Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Planned Intervention at Magnox Ltd’s Wylfa licensed site, undertaken as part of a series of planned interventions outlined in the ONR Integrated Intervention Strategy Plan Wylfa Power Station 2014/2015

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

Planned intervention at Magnox Ltd’s Wylfa licensed site, undertaken as part of a series of planned interventions outlined in the ONR Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) Plan Wylfa Power Station 2014/2015.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

Planned compliance inspections of Licence Condition 10 ‘Training’ and 36 ‘Organisational Capability’ were undertaken.

A number of meetings were held to discuss future work plans to inform ONR resource bids for the remainder of 2014/15 and 2015/16. These included the Periodic Safety Review (PSR), Post Generation Defuelling Safety Case (PGDSC), Management of Change for the station defueling staff structure and the return to service of Secondary Dry Store Cell 5 (SDSC5).

An inspection of the turbine basement was undertaken with some of the station safety representatives.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No safety system based inspections were undertaken during this intervention.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

On the basis of the inspection of Licence Condition 36 (LC36) arrangements, I am content to consider removal of the Approval of Wylfa LC36 arrangements in order to enable more flexible delivery of defueling and decommissioning subject to site arrangements being revised to ensure compliance with Nuclear Industry Code of Practice (NICOP) and LC36. Wylfa’s current draft arrangements require additional detail to address the organisational capability requirements of LC36 (focus is on management of change). The draft arrangements also require detail to support a more dynamic organisational structure anticipated for post generation operations and is currently suited to a static structure. Wylfa clearly recognises the gaps and should seek to address these immediately. Despite the enhancements required in the sites documented arrangements it is recognised that current practices are consistent with regulatory expectations and compliance is considered to be adequate.  I judge that the L36 element of this inspection is adequate and as a result I have scored it as 3 (adequate) through the IIS.

The overall impression formed from the inspection of Wylfa’s improvements for specific aspects of Licence Condition 10 is that Magnox Ltd is making slow progress with addressing improvements to show that adequate training records exist to support the demonstration that station operators are suitably qualified and experienced. While fundamental requirements are met, there are some specific procedural weaknesses identified and examples of failure to follow procedures.  I judge that the LC10 element of this inspection is below standard and as a result I have scored it as 4 (below standard) through the IIS and ONR Issue 762 remains open. 

The various meetings undertaken to examine anticipated permissioning activities over the next 18 months provided clarity of the tasks required to manage the transition from the generation phase of operations to the defueling phase at Wylfa. ONR will develop suitable scopes for tasks in order to identify potential resource to support the expected permissioning and inspection activities during this period of transition.

The inspection of the turbine basement provided a useful engagement with Wylfa safety representatives who demonstrated a good understanding of current health and safety expectations and confidence to address potential problems identified.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change to the planned interventions and inspections of Wylfa power station.