Hinkley Point B Planned Intervention
- Site: Hinkley Point B
- IR number: 15-061
- Date: August 2015
- LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30
Purpose of intervention
This was a planned inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Hinkley Point B power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
The work was carried out in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hinkley Point B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
I (the nominated site inspector for Hinkley Point B) with an ONR Structural Integrity Inspector and a Mechanical Engineering Inspector carried out a System Based Inspection (SBI) on control rods.
- Carried out a licence condition 30 (periodic shutdown) compliance inspection.
- Discussed key matters with the site internal regulator.
- Held a number of information exchange meetings with station staff.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Not applicable – the system was judged to be adequate.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
From the system based inspection on control rods we concluded that:
- In relation to the LC10 (training) element of the SBI, we considered that the training records were up to date and in accordance with the post training profile requirements. We concluded that the LC10 element of this inspection warranted an Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) rating of 3 - adequate.
- In relation to the LC23 (operating rules) element of the SBI we considered that NGL demonstrated a good understanding of the requirements of the safety case. The supporting technical specifications, commentaries, and schedules were judged to be consistent with the claims presented within the living safety case document and system based view. We concluded that the LC23 element of this inspection warranted an IIS rating of 2 - good.
- In relation to the LC24 (operating instructions) element of the SBI, we were satisfied that the operating instructions provided sufficient detail, had been enhanced over time and successfully captured the requirements of the safety case. We concluded that the LC24 element of this inspection warranted an IIS rating of 3 – adequate.
- In relation to the LC27 (safety mechanisms) element of the SBI, we were satisfied that the availability and reliability of the safety mechanism, devices and circuits for the control rod system identified in the safety case were subject to procedural controls which were being adequately followed. We concluded that the LC27 element of this inspection warranted an IIS rating of 3 – adequate.
- In relation to the LC28 (examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) element of the SBI, we considered that the licensee had demonstrated that there were adequate processes, procedures and records in place for the examination, inspection, maintenance and testing of control rod systems. The activities were adequately defined and implemented and the system performance was consistent with the safety case reliability claims. The requirements identified in the safety case were included on the maintenance schedule and evidence that they were undertaken consistently on the required frequency and performed to an adequate standard was presented. Overall we concluded that the control rod arrangements under LC28 warranted an IIS rating of 3 – adequate.
- In relation to the LC34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material) element of the SBI, we concluded that this was not applicable to SBI28, control rods.
Overall, after considering the evidence presented by the Licensee, we considered that the arrangements and their implementation associated with the control rod system met the requirements of the safety case and were deemed to be adequate.
I (the nominated site inspector) carried out the following inspections:
- For licence condition 30 (periodic shutdown). The objectives of the outage intentions meeting were to allow the Station to present to ONR its scope of work and the arrangements that will be place to deliver the Reactor 3 statutory outage. I concluded that this was a useful meeting that provided significant detail on NGL plans for the outage. The meeting was well represented by NGL staff and good quality information was supplied in advance of the meeting. I was satisfied that arrangements were in place to demonstrate compliance with LC30 and I therefore assigned an IIS rating of – 3 (adequate) to this inspection.
- I met with the Independent Nuclear Assurance (INA) team on site to review recent events including imminent and proposed changes to INA representation on site, ONR inspection plans and outcomes, fuel route improvements and emergent issues on the site.
- I was satisfied with the information exchanged during meetings with NGL staff on a range of topics including the recent accreditation from Lloyds Register Quality Assurance, plant condition in the turbine hall, training of control room supervisors, station management of hot standpipes on Reactor 3, and follow up work relating to an event at the buffer store earlier in the year when a closure unit was ejected from a storage tube.
Conclusion of Intervention
There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.