Office for Nuclear Regulation

Hartlepool planned inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake a Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspection at EDF Nuclear Generation’s (NGL’s) Hartlepool power station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hartlepool Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2014/15.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

A system based inspection of the diverse shutdown system, SBI 29, was undertaken by the nominated ONR Site Inspector and supporting Technical Specialists.  The aim of the inspection was to confirm the adequacy of the implementation of the safety case with respect to the safety shutdown systems against the following licence conditions (LC):

I separately inspected control and supervision aspects focussing on sub contract radiation protection supervisors against the requirements on LC 26.

The inspections were based on sampling the implementation of the arrangements in place against each licence condition.  Meetings were held with key site personnel and the main findings of the discussions were communicated to them.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

I judged that overall the Diverse Shutdown System meets the requirements of the safety case and is deemed adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Training on the diverse shutdown system for the control room staff was demonstrably appropriate with all initial training and simulator modules complete.  I have therefore rated the LC 10 element of my inspection through the IIS as 3 (adequate).

I judged the operating rules to be appropriate. In general they were clear and consistent with the principles presented in ONR guidance.  I have therefore rated the LC 23 element of my inspection through the IIS as 3 (adequate).

The arrangements and operating instructions that were in place regarding the use of the diverse shutdown systems were acceptable.  Links between the Technical Specifications (formal instructions) and the relevant operating instruction were easily identified, but in one case would benefit from a review against current operations.  I judge compliance with LC24 to be adequate, IIS rating 3.

The Safety Mechanisms relating to the diverse shutdown system are all listed and prioritised on a critical component database.  I judge that compliance with LC27 was adequate, IIS rating 3.

The diverse shutdown aspects of the maintenance schedule were found to contain an adequate level of maintenance regarding the key components relevant to safety.  The evidence sampled demonstrated maintenance was being carried out in accordance with the maintenance schedule.  I judge the examination, inspection, maintenance and testing under LC28 to be adequate, IIS rating 3.

There were no significant aspects of LC34, leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste.  Hence, I have judged that compliance with LC34 to be “not applicable”.

Inspecting contractor supervisors I was furnished clear evidence of a task training matrix, experience relevant to the specific role and examination, and appointment from both the contractor-supervisor’s parent companies and the licensee.  I judge that compliance with LC26 is adequate, IIS rating 3.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this intervention, there are no findings that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and hence no change to the planned interventions and inspections of Hartlepool are required.  However, although the current Tech Specs meet the fundamental safety case requirements they do require review and update to make them clearer and to reflect the current operations at Hartlepool.