This intervention report covers the planned inspection performed as part of an ONR Operational Facilities Division (OFD) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (NGL) during the 2018 statutory outage of Reactor 2 (R2) at Torness (TOR) Power Station. The main focus of this inspection was to inspect work activities carried out in relation to control and instrumentation (C&I) equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that they remain fit for their intended purpose at TOR.
This inspection was undertaken in support of ONR’s 2018/19 periodic shutdown inspection programme. Our inspection included a review of progress made with various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at TOR. It also covered NGL’s arrangements for compliance with LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). Our inspection contributes towards ONR’s regulatory decision to grant Consent, to return R2 at TOR to normal operating service, in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown).
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides), which can be found at www.onr.org.uk/operational/tech_insp_guides/index.htm in the areas inspected. Further information on intervention ratings is available at https://www.onr.org.uk/intervention-records/onr-inspection-rating-guide.pdf.
Not applicable, no system based inspection was undertaken.
This inspection sampled engineering procedures and records and found that, at the time of our inspection, the commitments made in the TOR R2 2018 Outage Intentions Document for C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety were being progressed satisfactorily.
During our inspection, we found examples of good ageing and obsolescence forward planning and management. We also found the plant areas and equipment cubicles we inspected to be clean, tidy and free from foreign materials, which demonstrated that good housekeeping practices were being followed. The staff we talked to also demonstrated a good level of knowledge of the systems they were responsible for and, more in general, adequate appreciation of the nuclear safety implications of related failures. An example of good leadership and nuclear safety culture was also apparent from the discussions with the protection and electrical group head and the system engineers. Based on the discussions during the outage, we also noted a positive attitude to the management of cyber security risk.
As part of the inspection, we also identified some additional areas of interest which could not be addressed in full during the inspection because of the level of progress in the maintenance activities or due to the need of additional investigation from the station for their resolution. We captured these outstanding areas of interest with actions under an ONR regulatory issue (number 6690). Based on the confidence gathered during the outage inspection, we do not consider these actions to be sufficiently relevant from a nuclear safety perspective to prevent the return to service of TOR R2. Therefore we will monitor their resolution via the ONR regulatory issue (see #1 in Section 3), which will be discussed with the station as part of the normal regulatory business.
Based on our sample inspection of the C&I aspects of the TOR R2 2018 periodic shutdown, we have assigned an intervention rating of Green to LC 28 compliance.
On the basis of our sample inspection of the C&I aspects of the TOR R2 periodic shutdown, no issues were identified that should prevent ONR Consent to allow R2 at TOR to be started up again following successful completion of the planned maintenance activities in accordance with LC30. This is subject to the completion of the planned EIMT activities, the implementation of the detailed modifications and the completion of any emergent work.
From the evidence gathered during this intervention, there were no matters identified that have the potential to impact significantly on nuclear safety.