The purpose of this intervention was to conduct system based and compliance inspections of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s Torness Power Station in relation to emergency equipment and emergency preparedness. This was undertaken as part of a series of planned interventions that are listed in the Torness Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) 2014/2015. The inspection was undertaken by the ONR Nominated Site Inspector with technical support provided by an Emergency Preparedness Specialist.
As part of this intervention, I (the nominated site inspector) carried out a system based inspection (SBI) of the Emergency Equipment, including the arrangements in place for the provision and stock of relevant equipment. Through examination of this system compliance inspections were performed against Licence Conditions (LC) LC 10 (training), LC23 (operating rules), LC24 (operating instructions), LC27 (safety mechanisms, devices and circuits), LC28 (examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) and LC34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste). The inspections were based on sampling the implementation of the arrangements in place at the station against each licence condition.
In addition, this intervention involved a thorough review of the emergency plan and handbook that are in place at Torness in accordance with LC11 (emergency arrangements) as these are essential in identifying requirements that are applicable to the emergency equipment.
From this inspection, I judge that overall the safety provisions applicable to the emergency equipment meet the requirements of the safety case and are adequate.
An SBI of the emergency equipment was carried out to judge the adequacy of the implementation of the station arrangements in place to ensure that relevant equipment can perform its’ requisite safety function. In deciding whether this safety system has been adequately implemented, I inspected compliance with a number of licence conditions. The standard consideration of licence conditions during system based inspections includes LCs 10, 23, 24, 28 and 34, with conditions added or excluded depending on their applicability. In this case, LC27 and LC34 that relate to safety mechanisms, circuits and devices and leakage/escape of radioactive material and waste, respectively, were not applicable to the emergency equipment and therefore have been deemed not applicable to this inspection.
During the course of this system based inspection it was found that Torness has made arrangements to ensure that emergency equipment is maintained and, as necessary, operated in accordance with its safety case and the arrangements are deemed to be implemented in an adequate manner, on the basis of those areas sampled by the inspection. The inspection identified a number of areas for potential improvement, and although none gave rise to significant concern, the station has agreed to take action to address them.
In summary, the outcome from the system based inspection of the emergency equipment is that the arrangements and their implementation are deemed to be adequate, and therefore I have given IIS ratings of 3 (adequate) in respect of LCs 10, 23, 24 and 28.
Additionally, in terms of LC11 it was found that all personnel interviewed, documentation sampled and all emergency facilities inspected demonstrated a good level of compliance with the arrangements at Torness. I therefore judged that overall the inspection of merited an IIS rating of 2 (good).
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
After considering all the evidence examined during the sample inspections undertaken against LCs 10, 23, 24 and 28, it was considered that the emergency equipment met the requirements of the safety case. Also, this intervention found a good level of compliance with the LC11 arrangements in terms of the demonstration provided throughout this intervention on the implementation and use of the emergency plan and handbook.
There are no findings from this intervention that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.