Office for Nuclear Regulation

Heysham 1 R2 Pre-Outage visit

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This report records the findings of my intervention visit to Heysham A Nuclear Power Station ahead of the 2015 Reactor 2 periodic shutdown. The intervention was undertaken to confirm the adequacy of mechanical engineering related activities conducted by the Licensee to comply with the requirements of Licence Condition (LC) 28, examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIM&T) against a sample of nuclear safety significant reactor components.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The intervention consisted of on-site meetings and a plant inspection with relevant staff from EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited to determine the adequacy of the work being undertaken on R2 in complying with the requirements of LC 28. The activities examined were selected due to their nuclear safety significance and agreed in advance of the visit with station and site inspector.

The inspection included:

The inspection was supported by inspection visits to the following areas:

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I am satisfied that EIM&T associated with Gas Circulators are been adequately controlled. Whilst I have raised the point that foreign material exclusion (FME) controls within the GCMF could be improved, I do not judge these to be safety significant at this time. I will review the results of their FME self-assessment and follow-up the matter as part of normal regulatory business.

Based on my sampling, I judge that arrangements and control of maintenance of safety significant valves at Heysham A is adequate. I have identified two areas for improvement associated with safety significant valves relating to upkeep of records and guidance associated with determining maintenance activities and their associated periodicities. I will follow these items up separately from the outage, and I do not consider these findings to be safety significant at this time.

I am satisfied based on my sampling that arrangements for EIM&T carried out on the control rod mechanisms are reasonable and adequately controlled. I consider it reasonably practicable for improvements to be made to the standard of foreign material exclusion, and I shall follow these up as part of normal business. I do not however judge these findings to be safety significant at this time.

I am satisfied that the control rod drop tests are carried out in line with the requirements of the safety case, through the relevant technical specification and suitable and sufficient records are been kept and monitored to identify problems both re-actively and pro-actively.

Conclusion of Intervention

This report presents the findings of the mechanical engineering intervention of the LC28 EIMT arrangements in place to support the 2015 Heysham A Reactor 2 periodic shutdown.

Based on my sampling, undertaken as part of this intervention I have satisfied that LC 28 arrangements in place are adequate and I am satisfied they are, overall adequately implemented.

There are in my judgement, clear areas for improvement associated with maintenance activities. Adequacy of record keeping and suitability of foreign material exclusion standards are two examples of this, however I do not consider these to be safety significant and will follow these matters up as part of normal regulatory business.

Based on my intervention I judge that an IIS rating of 3 – Adequate is appropriate for this intervention.