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**ONR NGO Forum**

**21 March 2018**

**Holiday Inn Hotel – Birmingham**

**Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) present:**

Adrienne Kelbie (AK) – Chief Executive (co-chair)

Mark Foy (MF) – Chief Nuclear Inspector

Katie Day (KD) – Acting Director Policy & Communications

John Donald (JD) – Superintending Inspector

Dr Mina Golshan (MG) – Deputy Chief Inspector, Director Sellafield,  
Decommissioning, Fuel & Waste Division

Dr Anthony Hart (AH) – Deputy Chief Inspector, Technical Director

**NGO Representatives present:**

Sue Aubrey (SA) – Stop Hinkley

Peter Banks (PB) – Blackwater Against New Nuclear

Prof. Andrew Blowers (AB) – Blackwater Against New Nuclear

Peter Burt (P Burt) – Nuclear Awareness Group / Nuclear Education Trust

John Busby (JB) – Stop Hinkley

David Cullen (DC) – Nuclear Information Service

Neil Crumpton (NC) – People Against Wylfa B

Rod Donington-Smith (RDS) – Cumbria Trust

Allan Jeffrey (AJ) – Stop Hinkley

Tom Griffith-Jones (TGJ) – Together Against Sizewell C

Rita Holmes (RH) – Ayrshire Radiation Monitoring Group

Sean Morris (SM) – Nuclear Free Local Authorities

Ian Ralls (IR) – Nuclear Network Friends of the Earth

Dr Jill Sutcliffe (JS) – Low Level Radiation and Health Conference (co-chair)

Trish Whitham (TW) - Nuclear Information Service

**Secretariat:** Daniel Jones, ONR Communications Officer

**1. Welcome and Actions arising**

1.1 Adrienne Kelbie (AK) opened the meeting by thanking NGO colleagues for making time to attend and introduced Dr Jill Sutcliffe (JS) as the meeting co-chair. Domestic arrangements were provided and all attendees were invited to introduce themselves to the wider group.

1.2 Action log was reviewed with an update requested on those actions (17.04, 17.12 and 17.15) whose status was shown as delayed. Tom Griffith-Jones (TGJ) requested that action 17.04 remain open.



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1.3 Actions 17.12 were to be considered as part of Katie Day's (KD) presentation later in the day and 17.15 to be considered as part of the session to look at the priority topics list.

**2. Update from Chief Nuclear Inspector**

2.1 Mark Foy (MF) introduced himself to the group as ONR's new Chief Nuclear Inspector and provided details of his professional experience and aspirations for the role. He directed attendees to the briefing paper that had been circulated with the agenda.

2.2 MF then provided details on the CNI themed inspection that took place in October/November 2017 and which focused on supply chain arrangements at Hinkley Point C. He explained this inspection was instigated by ONR following the records falsification issues that emerged in 2016 at the Le Creusot Forge facility in France. MF confirmed that five different themes were identified following the inspection and that ONR would be tracking these issues to ensure they are addressed by the licensee (NNB GenCo) in line with ONR's regulatory expectations. He confirmed that the next CNI themed inspection is expected to take place at AWE in 2019.

2.3 **Question/comment:** Ian Ralls (IR) requested further details on what components manufactured at Le Creusot forge are in use across the UK nuclear fleet.

2.4 **Response:** MF explained that components manufactured at Le Creusot forge are in use at Sizewell B. He confirmed that ONR has completed checks on these too and is satisfied those components in use have not been subject to records falsification.

2.5 **Question/comment:** Neil Crumpton (NC) questioned if ONR had any intention to begin looking at all components in use and asked if ONR had the capacity to do this.

2.6 **Response:** MF emphasised that ONR fully recognises the need to focus on the supply chain and has five inspectors who pro-actively go out to companies involved in the supply chain both in the UK and overseas to ensure manufacturing standards are being met.

2.7 **Question/Comment:** David Cullen (DC) asked for further information regarding the timing of the next CNI themed inspection at AWE and Peter



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Burt (P Burt) asked for further details on what AWE needs to do in order to come out of enhanced regulatory attention.

- 2.8 **Response:** MF advised that the CNI themed inspection at AWE is expected to take place towards the end of 2019. He advised ONR is working to identify root causes of failures at the site and have identified thirteen themes as part of a Strategic Improvement Plan. MF confirmed that in order for AWE to be taken out of enhanced regulatory attention ONR would need to be satisfied that those improvements had been made.

