Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Withdrawal notifications for 2015

Information on advance notifications of withdrawals of nuclear material from safeguards made in 2015 is shown in the table below. Data are shown in the same format as provided previously. The withdrawals involved material used as radiological shielding or small quantities of material for use in instrument calibration or radiation detectors, or as analytical tracers or for research and development.

Table: Summary of Notifications of Withdrawals from Safeguards (1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015)

Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 Reason for withdrawal
Nine notifications involving plutonium (Pu), µg quantities Five notifications involving plutonium, µg quantities. Four notifications, which also involved mg quantities of natural uranium, thorium, depleted uranium and high enriched uranium for use in analysis (e.g. as samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) from organisations that provides standards/tracers and/or nuclear material for instrument calibration2
There were no withdrawals of high enriched uranium (HEU) Not applicable
Eighteen notifications involving depleted uranium (DU), total ~ 276 kg and two notifications involving thorium (Th), µg quantities Sixteen notifications for depleted uranium as shielding containers3
Two notifications for depleted uranium for use in analysis/analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration)2 and two other notifications involving thorium2, µg quantities


  1. tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by ONR Safeguards and which resulted in the withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards.
  2. there are no facilities outside safeguards that have material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.
  3. the advance notifications of withdrawal for depleted uranium shielded containers were for temporary withdrawals, the containers being used during the replacement of spent radioactive sources at UK defence establishments.