The purpose of this intervention was to undertake a Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Heysham 2 power station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Heysham 2 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).
This intervention was a compliance inspection against the following Licence Conditions (LC):
The LC32 and LC34 intervention was jointly undertaken with the Environment Agency.
The site inspector also attended a number of routine meetings.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
No safety system inspection was undertaken, hence this is not applicable.
The following areas were covered as part of the LC32 sampled inspection:
During the inspection we found demonstrable evidence of Heysham 2 compliance with its own arrangements, we sampled examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EMIT) routines, records of accumulated waste held in the HADV, active waste records for 210 litre drums and records for the acceptance and receipt of a dismantled fuel stringer into the HADV pond.
From an LC32 perspective, based on the evidence sampled during this inspection I consider the arrangements to have been implemented to an adequate standard and hence warrant an associated IIS rating of 3 (adequate).
The following areas were covered as part of the LC34 sampled inspection:
We sampled several new EMIT routines for the pondwater treatment plant (PWTP) and the active effluent treatment plant (AETP). Our inspection of the documentation provided indicated a significant amount of work had been undertaken to establish these new EMIT routines. Parts of the inspection include a plant walk down which encompassed several areas associated with the PWTP and AETP where improvements had been completed.
A previous ONR LC34 inspection raised an issue concerning progress on EMIT routines. NGL’s commitments for 2015 (whilst this not a formal commitment to ONR) demonstrate NGL’s positive progress in this area. Based on my sampled inspection, I have therefore considered that this ONR issue can be closed and followed up via normal regulatory business.
From an LC34 perspective, based on the evidence sampled during this inspection I consider the arrangements to have been implemented to an adequate standard and hence I have given an IIS rating of 3 (adequate).
The following areas were covered as part of the LC36 sampled inspection:
My LC36 inspection examined the Heysham 2 organisational capability arrangements and the implementation of those arrangements. My inspection included examination of the nuclear baseline, future forward thinking, how proposed changes to personnel or to the structure of the organisation are managed through Heysham 2’ ‘management of change’ processes, and how Heysham 2 manage the its age profile demographics and areas of identified vulnerability.
I am satisfied that the arrangements and their implementation for LC36 are to a good standard and have rated this inspection through the IIS as 2 (good).
The meetings attended during this inspection provided useful information in order to inform future interventions and provided an early incite to the upcoming annual LC11 Counter Terrorism Emergency Safety Arrangements annual demonstration exercise.
A review of the ONR issues database and condition reports raised during inspections did not currently identify any significant shortfalls or areas of significant concern such that they required elevation in relation to categorisation or further regulatory attention. There are minor updates required to some issues which may enable their closure; overall NGL continue to address the current open issues at Heysham 2 in a satisfactory manner.
Overall I considered that the arrangements and their associated implementation for LC32, 34 met with the requirements of ONR guidance and was rated through the IIS as 3 (Adequate) for the LC36 element this was rated through the IIS as 2 (good) respectively.
There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change to the planned interventions and inspections of Heysham 2.