Office for Nuclear Regulation

Hunterston A compliance inspection  

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

This inspection was to inform the release of the regulatory hold point that will enable the licensee at Hunterston A (HNA) to commence breakthrough of the wall from within Solid Active Waste Bunker (SAWB) No. 2 into Bunker No.1 to allow Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) retrieval operations to commence from the final bunker.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I carried out a compliance inspection of HNA’s arrangements and their implementation for SAWB No. 1 breakthrough and ILW retrieval operations. Other meetings on the Solid ILW Encapsulation plant and risk based de-planting also took place.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate


Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The inspection to judge whether to release the SAW Bunker 1 retrievals regulatory hold point included the following elements:

I confirmed that the scope of the review and level of internal challenge in the SCENATE meeting was sufficient. I found evidence of plant readiness and I am confident that the DAP and operators are Suitably Qualified and Experienced Persons (SQEP) to carry out the breakthrough and ILW retrieval operations. I reviewed ML HNA Site Inspector’s ORR report and judged that he had undertaken a comprehensive independent review.

From the evidence gathered during the inspection related to readiness for SAW Bunker 1 breakthrough and FED retrieval operations, I am content that the arrangements are adequate.

Conclusion of Intervention

I consider that the appropriate regulatory action is to release the regulatory hold point to enable HNA to commence SAWB No. 1 breakthrough and Fuel Element Debris (FED) retrieval operations.