Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Inspection of C&I Equipment at Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station to Determine Continued Suitability to Control Risks

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This Intervention Record covers a Control and Instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as a part of an ONR Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) intervention applicable to EDF Nuclear Generation Ltd (EDFNGL) during the Refuelling Outage 13 (RO13) at Sizewell B (SZB) Power Station. The main focus of my inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that this remains fit for its intended purpose at SZB.

During my inspection, I covered a wide range of C&I equipment and activities associated with nuclear safety, including neutron flux detectors, maintenance and test procedures, modifications (including those to the polar crane), and the site response to events.

In order to gather evidence that C&I equipment is in a suitable condition, and that activities are being carried out adequately, I asked questions of station personnel, sampled documents, and performed physical inspections. I have recorded these activities in this report.

Following my inspection I am content that the C&I equipment is in a suitable condition for continued operation, and that this is being adequately supported by appropriate processes and documentation.

I have raised a number of actions following my inspection. These are recorded in this report. None of the actions I have raised need to be closed prior to restart of the reactor.

Purpose of Intervention

This Intervention Record covers a Control and Instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as a part of an ONR Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) intervention applicable to EDF Nuclear Generation Ltd (EDFNGL) during the Refuelling Outage 13 (RO13) at Sizewell B (SZB) Power Station. The main focus of my inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that this remains fit for its intended purpose at SZB.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This inspection was made in support of ONR’s 2014 Statutory Outage inspection programme. The outcome of this inspection, which included a review of progress made in various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at SZB, covered EDF NGL’s arrangements under Licence Conditions 22 (Modification or experiment on existing plant), 27 (Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits) and 28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). This is intended to provide a contribution towards ONR’s regulatory decision as to whether a Consent in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown) should be issued to allow SZB to return to normal operating service.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

I judge that evidence gathered through the sampling of documents during and after the inspection, and inspection of equipment and devices, is sufficient to demonstrate that the C&I aspects of the safety devices and mechanisms remain adequate to control risk.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

This report presents the findings of C&I inspection activities carried out during the RO13 refuelling outage at SZB Power Station. These activities have included review of the Outage Intentions Document (OID), inspection of outage related maintenance activities and inspection of outcomes following relevant events notified to ONR since the last C&I outage inspection in May 2013. My inspection of the C&I related work activities covered during this intervention has, generally, found that the standards of workmanship applied was adequate and consistent with the standards expected from C&I Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP).

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this C&I-based intervention, I believe there are no significant matters that may impact on nuclear safety. I have not identified any significant issues in relation to the C&I equipment and systems that should prevent ONR from issuing Consent to allow SZB to restart.