Office for Nuclear Regulation

Licence Condition Compliance Inspections covering LC10, LC26 and LC34

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to conduct Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s Torness Power Station in accordance with the planned inspection programme contained in the Torness Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2015/16.

This intervention was undertaken by the Nominated ONR Site Inspector for Torness, with support from ONR Inspectors for the statutory outage of reactor 2.

 Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This intervention included compliance inspections against the following Licence Conditions (LCs):

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No safety system inspection was undertaken, hence this is not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The LC10 inspection examined Torness’ arrangements for training, and the implementation of those arrangements with particular focus on progress made against findings from previous interventions.

During the course of my inspection, I found evidence of a systematic approach to training, and examples of good standard in the implementation of Torness’ arrangements. I propose to initiate further discussions at corporate level with the EDF-fleet training manager to explore the potential to further reinforce the oversight of training compliance and to strengthen and accelerate the training of systems engineers.

I judge that the arrangements for compliance with LC10 covered during this inspection provide an adequate demonstration of the approach taken by Torness to satisfy relevant expectations of ONR guidance.

The LC26 inspection examined Torness’ arrangements for the control and supervision of operations, and focussed on Torness’ response to some recent events reported to ONR.

I found that the career path adopted by Torness for its new starters provides a good means of ensuring that they acquire good plant skills and a good understanding of the equipment before moving into control room positions. Following up on a recent event, I strongly emphasised the need for Torness to ensure that the full complement of emergency plan manning levels is maintained at all times.

Based on my inspection sample, I judge that Torness’ LC26 arrangements and the implementation of those arrangements meet the requirements of ONR guidance.

The LC34 inspection examined Torness’ arrangements and the implementation of those arrangements, to control the leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste. I focussed in particular on Torness’ response to the high level reading in sump AD08 of the Tritiated Effluent System.

Based on my inspection sample, I am satisfied that Torness is adopting a systematic approach to identify potential leaks, and to ensure any issues identified are promptly acted upon and resolved.

Although I welcomed that the Tritiated water was fully contained in sump AD08, and that there was no leak or escape of radioactive material to the environment, I strongly emphasised that there has been a breach of the first line of containment (the pipe), and that it is important for Torness to restore all lines of defence to their original design intent at the earliest opportunity.

Based on my inspection sample, I judge that Torness’ LC34 arrangements and the implementation of those arrangements meet the requirements of ONR guidance.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

I am satisfied that the arrangements and their implementation at Torness for LC10, LC26 and LC34 respectively, are adequate and judge that the outcome of the sample inspections undertaken met expectations detailed within relevant ONR guidance.  I have therefore rated the respective LC10, LC26 and LC34 elements with an IIS rating of 3, adequate.

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety or which would result in changes to the planned interventions and inspections of Torness Power Station.