Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Withdrawal notifications for 2016

Information on advance notifications of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made in 2016 is shown in the table below. Data are shown in the same format as provided previously. The withdrawals involved material used as radiological shielding or small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers or for research and development.

Summary of Notifications of Withdrawals from Safeguards (1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016).

Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 Reason for withdrawal
Four notifications involving plutonium (Pu), total mg quantities One notification involving plutonium only and three other notifications which also involved mg quantities of uranium and/or thorium for use in analysis (e.g. as samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) from organisations that provide  standards/tracers and/or nuclear material for instrument calibration2
10 notifications involving high enriched uranium (HEU), total ~ 2g Nine notifications for material contained in radiation detectors2 (from a company that manufactures radiation detectors) and one other notification for use in analysis/analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and in instrument calibration)2 which also  involved mg quantities of depleted uranium and thorium
Twenty nine notifications involving depleted uranium (DU), total ~ 570kg, three notifications involving thorium (Th), mg quantities, and one notification involving natural uranium, total ~ 282g Twenty nine notifications for depleted uranium as shielding containers3.
Three notifications involving thorium and uranium and one notification involving the return of natural uranium sources for instrument calibration2

Notes

  1. the tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by ONR Safeguards and which resulted in the withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.
  2. there are no facilities outside safeguards that have material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.
  3. the advance notifications of withdrawal for depleted uranium shielded containers were for temporary withdrawals, the containers being used during the replacement of spent radioactive sources at UK defence establishments.