Office for Nuclear Regulation

Compliance inspection of Westinghouse Transport consignment operations

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This reactive intervention was in support of the application by INS (applicant on behalf of Westinghouse) for a 12 month extension to the ONR Certificate of Approval for the GB/3516A/AF-96 Transport Package for the transport of uranium oxide which is used to manufacture new fuel.

The inspection purpose was:

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The inspection reviewed Westinghouse arrangements in respect of the safe transport of radioactive material, against the requirements of the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Inspection Methodology

The transport package designated GB/3516A/AF-96 consists of an outer protective welded box, and inside a container designated 3544 that is sealed using an elastomer seal and known as a “pail” which contains the uranium oxide. The Inspector examined arrangements deployed by Westinghouse for the safe transport of radioactive material in the 3544 pails.

The process specifically inspected was OFC/SO/C601 issue 68 and the associated traveller OFC/DCS/CON/84 issue 34, for filling the pails and loading into the transport package for consignment.

Inspection Findings

The arrangements for pail seal inspection to confirm the correct seal and correctly fitting it, are considered adequate. Westinghouse was still considering ONR’s assessment queries relating to providing evidence of the quality of fabrication of the GB/3516A required for the safety case.

Conclusion of Intervention

In my opinion the Westinghouse arrangements relevant to inspection and fitting of the lids with seals onto pails (3544) appeared adequate. Implementation in the Pail packing area was well understood by staff and was followed effectively.