**Action 18.03** – ONR to provide NGO forum members with a list of topic areas in the Strategic Improvement Plan for AWE.

- 2.9 Discussion moved onto ONR's new Enforcement Management Model with MF advising that this will be introduced shortly. He explained that the new model lends itself to ONR's needs and will replace the previous model which ONR inherited from the Health & Safety executive following vesting in 2014.

- 2.10 MF also updated on activity at Sellafield, explaining that over the last two years, significant progress has been made in addressing some of the legacy issues at the site

- 2.11 **Question/Comment:** IR raised an issue relating to Tritium concentration in evaporated water at evaporation facilities at Sellafield.

- 2.12 **Response:** MG/AH/MF all contributed to the response and explained that during the 'scrubbing' process radioactive material is removed and vitrified.

**Action 18.04** – ONR to provide an explanation to NGO forum on what happens to tritiated water that is released via evaporation from the evaporation facilities at Sellafield.

- 2.13 MF updated on Advanced Nuclear Technologies (ANTs) and explained that ONR is working with Government to provide technical advice over the next 12 to 18 months. He also confirmed that the government has made £5 million available to ensure ONR build regulatory capability around these new technologies.

- 2.14 MF updated on ONR's Independent Advisory Panel that took place earlier in March and provides advice to him (as CNI) on a range of technical matters. He explained that discussions focused on ANTs and the evolving of ONR's regulatory strategies. MF also made an offer that he would like a member of the NGO community to join the Panel and advised that a tender will be issued



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in due course. MF also updated on the Licence Condition Review and encouraged the NGO community to feedback to ONR any comments.

**Action 18.05** – NGO forum members to feedback to ONR any comments regarding the Licence Condition Review by 26 April 2018.

**Action 18.06** – ONR to notify members of the NGO forum once tender to join Independent Advisory Panel has been issued.

2.15 In conclusion, MF advised that an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission is due in the UK in 2019. He explained that the mission, which is a form of peer review, would involve experts from across the world that would look at the UK's regulatory policy framework and regulatory processes in ONR, and other nuclear regulators. It is expected to be a full scope mission.

2.16 Questions from forum members focused on why the mission was taking place and why it was requested, as well as the impacts this might have on safeguards work.

2.17 MF confirmed that IRRS missions take place periodically and reassured the forum that this should not be seen as a cause of concern. He explained that the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is requesting the mission on behalf of the UK. He also confirmed that the mission will not affect the on-going work to set up a new UK State System of Accountancy and Control (SSAC) as part of exiting Euratom.

**Action 18.07** – NGOs to consider which topics from the Priority List they would like to see discussed via webinar during the 18/19 year and to feedback to NGO co-chair(s).

### **3. Developing a domestic safeguards regime**

3.1 Dr Mina Golshan (MG), Deputy Chief Inspector and Senior Responsible Officer for the UK SSAC project, delivered a presentation which focused on 3 elements: current & planned (post-Euratom exit) safeguards regimes in the UK; ONR project structure; and planned regulatory framework.

3.2 For clarity MG outlined what is currently outside of ONR's remit, including: decision to exit Euratom; Brexit negotiations; issues relating to treaty obligations; and policy relating to the extent of the UK safeguards assurance level.



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- 3.3 **Question/Comment:** NC asked if ONR is being pro-active in offering advice on Brexit negotiations.
- 3.4 **Response:** MG assured the forum that ONR is aware when discussions are taking place pertinent to Euratom exit, , and is proactively providing advice to BEIS where necessary on regulatory / technical matters.
- 3.5 MG updated the forum on the 3 main elements of the 'Regional/State System of Accounting for and control of nuclear materials' which includes: a safeguards reporting/information handling system; activities to provide assurance about dutyholder nuclear materials accountancy and quality of reporting to the IAEA; and activities to support IAEA inspections.
- 3.6 MG moved the discussion onto looking at the six project work streams and provided a detailed update on each of the work streams which include: Support to BEIS; SIMRS; Capacity; Capability; Equipment & Hardware; and Regulatory Framework.
- 3.7 A number of questions were received regarding work stream 3 (Capacity). Prof. Andy Blowers (AB) asked what the net cost of this project was and whether money allocated could be used elsewhere. Sean Morris (SM) asked if ONR was able to recruit existing Euratom staff.
- 3.8 **Response:** MG advised that the cost of the project was being met by BEIS and that funding for the project is ring-fenced. MG confirmed that there are UK based Euratom staff, but that it is a matter of choice for them to decide if they wanted to apply to join ONR.
- 3.9 There was some discussion on the implications of the 'Transitional Period' (to December 2020) that had been announced that week. MG advised what ONR's working assumptions were, but noted that further details were awaited from government. Further questions were then received regarding work stream 6 (Regulatory Framework)
- 3.10 **Question/Comment:** IR raised a number of concerns. He felt there could be a credibility gap with ONR effectively marking its 'own homework' and also raised concerns whether ONR would be unduly influenced by industry and subject to political pressure. He also queried the UK's decision to leave Euratom.
- 3.11 **Response:** MG emphasised that ONR is an independent regulator and that she did not believe ONR would come under any undue political



