Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Hunterston B planned inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake inspections and information exchange meetings at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s [NGL’s] Hunterston B [HNB] power station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the HNB Integrated Intervention Strategy [IIS].

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

As part of this intervention, I held undertook a review of lessons learned from the Reactor 4 statutory outage. I undertook a planned compliance inspection against Licence Condition 11 during which I participated in an annual review of emergency arrangements. I represented ONR at an annual information exchange meeting with   l’Inspecteur Général pour la Sûreté Nucléaire [IGSN] to give ONR’s view on fleet safety performance. I met with the head of Independent Nuclear Assurance [INA] for Region 1 to discuss INA’s initial proposals for influencing appropriate learning from recent outage related events across the fleet.  

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No safety case informed system based inspection was undertaken during this intervention.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I presented to Hunterston B my perspective on the quality of ONR-NGL interactions during the Reactor 4 statutory outage, and the extent to which lessons learned from previous outage seasons had been addressed.

I undertook a compliance inspection against Licence Condition 11, and made the following judgements for compliance [the inspection excluded aspects of LC11(5) since the Level 1 demonstration is scheduled for March 2015]:

I represented ONR at a meeting with the l’Inspecteur Général pour la Sûreté Nucléaire [IGSN]. I presented an update on developments in ONR since vesting as a statutory corporation and an overall perspective on the safety performance of EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd.

I met with the head of Independent Nuclear Assurance [INA] for Region 1 to discuss INA’s initial proposals for influencing appropriate learning from recent outage related events across the fleet. INA has proposed an outline programme of work to influence promulgation of fleet learning in time for a busy 2015 outage season:

In my opinion, INA has proposed credible initial proposals by which to influence learning from the recent outage related event at Hunterston B. INA has committed to develop these proposals in greater detail in time for the next Regulatory Interface Meeting. ONR oversight of INA’s work should form an integral component of further regulatory intervention in light of the recent gas circulator event at Hunterston B.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

I am satisfied that the arrangements and their implementation at Hunterston B for LC11 are to a good standard and judge that the outcome of the sample inspection undertaken met with the expectations detailed within ONR guidance.  I have therefore rated this element of my intervention an Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) rating of 2, good.