Office for Nuclear Regulation

EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation Ltd - Hinkley Point B Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned inspection of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Hinkley Point B power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hinkley Point B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I (the nominated site inspector for Hinkley Point B) and a Mechanical Handling Technical Specialist from Amec Foster Wheeler carried out a system based inspection on the Fuelling Machine.

I also:

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable – the system was judged to be adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

From the system based inspection on the Fuelling Machine we concluded that:

Overall, we concluded that the arrangements and their implementation associated with the Fuelling Machine met the requirements of the safety case and was deemed to be adequate.

I (the nominated site inspector) carried out the following inspections:

For licence condition 7 (incidents on the site) I concluded that the site was following its procedures for identifying, raising, screening and processing Condition Reports.  I was satisfied that investigation of the events and corrective action was being taken in a timely and professional manner.  Good quality data on past events was readily available.  I judged that NGL had implemented a good quality and robust process and I therefore assigned an IIS rating of 2 (good) to this inspection.

I carried out a review of conventional safety matters on the site and chose to concentrate on the application of the Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations (LOLER).  I was satisfied that LOLER was being correctly applied across the site, apart from the issues noted above with some activities being exempt.  I was also satisfied with other ongoing initiatives on site including an investigation into two recent lost time accidents, compliance with the Pressurised System Safety Regulations (PSSR), initiatives to reduce the occurrence of slips, trips & falls on site and improvements to vehicle/pedestrian separation on site.

I met with an Independent Nuclear Assurance (INA) Inspector on site to review recent events including proposed changes to INA representation on site, ONR inspection plans and outcomes, fuel route improvements and emergent issues on the site.

I was satisfied with the information exchanged during meetings with NGL staff on a range of topics including preparations for the Reactor 3 statutory outage, discussions with the new Station Director concerning his vision for the site and response to an event earlier in the year when a closure unit was ejected from a storage tube, emergency response capability, safety case developments on site and requests to ONR for permissioning of key projects on site.

Conclusion of Intervention

There were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.