Office for Nuclear Regulation

Hartlepool Power Stations - Planned Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake a Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspection at EDF Nuclear Generation’s (NGL’s) Hartlepool power station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hartlepool Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2015/16.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

A system based inspection of the Seawater System was undertaken by the current and incoming nominated ONR Site Inspector.  The aim of the inspection was to confirm the adequacy of the implementation of the safety case with respect to the seawater system against the following licence conditions (LC):

We inspected a sample of 3 modifications against the requirements of LC 21 “commissioning”.

We reviewed progress that Hartlepool had achieved against the ONR database issues.

The inspections were based on sampling the implementation of the arrangements in place against each licence condition. Meetings were held with key site personnel and the main findings of the discussions were communicated.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides), which can be found at in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

I judged that overall the seawater system meets the requirements of the safety case and is deemed adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Required seawater training modules were appropriate.  Staff training records were up to date. We judge that compliance with LC10 is adequate, IIS rating 3.

We reviewed the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs) relating to the Seawater system we found the tech spec adequately described the limits and conditions of the safety case. We judged compliance with LC23 to be adequate, IIS rating 3. 

The arrangements and operating instructions that were in place regarding the use of the Seawater system were acceptable. The instructions describing emergency responses were clear, systematic and symptom based. We judged compliance with LC24 to be above standard, IIS rating 2.

The safety mechanisms relating to the seawater system were listed in the plant maintenance policy.  We judged that compliance with LC27 was adequate, IIS rating 3.

The seawater system aspects of the maintenance schedule were found to contain an adequate level of maintenance regarding the key components relevant to safety. The evidence sampled demonstrated maintenance was being carried out in accordance with the maintenance schedule.  The system had been subject to significant capital expenditure to counter ageing and obsolescence. We judged the examination, inspection, maintenance and testing under LC28 to be adequate, IIS rating 3.

Compliance with LC34, leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste, was considered not applicable as the seawater system is not claimed as a line of protection against release.

We judged the implementation of LC 21 commissioning to be adequate but support the ONR corporate issue raised.  ID ONR ISSUE 3573 – “EDF to review and update the company procedures to ensure that adequate guidance is given within the arrangements to ensure compliance with Licence Condition 21”. 

Implementation on Hartlepool site was found to be adequate despite relatively light corporate arrangements in this area.  We have therefore rated this element of my inspection through the IIS as 3 (adequate).

Progress against ONR issues was adequate.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this intervention, there are no findings that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and hence no change to the planned interventions and inspections of Hartlepool are required. 

The station were actioned to consider including the drum screen filter differential pressure alarm for inclusion into the maintenance schedule.