Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Torness - Planned Intervention - SBI19 (H&V Systems)

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections at EDF Nuclear Generation Limited's (NGL) Torness (TOR) power station in line with the inspection programme contained in the TOR Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) Plan for 2014/15. This compliance inspection and information exchange meetings were carried out by a specialist mechanical engineering inspector and the Nominated Site Inspector.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

We undertook a safety case informed system-based inspection of the Heating and Ventilation (H&V) systems [SBI19] at TOR. The inspection sampled compliance against several licence conditions, specifically LC10 (Training), LC23 (Operating Rules), LC24 (Operating Instructions), LC27 (Safety Mechanisms, Devices and Circuits), LC28 (Examination, Inspection, Maintenance and Testing) and LC34 (Leakage and Escape of Radioactive Material and Radioactive Waste).

The objective of this system-based inspection of the H&V systems was to determine whether the licensee's arrangements for plant operational limits, plant maintenance schedules, staff training requirements and inspection plans were adequate in accordance with safety case requirements.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Inspectors judged that the arrangements and their implementation, associated with H&V Systems, met the requirements of the safety case and are adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

In respect of LC10, staff training records and profiles for station staff sampled were judged to be in accordance with the post training profile requirements. Therefore, we judged the LC10 element of this inspection to be adequate, warranting an associated IIS rating of 3 - Adequate.

In respect of LC23 and LC24, based on the evidence sampled during this inspection, the implementation of relevant technical specifications, commentaries, and schedules were judged to be consistent with the claims presented within the TOR Station Safety Report (SSR) for the H&V and associated systems. The licensee demonstrated adequate knowledge and understanding in the areas of the safety case and how they relate to the operating rules and instructions in place for the H&V systems. We judged the LC23 and LC24 element of this inspection to be adequate, warranting an IIS rating of 3 - Adequate.

In respect of LC27 and LC28, the licensee demonstrated adequate processes, procedures and records in place for safety mechanisms and the examination, inspection, maintenance and testing of plant which may affect safety. Several samples were taken and suitable records were produced for each sample. We judged the LC28 compliance element of this inspection to be adequate, warranting an associated IIS rating of 3 - Adequate.

In respect of LC34, the licensee demonstrated that containment is being appropriately maintained and that radioactive material and waste management is in compliance with the licensee's arrangements. We consider that the LC34 element of this inspection to be adequate, warranting an associated IIS rating of 3 - Adequate.

The licence conditions were inspected against ONR's published guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides).

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence sampled, witnessed and collected during the inspection against LCs 10, 23, 24, 27, 28 and 34, the mechanical engineering and control and instrumentation aspects for this system based inspection meet the requirements of the safety case and its implementation is considered adequate.

A number of observations were made as a result of this system-based inspection associated with the routine maintenance of the H&V systems which have been raised and will be addressed as part of the licensee's condition reporting and corrective action process. However, given that they are of minor nuclear safety significance, we are content that they will be addressed by the licensee in accordance with their own arrangements. There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.