Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 2 events follow-up intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to investigate and follow-up on a number of events that have occurred at the EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (NGL) Heysham 2 Power Station during the past few months. Normally this activity is combined with inspection but due to COVID-19 precautions time on site is currently minimised.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

I, the nominated Heysham 2 site inspector, undertook a walk down of areas associated with a recent nuclear safety event, where the reactor was started with one of the three types of flux detector unavailable. This will inform an investigation into this event. Whilst at site I took the opportunity to follow-up two separate conventional safety events and judge the measures that the site was adopting in relation to Covid-19. 

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

A system-based inspection was not performed.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The walk down and discussions with staff in relation to a recent nuclear safety event provided additional clarity on the details of the event to aid the investigation.

A walk-down of the area where a recent high potential fall from height was reported showed the physical improvements to the protection that had been made and provided insight as to why the contractor had taken the actions that led to the unsafe act.

Site is making good progress in carrying out an electrical cable survey to determine any potential electrical safety issues following the discovery of a live 240v cable with inappropriate protection (only insulation tape).

The site has made significant changes to protect the workforce and reduce the risk of Covid-19 transmission whilst on site. Examples include a significant reduction of the number of personnel physically on site; installation of personnel temperature monitoring equipment; an increased cleaning regime; increased hand sanitiser stations; social distancing modifications and provision of PPE if required.

Conclusion of Intervention

The findings of this intervention were communicated verbally to Heysham 2 management. There were no issues raised from this inspection and there were no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.  At present, no additional regulatory action is needed over and above closing out the on-going investigation into the log / lin flux detector event and the planned interventions at Heysham 2 power station as set out in the 2020/21 Integrated Intervention Strategy.