Office for Nuclear Regulation

Hartlepool - Statutory Outage Control and Instrumentation (C&I) Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This intervention record covers a planned inspection performed as part of an Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Operating Facilities Division (OFD) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (EDF NGL) during the 2019 statutory outage of reactor 2 (R2) at Hartlepool (HRA) power station.

The main focus of this inspection was to inspect a sample of outage work activities carried out in relation to control and instrumentation (C&I) equipment and systems important to nuclear safety in order to confirm that they remain fit for their intended purpose at HRA.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The inspection covered by this intervention report was undertaken in support of ONR’s 2019/20 statutory outage inspection programme. The inspection included a sample review of the HRA R2 2019 statutory outage activities carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety.

It also covered EDF NGL’s arrangements for compliance with Licence Condition (LC) 28 – examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIMT). The findings of this inspection will contribute to ONR’s regulatory decision to grant Consent to the return of R2 to normal operating service in accordance with LC 30 – periodic shutdown.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

This inspection has found that the commitments made in the outage intentions document (OID) for the HRA R2 2019 statutory outage in relation to the C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety that were sampled during this inspection had been adequately implemented.

During the inspection we observed maintainers overhaul and test a number of relays and noted that they appeared to have a clear understanding of the task in hand and the importance of the work they were undertaking. The engineering staff we talked to also appeared to have a good level of knowledge of the systems and equipment they were responsible for. We also found that the level of maintenance record keeping was generally adequate.

We raised five regulatory issue (RI) related actions in relation to the following, which have been captured in the ONR regulatory issues database (RID) under number 7505, and will monitor their progress to resolution of these actions through normal regulatory business.

It should be noted that we consider the aforementioned issues do not pose an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety. We also do not consider that any of them need to be addressed prior to R2 returning to normal operating service and will monitor their progress to resolution through normal regulatory business.

Based on our sample inspection of the C&I aspects of the HRA R2 2019 statutory outage we have assigned an intervention rating of Green to LC 28 compliance.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this inspection of a sample of HRA R2 2019 statutory outage C&I activities, we have not identified any C&I issues that could have a detrimental impact on nuclear safety or prevent ONR issuing a Consent to allow R2 to restart. Therefore, from a C&I perspective, we recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow R2 to return to normal operating service. This is subject to the completion of the planned EIMT activities, the implementation of the detailed modifications and the completion of any emergent work.