Office for Nuclear Regulation

Hartlepool Power Station –  Planned Compliance Inspections and evaluation of Level 1 demonstration exercise

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake compliance inspection activities at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s (NGL’s) Hartlepool power station in line with the ONR’s planned inspection programme contained in the Hartlepool Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2015/16.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

We observed the annual level 1 emergency exercise designed to demonstrate Hartlepool’s capability to deal effectively with any accident or emergency arising on-site and their effects.

In addition, we undertook the following interventions using a sampling approach:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable during this intervention.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

We judged that level 1 emergency exercise was a successful demonstration of the station’s emergency arrangements and capability to respond to an emergency. We judged that overall the standard of compliance with LC11 was adequate, IIS rating 3.

With regards to working at height, several areas of good practice were identified. General standards of scaffolding, in the areas observed were of a good standard. No significant shortfalls were identified. With regards to workplace transport, we confirmed that lessons learn following a RIDDOR incident 2014 had been satisfactory implemented.

In respect to licence condition 22, NGL has successfully used their operating experience processes to incorporate learning identified from previous boiler cleans into the planning and arrangements for the coming Reactor 1 boiler chemical clean. Overall, we judge the LC22 aspect of the inspection to be of a good standard, warranting an IIS rating of 2 (good standard).

In respect to licence condition 23, NGL were able to demonstrate that a regime is in place for the monitoring of chemical parameters of safety systems in accordance with NGL’s company standards. NGL were unable to demonstrate a consistent approach to inclusion of chemical surveillance of a cooling water system and a lubricating oils circuit within the power station’s list of operating rules.  For this reason, I award an IIS rating of 4 (below standard) against licence condition 23. NGL accepted an action to review their approach against safety case claims made on these systems.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change is necessary to the planned interventions and inspections at Hartlepool as a result.

We have raised an ONR Issue to manage our observations in relation to inclusion of the cooling water system and a lubricating oils circuit within the Station’s operating rules.