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pressure/influence, in the same way that it doesn't on the safety and security side. Further she advised that other nations (e.g. Japan, Canada, USA) undertook safeguards reporting / regulation within the same body as safety/security regulation and/or by the State itself. MG advised that exiting Euratom is a decision taken by government. MF added that ONR is a robust independent regulator.

- 3.12 **Question/Comment:** NC asked if IAEA inspectors from all nationalities would be allowed to inspect UK facilities.
- 3.13 **Response:** John Donald (JD) confirmed that only IAEA inspectors from certain countries are allowed to visit certain sites and that this would continue to be the case.
- 3.14 **Question/Comment:** PBurt asked what the project's most significant areas of risk were.
- 3.15 **Response:** MG advised that like (history shows us) many IT projects carry risks. MG emphasised that ONR has undertaken considerable work over several months to mitigate this risk by engaging with the IAEA, Licensees, Euratom and digital/IT specialists to ensure IT requirements are fully understood and clear, prior to tendering. This engagement work has allowed ONR to have confidence from the outset that the specification produced for the tender is correct. MG also advised that companies bidding for the IT contract will be expected to have relevant knowledge and experience. .
- 3.16 **Question/Comment:** John Busby asked about plutonium stockpiles at Sellafield.
- 3.17 **Response:** MG advised that this is a policy matter for BEIS. ONR is providing technical advice/input as necessary on options, but that a mature option has not yet been arrived at.
- 3.18 **Question/Comment:** AB asked what oversight there is to try and ensure compatibility between countries that have their own domestic safeguards regimes.
- 3.19 **Response:** MG advised that IAEA have oversight of safeguards materials, but that IAEA is not seeking to put in place a universal model.
- 3.20 **Question/Comment:** DC asked for an update on progress being made on third party international co-operation agreements.



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- 3.21 **Response:** MG advised that informal feedback had been positive thus far.
- 3.22 **Question/Comment:** Sean Morris (SM) commented that there is a significant amount of work for ONR to complete in order to set up a domestic safeguards regime and asked what would happen if this was not done before the end of March 2019. He also asked if ONR was in communication with IAEA about this project.
- 3.23 **Response:** MG advised that ONR has a good degree of confidence it will be delivered on time. JD also confirmed that ONR has done some contingency planning around each of the six work streams and is in communication with the IAEA regarding the project.
- 3.24 **Question/Comment:** Tom Griffith-Jones (TGJ) commented that big projects can often fail and asked if ONR will be using a project manager to help ensure project is delivered.
- 3.25 **Response:** MG responded to confirm ONR had put in place two project managers on SSAC, and was seeking additional resource to support on the IT system and contract management. Further, she confirmed that there is a process to provide AK and MF with assurance on governance arrangements for the project. AK confirmed that MG has been provided with Senior Responsible Owner delegations (such as tolerance levels and risk management arrangements) and that she provides regular updates to the ONR board.
- 3.26 **Question/Comment:** NC asked if there were opportunities to enhance safeguard standards internationally and also if we have identified things that we can do better once our new domestic regime is established.
- 3.27 **Response:** MG advised that what we currently have with Euratom is very comprehensive and that it is the government's intention to continue with those same standards. She advised that ONR intends to develop safeguards principles and guidance, similar to that which is already in place for safety and security regulation. MG confirmed ONR's current focus is on meeting delivery requirements by March 2019, but it is taking note of opportunities that need to be considered over the longer term.
- 3.28 **Question/Comment:** AB asked if the domestic safeguards regime could be better than current IAEA standards and asked if ONR has a role to play in upping IAEA quality.



