Office for Nuclear Regulation

Planned inspection at Devonport Royal Dockyard Limited (DRDL) licensed site

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This intervention at the Devonport Royal Dockyard Limited (DRDL) licensed site was undertaken as part of the 2016/17 intervention plan and propulsion sub-programme strategy.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

As part of this inspection we examined the implementation of DRDL's licence condition (LC) arrangements for control and supervision of operations which may affect safety. We targeted Maintenance activities being undertaken in SRC and 9 Dock Facilities.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

We found evidence of good stakeholder interactions during early planning activities and setting to work meetings. Supervisors and operatives understood the tasks they were performing and the safety implications of the work being conducted.

We concluded that there was adequate control of nuclear safety related tasks through the Facility Plant Authorisation Group (FPAG), the FPAG is well attended with an effective level of governance that requires a unanimous decision from members prior to tasks being authorised.

In Both 9 dock and SRC I concluded there was an inconsistent approach to how electrical and mechanical isolations are planned, executed and controlled. In my opinion, to enable workers to carry out activities safely the plant state should be reflected within the instructions and drawings to give clear and concise guidance. I also noted the number of separate individuals responsible for control of isolations. In my judgement, DRDL should consider a single point of ownership for the planning, execution and control of isolations across the respective sites.

SRC are currently conducting a review of the isolations of plant and equipment, benefit could be gained from rolling out a consistent approach across both SRC and 9 Dock once developed. The work on completing the SRC isolation review and its subsequent roll out will be monitored through routine regulatory activity.

Conclusion of Intervention

We judge that the licensee's approach to controlling and supervising Maintenance activities which may affect safety require improvement. The licensee has been asked to take action to address the identified shortfalls against relevant good practice.