Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Hinkley Point B - Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd.'s (NGL's) Hinkley Point B power station, undertaken as part of the planned intervention strategy for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

The work was carried out in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hinkley Point B Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

Two ONR electrical inspectors, the NGL Independent Nuclear Assurance (INA) inspector, the ONR nominated site inspector for Hinkley Point A and I (the nominated site inspector for Hinkley Point B) carried out a system based inspection of the short break electrical power supplies.

I carried out a compliance inspection on LC36 (organisational capability), reviewed the ONR issues database, met with the internal regulator and held information gathering meetings with NGL.

The licence conditions were inspected against ONR's published guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides).

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

The short break electrical power systems were judged to meet the requirements of the safety case and were adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The ONR and NGL INA team carried out a system based inspection of the short break electrical power systems and concluded that:

The management of the electrical system by the Licensee was good with respect to LC10 (training), LC23 (operating rules) and LC24 (operating instructions). Evidence was provided of effective management of these areas. We rated these elements of the inspection through the IIS as 2 (Good).

The arrangements for LC27 (safety mechanisms, devices and circuits) were considered to be adequate. We rated this element of the inspection through the IIS as 3 (Adequate).

The arrangements for LC28 (examination, maintenance, inspection and testing) were considered to be adequate. We rated this element of the inspection through the IIS as 3 (Adequate).

LC34 (leakage and escape of radioactive material) did not apply to this inspection.

Overall we considered that the short break electrical power systems met the requirements of the safety case and were adequate

I carried out a compliance inspection of LC36 (organisational capability) and concluded that good arrangements were in place regarding human resources and the management of organisational change. I rated this element of my inspection through the IIS as 2 (Good).

I reviewed the ONR issues database, met with the site internal regulator to discuss recent events, ongoing inspections and future intervention topics. I held information gathering meetings with station staff on a range of topics including the recent failure of a section of Nitrogen pipework, the revision of the Technical Specification relating to the kerosene storage tanks, graphite core inspections at Hunterston B and the proposed extension to the Reactor 4 operating period.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence sampled during the SBI inspection against LCs 10, 23, 24, 27, and 28 for the short break electrical power systems I consider that the requirements of the safety case have been adequately implemented at Hinkley Point B.

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety. No actions were raised during this inspection.