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3.29 **Response:** JD confirmed once the domestic regime is in place ONR safeguard inspectors will visit a wider range of facilities than are currently inspected by the IAEA and that the same standards will apply. MG added that IAEA systems are comprehensive and well developed.

**Action 18.08** – ONR to engage NGO community when new safeguards guidance / principles are available for comment.

#### **4. Emergency Planning Arrangements**

4.1 Dr Anthony Hart (AH), Deputy Chief Inspector and ONR Technical Director, delivered a presentation which focused on current UK nuclear emergency arrangements and proposed future emergency arrangements. AH also provided answers to the six specific questions put forward by members of the NGO working group following the teleconference on 8 February 2018. AK noted that three Nuclear Free Local Authorities (NFLA) briefing papers had also been circulated with the agenda by way of background to this topic.

4.2 AH gave an overview of the existing UK emergency planning legislation, providing further information about ONR's Licence Condition 11, which specifies the role operators are required to undertake in making arrangements for dealing with emergencies or accidents on their sites. He also provided details on ONR's role in determining offsite emergency planning zones.

4.3 **Question/Comments:** AB asked about the geographical distance of the emergency planning zone. He also commented that public are suspicious of why boundaries sometimes stop in the sea before they reach populated areas.

4.4 **Response:** AH responded by explaining some of the factors that will determine the emergency planning zone, which will include the inventory of materials on site and protective measures in place at a site.

4.5 **Question/Comments:** IR asked if weather patterns (prevailing winds) were taken into account when determining an emergency planning zone. PB also asked if emergency planning zones were based on worst case scenarios.

4.6 **Response:** AH confirmed that weather was considered when determining emergency zones and also advised that the worst case scenario is considered under the methodology too. In response to a question from NC he also confirmed that tidal factors were considered as part of the process.



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- 4.7 **Question/Comment:** AB raised some concerns about the boundaries between neighbouring local authorities and political influences.
- 4.8 **Response:** AH confirmed that ONR has absolute authority to put a boundary where it needs to go.
- 4.9 AH moved discussion onto addressing some of the specific questions raised in advance of the meeting regarding emergency planning arrangements.
- 4.10 **Question/Comment:** SM queried why more information was not provided to those living within an emergency planning area, believing a more expansive approach was required.
- 4.11 **Response:** AH advised it was a difficult call when considering how much information to provide, advising that prior information can have both positive and negative effects and acknowledged that people will have different views about this.
- 4.12 **Question/Comment:** JS added that lack of information can lead to chaos and advised that in the UK people need to know when to evacuate. AB also added that we need to be up front with those living within a zone on what they need to do.
- 4.13 **Question/Comment:** AB asked if emergency planning was considered as part of the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process. He also commented that the Environment Agency should be invited as a matter of routine to these forum meetings.
- 4.14 **Response:** AH advised that emergency planning was not considered by ONR as part of the GDA process. MF added that the GDA process looks at the reactor technology and that emergency planning is considered as part of the licensing process. ONR confirmed that EA will be invited to future meetings.
- 4.15 **Question/Comment:** NC asked if there would be different emergency planning criteria if Small Modular Reactors were introduced.
- 4.16 **Response:** MF advised that this would need further consideration in due course once the siting criteria are decided upon by government.
- 4.17 AH also explained how the existing emergency planning regime is expected to change as a result of the Basic Safety Standards Directive (BSSD). Going forward, local authorities are expected to determine emergency planning



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zones and AH advised that the process would be overseen by ONR as the regulator.

