years to promote inclusion and excellence, and ensure that we remain agile, resilient and effective to protect the long-term delivery of our mission. This work is important as our leadership recognises that we must continue to work hard to make sure our values are being lived out in the organisation on a day-to-day basis.

We are in the process of reviewing our Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs), marking a pivotal step in modernising the UK’s nuclear safety framework. This will deliver a streamlined, future-ready set of principles that reflect the evolving regulatory landscape and enable technological advancements⁠, showing that we are able to respond to challenges and opportunities. This is a key element of a broader review of our guidance throughout 2025/26, streamlining and simplifying it so that it is accessible and supports the industry.

We have published a new ‘RITE’ policy, setting out how we can ensure that we deliver Risk Informed and Targeted Engagements. RITE is not a new process but a philosophy giving our inspectors the increasing confidence, knowledge and skills to target engagements in an efficient and effective manner.

We have launched an Organisational Learning and Knowledge Management (OLKM) improvement project to ensure that we are up to date in techniques and tools to capture and share knowledge efficiently and effectively across the business. Supported by external exert partners, the team has developed a clear future vision for OLKM that will serve as the foundation for our future framework and will help guide its roll-out.

We welcome the taskforce’s focus on culture and acknowledge its interim findings. They provide an opportunity to refresh our expectations and re-engage our workforce in this area. We welcome the idea of a strategic steer from government to incentivise cultural change. We believe there is a timely opportunity to reflect this strategic steer in the update of our strategy for 2025-2030, which will give us the necessary focus and accountability for sustained change.

We believe our approach to understanding and continually improving our culture, aligned to international good practice, is sound. Furthermore, many of the elements of an efficient and effective regulatory culture are already captured in our existing ‘enabling regulation’ philosophy. We therefore have a good platform to build upon a strategic steer from government, and we have the processes in place to monitor and drive improvements to our culture. This will be a significant feature of our new strategy.

1. Where is there sufficient international agreement to enable mutual recognition?

We are supporting efforts to enable mutual recognition, both in terms of streamlining our own assessments by utilising work undertaken by other regulators and through building confidence with other regulators, who may want to utilise some of our assessments, for example on the Rolls Royce SMR. We do this while retaining sovereign decision making on the safety and security of deployment of new nuclear within Great Britain.

We have many good examples of this within the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process. For example, the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) was designed to French standards which we judged to be broadly acceptable. The AP1000 safety case presented in GDA was largely based on the Design Control Document produced for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), with supporting evidence.

We have agreed a trilateral Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the United States and Canadian nuclear regulators to enable collaboration and discussion on Small Modulars Reactors and Advanced Nuclear Reactors.

We have good understanding of US requirements, and our experience demonstrates we can undertake a meaningful GDA and reach an informed view on the suitability of a design for deployment in Great Britain through the assessment of submissions produced to US requirements.

We note the US government are focused on accelerated nuclear deployment for energy security and we too are looking at reducing timescales for regulatory processes. We are proposing to establish a dialogue and knowledge sharing forum with the US NRC to enable us to mirror the progress being made on licensing decision timescales. We have an ambition to provide decisions on the acceptability of reactor designs within two years, and nuclear site licensing within one year, subject to some clearly defined assumptions.

This could be achievable with greater collaboration between the US NRC and us but does require vendors and applicants to produce high quality submissions relating to mature reactor technologies.

There are areas where industry could assist with regulatory collaboration. for example, if reactor technology vendors developed designs with a global deployment model in mind to increase the confidence that regulatory expectations could be met in multiple territories. This is the approach GE-Hitachi has taken with the BWRX-300, which has been designed to IAEA standards.

To enable further regulatory collaboration, it is key for regulators to be looking at the same designs at the same time. A good example here is again the BMRW-300. The design information being assessed by the three regulators is the same, which has allowed collaboration and agreement of common positions. However, timing is not fully synchronised which has presented a barrier to more substantive collaboration, despite the opportunities being greater than on most other reactor designs.

These activities need the technology vendor to allow sharing of their intellectual property IP between itself, its international development partners, and the different regulators involved. Without it, regulatory collaboration is very limited. We previously raised the challenges relating to export control legislation in our call for evidence response and the restrictions that apply to us on the exchange of information with other national regulators.

We are also part of the longstanding efforts in promoting and achieving alignment of international standards and expectations through our work with the IAEA.  This ensures that we maintain our sovereign decision-making capability and continuing to uphold our international reputation.

Finally, we recognise the important part international collaboration plays in promoting UK companies and technology overseas with a view to driving exports. A group of regulators from Europe are observing our GDA of the Rolls Royce SMR to inform their regulatory decisions. The knowledge and experience gained could result in significant acceleration of the regulatory process and deployment of UK technologies in other countries.

1. Should duty holders have mechanisms to challenge regulators when they require significant new evidence of compliance, beyond what has been sufficient for international regulators?

As highlighted in our response to question two, we recognise that dutyholders don’t often challenge our regulatory decisions, despite there being processes in place. We agree that timely challenge and debate are a necessary part of a healthy regulatory system and are considering ways to enable dutyholders to feel confident that challenge is not unwelcome.

We would encourage dutyholders to facilitate ways for us to directly compare their submissions for the UK with the equivalent submissions in other countries, to allow us to appreciate the basis for overseas compliance judgements. This is in addition to our own efforts to work with international colleagues to understand and leverage their judgements.

It should be noted that we do not support the use of operational experience in other jurisdictions as evidence of safety performance. Nuclear facilities need to be designed to deal with rare events, therefore safety performance comparisons based on day-to-day indicators can be misleading.

