Office for Nuclear Regulation

R1 2020 Statutory Outage C&I Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This intervention record covers a planned inspection performed as part of an Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Operating Facilities Division (OFD) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (EDF NGL) during the 2020 statutory outage (025) of reactor 1 (R1) at Heysham 1 (HY1) nuclear power station.

The main purpose of this inspection was to inspect a sample of outage work activities carried out in relation to control and instrumentation (C&I) equipment and systems important to nuclear safety in order to confirm that they remain fit for their intended purpose at HY1.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The inspection covered by this intervention report was undertaken in support of ONR’s 2020/21 statutory outage inspection programme.

The inspection included a sample review of HY1 R1 2020 statutory outage activities carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety and considered compliance of the associated arrangements in relation to Licence Condition (LC) 28 – examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIMT).

The findings of this inspection will contribute to ONR’s regulatory decision to grant Consent to the return of R1 to normal operating service in accordance with LC 30 – periodic shutdown.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

During this inspection I found that the C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety maintenance schedule (MS) activities identified in the outage intentions document (OID) for the HY1 R1 2020 statutory outage (025), which I sampled and had been completed, appeared to have been undertaken appropriately. Based on the information provided to me I was also confident that the outstanding C&I related MS activities would also be satisfactorily undertaken.

During the inspection I held discussions with several C&I equipment and system stakeholders and found that they had a good understanding of the systems and equipment they were responsible for and appreciated the importance of the statutory outage work being undertaken. I also observed two maintainers undertaking static reversing contactor testing and found that they had a clear understanding of the associated work specification.

I did identify a small number of maintenance record keeping shortfalls and raised them with HY1, who agreed to address them. However, I considered them to be minor in nature and that they did not pose an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety. It should be noted that none of these issues would preclude R1 returning to service.

During the plant walkdown, I found the operating conditions and lighting levels afforded a comfortable working environment for maintainers and I did not identify any significant signs of age-related degradation with respect to the items of C&I equipment I examined. I also found the general standard of housekeeping to be adequate. I did identify five regulatory issues (RI) and will monitor their progress to resolution as part of normal regulatory business. However, it should be noted that I did not consider any of these issues would pose an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety. Nor did I consider that any of them need to be addressed before R1 can return to service.

Based on my sample inspection of the C&I aspects of the HY1 R1 2020 statutory outage I have assigned an intervention rating of Green to LC 28 compliance.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this inspection of a sample of HY1 R1 2020 statutory outage C&I activities, I did not identify any C&I issues that would pose an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety or prevent ONR issuing a Consent to allow R1 to restart. Therefore, from a C&I perspective, I recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow R1 to return to normal operating service. This is subject to the satisfactory completion of the planned EIMT activities and any emergent work.