- 4.18 **Question/Comments:** TGJ commented that ONR must ensure they inspect local authorities to ensure they are doing what they say they are doing.
- 4.19 **Response:** AH confirmed ONR will inspect local authorities but acknowledged there was work for ONR to do with local authorities to get them use to being 'inspected.' ONR is currently undertaking inspections under the current regime, which it is hoped will provide a level of familiarity to local authorities going forward as well as being essential for public safety now.
- 4.20 **Question/Comments:** AB raised concerns about local authority resources and also queried if operators would supply the information needed for local authorities to complete their work. In addition he also questioned if information would get to the public.
- 4.21 **Response:** AH advised that the UK has a positive culture for reporting and explained how it can work in practice.
- 4.22 **Question/Comments:** AB commented that with foreign influence in the UK nuclear sector and different cultural 'norms', there are widespread concerns that information may not be disclosed. AB asked how ONR can ensure it gets hold of relevant information.
- 4.23 **Response:** AK responded by saying that senior figures across the sector understand the need to be open and transparent, and mechanisms for operator to operator peer review exist, such as through the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). MF added that organisations such as EDF are aligned to several of the reactor designs/developments in the UK can therefore bring to bear their positive approach to safety culture too.
- 4.24 **Question/Comment:** Rita Holmes (RH) raised issue of access to potassium iodide tablets for those living within an emergency planning zone.
- 4.25 **Response:** AH responded by advising that new legislation will require local authorities to have tablets for all those who would need them in case of an emergency, and that ONR's role will be inspect that adequate arrangements in place and that they can be properly managed. The Code of Practice that ONR is working on to support the new emergency planning regulations will set out the detailed requirements.



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4.26 **Question/Comment:** PB commented that the public information documents produced by operators can be very corporate in tone, which he felt raises issues regarding their credibility. He asked if there are editorial guidelines which operators should follow.

4.27 **Response:** AH advised that the requirement to produce public information documents does sit with the operators but there is nothing stopping local authorities also providing further information.

**Action 18.09** – ONR to provide a link to the ‘Brown Book’ guidance by way of background on international standards for emergency planning arrangements.

**Action 18.10** – Peter Burt to provide advice / note regarding information provided to the public in an emergency situation and ONR to consider how this could be reflected in the Code of Practice (e.g. editorial considerations)

4.28 **Question/Comment:** SM expressed concern that the new regulations will require increase in workload of local authorities at a time of resource pressures.

4.29 **Response:** AH confirmed that government has been in dialogue with the Local Authority Working Group, which ONR has also attended, and advised that they are broadly content with new arrangements.

4.30 **Question/Comment:** Rod Donington-Smith (RDS) questioned what the likely emergency zone would be around Sellafield, given current activities and potential new build.

4.31 **Response:** AH advised that this would be a policy matter for the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and thus for the Minister(s) to decide upon.

**Action 18.11** – ONR to engage with NGO community when new emergency planning guidance (Code of Practice) is available.

**5. ONR Independence, Openness and Transparency**

5.1 Katie Day (KD), Acting Director for ONR Policy and Communications, delivered a presentation which focused on the results of the recent ONR stakeholder survey and future ONR engagement plans.

5.2 KD gave an overview of survey results which showed ONR is highly regarded by a wide range of different stakeholders. KD acknowledged that while



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overall results were positive, there are areas for improvement which ONR will be working to address.

- 5.3 KD moved discussion onto look at results from the 'interested groups/individuals' category which included NGO representatives, and focused on the following themes: effectiveness; influencing; communications; and efficiency.
- 5.4 KD gave an overview of work currently under way by ONR to address these concerns and planned improvements to engage with the NGO community and public more generally. KD also revisited the list of 'Asks' put forward by the NGO community at the last forum event on 21 September 2017, but these were not discussed in detail.
- 5.5 **Question/Comment:** AB commented that ONR spends a lot of time talking to industry and believes more frequent exposure of ONR staff to contrary opinions is important.
- 5.6 **Question/Comment:** DC asked if all Local Liaison Group meetings should be open.
- 5.7 **Response:** MF advised that ONR provided the paper produced by the NFLA (No.156) to the Safety Directors Forum to try and ensure more consistency is brought to LLC/SSG meetings. He confirmed that feedback from the SDF has not yet been received. AK asked what more can ONR do and invited comments from the audience.
- 5.8 **Question/Comment:** AB, in the context of New Build, suggested that ONR needs to be more proactive in seeking views of others. He felt that the public is apprehensive and that ONR needs to engage more in process.
- 5.9 **Question/Comment:** P Burt cited a Nuclear Awareness Group meeting where ONR was invited to attend to address specific technical questions. He commented that ONR presence was very well received and more regular, bespoke engagement of this kind would be welcomed. He suggested that in any kind of public consultation by industry or others, ONR should be routinely involved and also suggested that ONR might consider holding roadshows around sites undergoing Periodic Safety Reviews to allow the public to be consulted.
- 5.10 **Question/Comment:** PB felt ONR needs to better explain its independence and to emphasise what it can do independently of government. Further, it was



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felt ONR's language often approaches matters (e.g. new build plans) from the perspective of 'when' rather than 'if'.