Severe faults and hazards, such as earthquakes or extreme weather events, need to be tolerated by a nuclear facility, but they are also rare.

This means that even through the accumulation of many years of operation, most facilities will still be unlikely to have experienced some of these more challenging and dangerous events. The reactors at Fukushima Daiichi operated for a combined total of many reactor years but this does not provide a basis to claim proven safety in the face of a one in several thousand-year event - as was the case with the 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

1. What could we put in place to enable regulators to give faster approval, where such approval has already been granted in another country with similar regulatory standards?

In our experience, we have been the first regulator to assess a reactor design, or we are assessing designs in parallel with other regulators, while the technology vendor is still developing the necessary design information and the underpinning safety and security documentation. The designs we are currently assessing, or expecting to assess in the next one or two years, have not yet been approved by any regulator in any country.

When a well-developed reactor design is brought forward by a developer that can demonstrate compliance with UK regulation and proposes to replicate what has been developed elsewhere, and with an appropriate suite of documentation is available from the start, there is the potential to significantly reduce timescales to achieve a GDA design acceptance confirmation (DAC) by up to 50%.

We anticipate being able to realise significant efficiencies on upcoming projects. For example, leveraging a significant amount of our assessment of the AP1000 reactor to inform our assessment of the AP300 reactor. We will focus on the delta between the two designs and where this may present an increase in risk.

Finally, as noted above, we are proposing to establish a dialogue and knowledge sharing forum with the US NRC to enable us to mirror the progress being made on licensing decision timescales.

1. How could the application of ALARP and cost benefit analysis be adapted to ensure that the cost of proposed safety measures is proportionate, avoiding undue delays for measures that do not significantly reduce risks?

There is opportunity in continuing to work with other Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 regulators – principally the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Office for Rail and Road (ORR) – to ensure consistency in our respective interpretation and application of the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle.

Quantitative cost-benefit analysis is not often presented to us as part of regulatory submissions. We have always been willing to work with industry to review any cost-benefit analysis, provide advice and make judgements.

We continue to do a lot of work looking at the application of ALARP. We provide training and guidance to our inspectors, we work with industry and other regulators, and we obtain legal advice to further improve our capability and that of industry so that all submissions and decisions are proportionate and cost-effective.

This is an area where we are committed to continuous engagement with the sector to define compliance.

In January 2024, we published internal guidance to support inspectors in actively considering the cost and economic impact of regulatory asks. We’ll evaluate the implementation of the guidance with input from our stakeholders.

An example of a fit for purpose solution being developed and agreed with licensees, considering broader issues, include:

* + Installation of filtered containment ventilation at Sizewell B: Following the Fukushima accident in 2011, the IAEA initiated a series of ‘stress tests’ across its member states. One of the findings of these stress tests was that reactors like Sizewell B should be retrofitted with filtered containment ventilation to reduce public radiation exposures in the event of a loss of containment accident. This was anticipated to cost £40 million. We engaged with EDF regarding the risks associated with this and agreed that this was not necessary or proportionate.
  + Discussion with EDF in recent years resulted in an agreed position being reached so that retrofitting of filtered containment ventilation was not required immediately. Rather, it would be related to the safety case necessary to justify a lifetime extension of Sizewell B, and that it would be installed at an outage leading up to the lifetime extension itself. We have detailed the rationale and regulatory justifications for this course of action to the international regulatory community.

1. Would more clearly defining tolerability be sufficient to achieve an appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of regulatory intervention, or would additional measures be required? If so, what measures would you suggest?

For ONR (and other health and safety regulators), tolerability refers to the willingness of people to live with a certain level of risk to achieve certain benefits. The HSE Tolerability of Risk framework sets out a Basic Safety Level (BSL) and a Basic Safety Objective (BSO) for risk to both a worker, and a member of the public.

We believe this framework is still relevant and useful in guiding regulatory attention. However, we recognise it has not always achieved the right intention and in some cases there has been a reluctance on the part of dutyholders to push back as they do not wish to be seen to challenge the regulator.

We want to support our dutyholders in having a good understanding of risks, uncertainties and conservatisms*;* ensuring that these are clearly established in safety cases. As highlighted above we agree that timely challenge and debate are a necessary part of a healthy regulatory system and are considering ways to enable dutyholders to feel empowered to challenge us where appropriate and that that is welcome.

1. What specific content do you believe should be included in a strategic steer to drive immediate positive change?

A clear strategic steer from government would help us significantly with prioritisation of new nuclear projects and enable maximum benefit and pace of deployment.

In terms of our voluntary engagement processes such as early engagement and Generic Design Assessment, a steer could include prioritising projects of strategic importance to government. For example, those that are in receipt of government support and which support government ambitions towards achieving key priorities such as net zero, energy security etc.

A steer could set out targets in terms of the number of projects and the key drivers in terms of government policy, for example, grid generation, supporting growth in digital sectors (data centres).

This steer could also highlight those projects or technologies that do not fit within government ambitions and could include government support in assessing the likelihood of successful deployment in the UK of a project.

To consider strategic considerations such as energy security and national security within our statutory obligations i.e. licensing new nuclear projects, we would require a legal basis to factor this into our regulatory decisions. Nevertheless, this should be considered further, particularly how it may be achieved using input from other agencies, as it has the potential to have a positive impact on our regulatory decision making.

1. Do you agree with the need for modifications to the environmental planning and permitting regimes, and if so, what specifically should change?"

Changes relating to planning appeals referred to in our call for evidence response