- 5.11 **Response:** MF emphasised that ONR has complete independence over regulatory decisions. AK added that during her tenure at ONR she has never experienced any pressure from outside of ONR on any regulatory decision. She also provided an overview of the role of the ONR board as an assurance board.
- 5.12 **Question/Comment:** AB expressed concern with ONR's 'enabling approach.' He added that he felt that ONR's work has an ethical dimension and that intergenerational equity should play a more prominent role in ONR's work and decision-making. He also asked about peer reviews of ONR's work. PB questioned if ONR processes allow inspectors to consider longer term ethical considerations.
- 5.13 **Response:** MF referred to his previous remarks regarding the IRRS mission, which is a form of peer review. Similar arrangements exist for security. He also advised that ONR's 'enabling regulation' approach is about driving progress to common goals and holding operators to account. He emphasised ONR will take enforcement action if operators breach licence conditions. On the point of ethics, MF agreed to discuss the matter further with ONR's Independent Advisory Panel.

**Action 18.12** – ONR to consider with IAP how 'ethics' (intergenerational ethical responsibilities) could be part of the regulatory decision making process.

**Action 18.13** – ONR to provide a written response on the 'asks' from the September 2017 meeting.

- 5.14 **Question/Comment:** Further questions/comments were received regarding waste storage facilities on nuclear operating sites, and the issue of 'not having a closed loop' in the nuclear cycle, which is a key concern. NGO members of the forum suggested that if the nuclear industry cannot resolve long term waste issues then they should not be proceeding with new nuclear developments. They also questioned how far ONR's regulatory / technical advice goes to government; in particular, when does the lack of Geological Disposal Facility compromise safety and security on existing sites and planned new facilities. They were keen for ONR to challenge government policy when/if current safety and security standards could be called into question without a long term storage solution in place. MF noted this point.



**6. Review of priority topics list**

- 6.1 JS invited each person to put forward any issues/topics they would like to see discussed with ONR in future.
- 6.2 A number of suggestions were put forward including: GDF/Radwaste storage; controls on development around power stations; cyber security and threat to nuclear facilities from future weapon technologies; and ONR's relationship with DNSR.
- 6.3 A number of questions were also asked and answered during this agenda item. These included questions from Sue Aubrey (SA) which were specifically centred around Hinkley. SA asked questions regarding the manufacturing of parts used for HPC; and key way route cracking risk at Hinkley Point B (HPB).
- 6.4 **Response:** MF commented that ONR has sought assurance from NNB Genco that problems which affected forgings at Flamenville will not occur at HPC. Also commented on the experience of the UK supply chain in working on site and to nuclear standards. He added that EDF have many trained operators who will soon begin moving over to HPC project. MF confirmed ONR is monitoring closely key way root cracking at HPB and Hunterston B. He explained that ONR has world leading experts in graphite cracking and will look very closely at inspection results and justifications put forward by operators.
- 6.5 A separate question regarding a change from wet to dry storage at HPC was raised, which MF agreed to respond to outside of the meeting.
- 6.6 **Question/Comment:** Trish Whitham (TW) asked for an update on the 'ground rules' for NGO forum meetings.
- 6.7 **Response:** AK referred to the group's Terms of Reference (ToR). PB commented that we seem to have lost track with these. An action taken for the co-chairs to review ToR.
- 6.8 AK and JS closed meeting by thanking all attendees for their contributions throughout the day

**Action 18.14** – NGO forum members to confirm to Adrienne Kelbie who they would like to nominate to co-chair future meetings.



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**Action 18.15** - Co-chairs to review forum ToR for application in future meetings

**Action 18.16** – ONR to provide further information on the proposal for waste originally intended for wet storage at HPC to be stored in dry storage.

**Action 18.17** – Priority topics list to be updated with suggestions put forward following discussion (para 6.2) with recommendations on how these could be addressed (e.g. via future meetings, webinars, in correspondence etc). NGOs to review and feedback to Dr Jill Sutcliffe how they would like topics discussed. Co-chairs to jointly consider proposals and agree forward plan for the 18/19 year.

**Action 18.18** - ONR to publish 21 March 2018 meeting agenda and papers, where appropriate, and meeting minutes.